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ABSTRACT

THE RHETORICAL TURN IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY PRAXIS:
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2.0

By
Randy Edward Cole, Jr.
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Pat Arneson
While discourse and rhetoric has always been a part of traditional diplomacy,
rhetoric and communication theory has not enjoyed an active voice in the scholarship of
foreign relations, and more specifically, public diplomacy. This project argues that a
postmodern turn in public diplomacy was formalized in the State Department‘s 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and that two specific
directives laid out therein—to expand and strengthen relationships between individuals
and steer the narrative—can find theoretical ground in communication scholarship. After
examining the mid-to-late 20th century shift from specialized modern policy training to a
rhetorical public diplomacy that views diplomats as generalists engaging members of
varied, local publics, Pearce and Cronen‘s Coordinated Management of Meaning and the
narrative work of Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Fisher, Arnett, and Arneson carve out a place for
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communication scholarship in the academic study of diplomacy and foreign relations. A
case study of the State Department‘s community diplomacy initiatives in Northern
Ireland are examined as a core tactic of what I call ―public diplomacy 2.0‖—postmodern
public diplomacy attentive to rhetoric and communication. This work rests on the
premise that philosophy of communication and rhetorical scholarship is central to good
public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern world.
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INSCRIPTION

But often, in the world‘s most crowded streets,
But often, in the din of strife,
There rises an unspeakable desire
After the knowledge of our buried life;
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force
In tracking out our true, original course;
A longing to inquire
Into the mystery of this heart which beats
So wild, so deep in us—to know
Whence our lives come and where they go. (Matthew Arnold, The Buried Life)
__________
Lord, make me an instrument of your peace.
Where there is hatred, let me sow love;
Where there is injury, pardon;
Where there is doubt, faith;
Where there is darkness, light;
And where there is sadness, joy.
O Divine Master, grant that I may not so much seek
To be consoled as to console;
To be understood as to understand;
To be loved as to love! (St. Francis of Assisi)
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CHAPTER 1
History of the State, Public(s), Diplomacy, and Public Diplomacy
Prior to the end of World War II, diplomacy in the United States and in the West
generally, occupied a space close to power politics, whereby a nation‘s interests were
largely achieved by policy makers and diplomats dealing directly with members of a
foreign government. With the rise of radio, television, and the relative ease of travel,
direct communication from members of the diplomatic establishment, such as the
Department of State, to members of foreign publics began to take a more prominent
place.
The term ―public diplomacy‖ was coined in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion at
Tufts University‘s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and marked a rhetorical turn in
diplomacy to engage a postmodern world. Public diplomacy can be defined as
communication from policy makers in a government directly to members of foreign
publics, including media relations, cultural education programs and cultural exchange
programs. Public diplomacy, however, still engaged increasingly postmodern publics in a
largely modern model, mostly assuming a homogenous foreign public sphere and
engaging members of that singular public with mass communications. Traditional
diplomacy, on the other hand, is formal communication between people representing
governments, including policy negotiation.
While discourse and rhetoric has always been a part of traditional diplomacy,
rhetoric and communication theory has not enjoyed an active voice in the scholarship of
foreign relations, and more specifically, public diplomacy. This project argues that a
postmodern turn in public diplomacy was formalized in the State Department‘s 2010
1

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and that two specific
directives laid out therein—to expand interpersonal relationships and steer the
narrative—can find theoretical ground in communication scholarship (United States
Department of State and United States Agency on International Development). This
project rests on the premise that a first rhetorical turn in American diplomacy praxis was
made in the 1960s with the rise of public diplomacy and its formalization as an element
of American diplomacy. Hillary Rodham Clinton‘s tenure as Secretary of State marked a
second rhetorical turn in American diplomacy toward postmodern public diplomacy. Her
work called for increasing person-to-person engagement as well as taking part in shaping
foreign narratives. While these efforts were implicit in the public diplomacy practice in
the 20th century, Rodham Clinton recognized the need to narrowcast to particular
vernacular publics in a postmodern world instead of by way of modern policy
communications media like radio broadcasts and large national cultural programs. Her
public diplomacy included an expanded new level: the direct rhetorical engagement of
public diplomacy professionals with members of particular, situated petite postmodern
publics.
Rodham Clinton saw foreign publics in a postmodern light. Against a modernist,
monolithic conception of the public sphere, by which public diplomacy would engage via
mass media broadcasts and other nationwide forms of communication in foreign
countries, Rodham Clinton recognized a need to engage multiple publics in a postmodern
moment. The issuing of the inaugural QDDR called for more attention on the behalf of
diplomats interacting directly with members of foreign publics. Public diplomacy 2.0, as
this project terms Rodham Clinton‘s advance, calls for direct interaction between
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diplomats and members of local foreign publics, both informally and in community
diplomacy programs as a specific tactic of public diplomacy 2.0.
This trend in the American diplomacy establishment as formulated by Rodham
Clinton moves away from the modern conception of public, to a Hauserian conception of
―vernacular voices,‖ those localized and emergent publics in a given rhetorical situation
as a new rhetorical iteration in the history of American diplomacy. From an early Greek
conception of the public sphere through medieval courts and fiefdoms, to the
Enlightenment bourgeois public sphere as a result of the printing press and growth of the
modern monolithic nation-state, to a postmodern rendering of localized, vernacular
publics in a postmodern state, the idea of public(s) has undergone great rhetorical
maintenance and change. Engaging a postmodern conception of the public sphere, the
QDDR will greatly benefit from a communicative theoretical approach to American
diplomacy overseas, and in particular, public diplomacy.
This chapter will trace the philosophical roots and evolution of the state in the
West, the public(s), diplomacy and public diplomacy by examining each of the four terms
in antiquity, the medieval period, the Enlightenment, and modernity. Engaging the work
of Aristotle, Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Jürgen Habermas, John Dewey, and
others, this chapter will situate the major terms of this project for a postmodern
engagement of public diplomacy.
The Western Nation-State
The federal nation-state as it exists in the West today has undergone significant
rhetorical changes since its earliest form, resulting in what most westerners today would
recognize as a nation with defined boundaries, large land masses, and relatively uniform
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language and cultural customs. The construction of a political state in the West has its
roots in ancient Greece. According to J.K. Davies in Democracy and Classical Greece,
constitutional forms of communal government existed in Greece by 478 B.C.E. ―Such
authoritarian or non-accountable governments as had existed had by now been generally
repudiated in favour of constitutional forms, however rudimentary and oligarchic‖ (13).
These constitutional forms consisted of fixed, if not written, codes of law, as well as a
sovereign governmental unit—the city-state. The city-state was defined, according to
Davies, ―not in terms of an area or a set of people unified simply by being ruled over by a
monarch through dynastic inheritance or amalgamation or force of arms, but in terms
partly of geographical unity and partly of the participation of all the citizens in some real
or fictional kinship—or descent-group structure‖ (13). Two structures defined the early
city-state: geographical unity and kinship structure.
While the city-state had been established and remained consistent in antiquity,
Oswyn Murray in Early Greece offers that ―the powers apportioned to the different
elements and the criteria for membership … varied in different periods. In early Greece
an assembly of all adult male members of the community (the agora or gathering) was
subordinate to the boule (council) of the elders‖ (56). As Greek political rationale
continued to develop, and as a sense of community developed based on reason and
justice, early democracy appeared in classical Greece.
Murray notes that the polis ―is a conceptual entity, a specific type of political and
social organization ... [and] the polis is also a process of urbanization‖ (63). As political
rationality and urban communal life emerged, the city-state became an increasingly
complex form of political organization in early western liberal democracy. At this point,
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Greek philosophers begin to deal with political organization as a topic of social concern
for human life together.
Aristotle offered a starting point for conceptualizing the state from a rhetorical
framework. Aristotle defined three branches of science, organized by their outcomes:
contemplative, practical, and productive science. Politics and the ordering of the state
belong to the practical sciences and had as its end the governance and happiness of those
in the city-state (Miller). Like rhetoric, politics had a practical use for Aristotle. Against
the Platonic philosopher-king, Aristotle advocated for rule through rhetorical decision—
the power of the better argument (Aristotle, The Rhetoric). The Greek conception of the
state remained intact in iterations, including in the Platonic medieval court on the
European continent, for centuries.
As antiquity gave way to the medieval period on the European continent, the way
in which the political form of the state was constructed began to change from the
classical Greek conception. In his discussion of the medieval state, Joseph Strayer
identified key elements of the medieval state that are recognizable in today‘s western
liberal democracies. These include persistence in time; fixation in space; permanent,
impersonal institutions; agreement on the need for an authority with power to make final
decisions; and acceptance of the idea that subjects should give loyalty to that authority.
Acknowledging the political structure of the Greek polis in antiquity, as well as the
Roman Empire, medieval Europe produced the first and most influential models of
political organization in this pre-modern mode. Moreover, according to Gerard Hauser,
―The church was an alternative institution autonomous of the state whose dogma led the
faithful to organize their individual lives around a different set of principles and ideals
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than political ones‖ (21). As the state‘s power and prominence in life grew in the
Enlightenment and modernity, the church‘s power waned.
―Medieval Christian society, at least in theory, was universal in extent. On the
political side, the Holy Roman Empire proclaimed its own universality, ignoring local
and dynastic particularism‖ (Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages 487). Medieval
political organization was not based on the nation-state, but on local fiefdoms and
dynasties, which had relatively little political power in comparison to the political
hegemony of the Catholic Church. Whereas the papacy had enjoyed relatively
unchallenged political power on the European continent for centuries, the emerging
monarchies in the late Middle Ages began to reorganize the conventional political
landscape. ―In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the growth of national states
dwarfed the power of the papacy, and the popes often became tools of royal policy
instead of the reverse. The power of the papacy was one of the first casualties of the
growth of national monarchies‖ (Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages 488). As print
technology began to take hold on the continent around this time, the Church saw
centuries of unchallenged doctrine falter as the printing press remade patterns of political
conversation among a growing literate class.
In History of Western Civilization, John L. Beatty and Oliver A. Johnson note that
in late medievalism, ―demands of national power … were given precedence over
religious convictions‖ (3). As Europe witnessed the rise of the modern, more secularized
nation-state out of the medieval courts and church, nation-states consolidated,
centralizing power, and this power increasingly became personalized in the head of the
government—the monarch. Mercantilism as an economic force ―deployed the economic
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activities of the country to enhance the power of the state, particularly in rivalry with the
other states of Europe‖ (4). As European colonialism provided an engine for mercantilist
economics, the rise of the capitalism and industrialism in the 18 th century gave rise to the
modern nation-state in the west.
By 1500, Europe was gaining visibility in both internal connectedness and world
importance. Strayer argues that a decisive shift toward the northwest occurred around
1500 where the French and English monarchies were growing in power. With the advent
of the printing press and its prominence in that part of Europe, the structure of the state
began to change as uniform political ideas, language, and cultural texts began to be
spread over larger distances (Eisenstein). Literacy rates grew and books became common
in late medieval Europe. At this point, the medieval state was largely governed by kings
and courts as the alternative to the Catholic Church, and structured around smaller
geographical areas. Medieval fiefdoms and dynasties gave way to the larger nation-states
of modernity.
Jurgen Habermas argues that the Enlightenment concept of state marked a change
from the Greek conception of the public sphere. As towns took over the functions of the
medieval court, the institutions of the coffee house and salon strengthened the role of
towns. Common people, because of economic and political change, were now franchised
in the public function of life. The coffee houses and salons were centers of literary and
political criticism where rational-critical debate was engaged (Structural
Transformation).
Habermas notes that the political public sphere developed in Britain at the turn of
the 18th century when the landed gentry formed the Parliament (House of Lords). The
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literary public sphere became political on the continent when capitalism entered an
advanced state. Because of the presupposition that capitalism could operate free from the
government and that it was self-regulating (an idea championed by the Scottish
Enlightenment and Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations), the bourgeois public sphere
believed in abolishing domination by the government. Instead, they believed that the role
of the state should be to make laws to protect the public sphere and economy, as well as
personal freedom, á la John Locke‘s Second Treatise on Civil Government (Structural
Transformation). The profound effects of the Enlightenment on the conception of the
nation-state became evident, as well as the nation-state‘s relation to the realm of
economics and the public. The idea of personal freedom also significantly influenced
western liberal democracy and brought it closer to how the public conceives of
democracy in the United States today.
In his chapter, ―The Social-Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,‖
Habermas argues that the public sphere began to decline in the modernity of the 19th
century. Gerard Hauser explains, ―Habermas finds the size and scope of the late modern
states problematic for the viability of the public sphere‖ (48). The industrial revolution
separated family from production (people left home to work on factories rather than
working on the farm) at the same time Europe was witnessing a move toward
protectionism as opposed to free trade. The state stepped in to alleviate poverty (a private,
not public, function in the Greek oikos) and create fair chances for the citizenry to thrive
in society. Consumption began to trump the rational-critical debate of the literary public
sphere of the 1800‘s, and society had to adapt to a less-educated public. Habermas is
concerned with the state in late modernity and its focus on consumption of goods over
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educated debate in the citizenry. John Dewey, however, sees the modern nation-state
differently.
The state in late modernity is a rhetorical, practical, and dynamic entity. Dewey
defines the state as ―the organization of the public effected through officials for the
protection of the interests shared by its members‖ (The Public and Its Problems 33). The
state serves a practical purpose for the public. ―The problem of discovering the state is
not a problem for theoretical inquirers engaged solely in surveying institutions which
already exist. It is a practical problem of human beings living in association with one
another, of mankind generically‖ (Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 32). As human
beings live in association with one another, they decide together through rhetoric and
deliberation the best course of action for their shared interests and common protection.
Dewey‘s practical and rhetorical definition of the modern state is based in the
Aristotelian notion of government. Aristotle defines government as a practical and
rhetorical construction in his Politics:
Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every
community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does
everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every
community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority
of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most
authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community (I.1.1252a1–
7).
The purpose of a government for Aristotle, like Dewey, was to protect the common good.
Deliberating over what the common good ought to be lies in the domain of rhetoric.
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The state and the public that constitutes it, because of its rhetorical nature, is dynamic.
Dewey holds that ―there is no a priori rule which can be laid down and by which when it
is followed a good state will be brought into existence. In no two ages or places is there
the same public. Conditions make the consequences of associated action and the
knowledge of them different‖ (33). The state is legitimized and given its power in the
West by the public and is by extension rhetorical, dynamic, and practical. The public is
engaged in the ongoing negotiation of what constitutes the good life for its situated
citizens living together in a particular society formed as political states (Aristotle,
Politics).
Dewey goes on to qualify the modern state as ―the organization of the public
effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members‖ (33).
Popular government, then, is unique to western modernity. Enlightenment individualism
gave rise to universal suffrage as in the United States today. Dewey argues that
democratic forms of government are a natural extension of Enlightenment philosophy:
The identification of democratic forms of government with this individualism was
easy. The right of suffrage represented for the mass a release of hitherto dormant
capacity and also, in appearance at least, a power to shape social relations on the
basis of individual volition. Popular franchise and majority rule afforded the
imagination a picture of individuals in their untrammeled individual sovereignty
making the state. To adherents and opponents alike it presented the spectacle of a
pulverizing of established associations into the desires and intentions of atomic
individuals (101).
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Liberal democracy has it modern roots in Enlightenment philosophy and the rise of
industry. With the rise of mercantilism and colonialism as economic and political
structures, and Enlightenment philosophy and the Industrial Revolution as cool, rational
movers, the modern nation-state‘s government with its impersonal, monolithic regulatory
body, is born.
With the Enlightenment also came the valorization of science and positivism as a
way of knowing the world. Francis Beer and Robert Hariman argue that the rise of
science and its effects on the conception and rhetorical construction of the modern
nation-state gave rise how members of a government effect international relations in
modernity:
This systematic inattention to the role of words in foreign affairs is the result of a
specific intellectual history that emphasized the material bases of international
politics as it ―really‖ was. Political realism, historically known as reason of state
… was linked to the modern valorization of the scientific method, the doctrine of
political realism became the dominant theory within the contemporary discipline
of international relations (Realism and Rhetoric 1).
Political realism, as the modern way nation-states engaged other sovereign nation-states,
is textured by an understanding of how the modern, western nation-state and liberal
democracy developed as part of a 2000-year history of western political and rhetorical
thought. As the idea of a rational-critical public grew out of the Enlightenment, the
western nation-state changed in new ways.
The evolution of the nation-state in the West has undergone marked philosophical
and structural changes as it contends with the particular needs of a people and their

11

philosophical and political concerns. From the early democratic structures in the citystates of Greece, through the fiefdoms of medieval Europe and the salons of
Enlightenment Europe, the modern nation-state emerged as the dominant form of
political structure in the West. In tandem with the development of the modern nationstate, the modern public is an invention that has deep philosophical roots in the Western
tradition, giving the public many of the characteristics that make a group of people
recognizable as a public to most westerners.
Public(s)
To understand ―public‖ across philosophical time periods in the West, Larry
Grossberg, et al. frame a historical definition of the concept:
In ordinary language, we think of public in a variety of ways. Among the most
common are the following: Public as the not-private, that which goes on in the
open, observable by and accessible to others, as in ―open to the public‖; Public as
general, pertaining to or emanating from all citizens, as in public interest or public
opinion; Public as communal, or governmentally owned or regulated, as in public
television or public utilities. Public implies openness, community, citizenship,
discussion, debate. (378)
This three-part definition provides a contemporary rendering of the term ―public‖ by
which to understand the history and evolution of the idea into the form commonly
thought of in the liberal democracies of the West today.
The idea of public is not a natural one discovered by the Greeks. Instead, public is
a rhetorical idea, created, maintained, and changed to order how people act together as a
whole in a given society. As Grossberg et al. note, ―Publics have to be created, they do
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not just arise, and what it means to be a public will change as historical circumstances
change‖ (379). Dating from the golden age of Greece, its contemporary manifestation
dates from the Enlightenment philosophy of the 1700s in Britain, Holland, and France.
Prior to 18th century Enlightenment, the contemporary conception of the public as a body
politic capable of expressing public opinion is virtually absent. Much as in ancient
Greece, medieval Europe was ruled as small kingdoms by coalitions of kings, feudal
lords, and the authority of the church (Ginsberg).
In ancient Greece, the public realm of the polis, state, city, or republic was the site
where people consent to or contest the laws, contracts, covenants, or principles of
community that govern personal and social conduct. For Aristotle, man is by nature an
animal intended to live in a polis, but the public sphere encapsulated very little of what
scholars in the contemporary West conceive of as public. For Aristotle, the public
excluded both economics (a private function in Greek life, from the Greek oikos,
meaning ―home,‖ and nomos) and individual identity (Politics). The public as recognized
in the West today—as political enfranchisement for all, or at least more—was born in the
salons and coffee shops of Paris and brought to fruition in the Enlightenment ideal of
individualism and the modern idea of progress.
Moreover, the political sphere in ancient Greece was not an entity apart from
public discussion. The ancient Greek tradition emphasized the role of the individual as a
public person. As Hauser notes, ―Without a buffer between social and political life—
since the political organized the social—Athenians had no need to conceptualize a public
sphere as a discursive arena apart from that of the legislative assembly‖ (19). Public life
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in ancient Greece was not bifurcated from political life until later time periods, as a result
of the invention of the printing press and the evolution of democracy as a concept.
In medieval Europe, prior to the rise of the printing press and the Renaissance,
political structures in Europe looked scarcely as they do today. Marketplaces, and with
them the marketplaces of ideas, remained local and in vernacular languages. Small
kingdoms and feudal societies provided the political life of Europe. Prior to the printing
press, a robust public life in which an emergent, literate class discussed common ideas
and the news of the day in print, was unable to exist (Eisenstein).
Evolving social structures also provided an alternative to the Greek conception of
the political citizen:
Both the church and the estates provided a sense of social identity apart from
citizenship. They provided a mode of social organization apart from the state in
which members could engage in discourse unregulated by the state. They also
caused great instability to states, which eventually provided support for the
doctrine of absolute monarchy as the only viable mode of governance. An
absolute monarch could raise money and armies independently, thereby
dispensing with the need to convene the estates in order to be militarily effective
(Hauser 21).
The medieval understanding of society was undermined by an Enlightenment conception
of the state.
In tracing the medieval public sphere into the Enlightenment and modernity,
Habermas, notes that the public sphere in the West has its roots in the Aristotelian notion
of phronesis or practical wisdom (Theory and Practice). Phronesis, or ―prudence, or
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practical wisdom, is the preeminent political virtue in the Aristotelian lexicon‖ (Farrell
146). Farrell goes on to extend the notion of Aristotelian phronesis for the public sphere
by arguing that ―the deliberative practice of rhetoric might go so far as to cultivate
practical wisdom as a relational good for those membership groups and collectivities that
are called to decide and act on civic matters‖ (146).
In the medieval period, the idea of a critical public sphere undergoes a marked
changed at the hands of political figures Niccolo Machiavelli of Italy and Thomas More
of England. The two men fundamentally altered the concept of the public when they
substituted phronesis for techne in terms of a practical reason (Habermas, Theory and
Practice). For Machiavelli, ―the skill of acquiring and preserving power does indeed
result from a transferring of workmanlike techne to a domain of praxis till then reserved
for phronesis‖ (59-60). In line with the Machiavellian maxim that the ―ends justify the
means,‖ for political leaders the public in the late Middle Ages became a matter of
technique to accomplish an end instead of the Greek conception of practical wisdom.
After the medieval period, the critical rationality of Enlightenment Europe
underwent a change (Habermas, Theory and Practice). ―Enlightenment thinkers such as
Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, had reintroduced the idea that humankind forms a
community of sorts constituted under natural law and in existence prior to society, which
is itself prior to the government‖ (Hauser 21). As towns took over the functions of the
medieval court, the institutions of the coffee house and the salon were centers of literary
and political criticism. An emergent, literate class, because of economic and political
change, was now franchised in the public function of life. Habermas argues:
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The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor (Structural
Transformation 27).
He also discusses the process by which the public sphere, which had been to that point
governed by the state, was taken over by groups of private people. Using their reason,
private individuals established public authority through the institutions that were already
in place, like universities and salons, which acted as forums for discussion.
After Habermas lays out what the public sphere is, he lays out its intellectual
foundations, stemming from Locke and Immanuel Kant, among others. Habermas cites
Kant‘s idea that publicity is a mechanism to unite morality and politics, but the public
itself must learn to use collective reason. Kant's discussion of the Enlightenment centered
on people emerging from self-incurred intellectual infancy to think for themselves.
Kant‘s project sought to reconcile the phenomenal and metaphysical in a world of
Newtonian science and Cartesian rationalism. Kant argued that people could only know
what was phenomenal—metaphysics, as it has no evidence, could not be known.
Morality then becomes an issue. Whereas one could not know for certain that God exists,
they still must believe that God exists in order to act morally. Belief is justified, then,
both on a moral and practical basis (Tarnas). Kant distinguished clearly between faith and
certifiable knowledge. For Kant, what is right lies beyond scientific verifiability.
Rightness is a matter of belief or opinion—the idea that lies at the root of the bourgeois
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conception of public opinion in Habermas‘ account. ―The self-interpretation of the
function of the bourgeois public sphere crystallized in the idea of ‗public opinion‘‖
(Structural Transformation 89). Habermas‘ argument is that the public sphere, the
Enlightenment, and capitalism share the same philosophical roots in the Kantian doctrine
of the right.
In political philosophy, social contract theory originated during the Enlightenment
and typically addresses the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the
authority of the state over the individual. Social contract arguments typically posit that
individuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their
freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler (or to the decision of a majority) in
exchange for protection of their remaining rights (Gough). The question of the relation
between natural and legal rights, therefore, is often an aspect of social contract theory
from the Enlightenment onward.
In Locke‘s Second Treatise on Government, he argued that the natural rights of
humankind—personal liberty chief among them—are inalienable and that the
government has no authority over those areas. Habermas‘s conception was that the
literate public sphere used rational-critical debate as a mechanism to hold government‘s
power in check from intervening in personal freedom and natural rights.
The concept of an Enlightenment public sphere was problematic for the
government, as Charles Taylor has noted:
[public opinion] developed outside the channels and public spaces of any
authority whatever, since it is also independent of that second focus of European
societies, the church. Governments were used to facing the independent power of
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religious opinion, articulated by churches. What was new was opinion, presented
as that of society, elaborated through no official, established hierarchical organs
of definition (Philosophical Arguments 217).
The Enlightenment marked a third shift in the conception of the public sphere: in ancient
Greece there was no public sphere because political life was a public exercise, and in
medieval Europe, the estates and the church formed the basis of opinion. In the
Enlightenment, however, the shift that took place in the public sphere was that of a civil
society—a new kind of cultural form independent from the old cultural forms. The public
sphere was not only separate from the church, but the public sphere was also separate
from the state. The public introduced a shift in political power from the exclusive
authority of aristocrats and educated humanists to ever-larger sectors of society.
Moreover, the independence of the public sphere allowed a more contemporary
idea of democracy to develop. ―The autonomy of civil society from state and institutional
control signals more than the newly emergent inability of the state to organize society. It
also attests to the importance modernity ascribes to public knowledge and informed
opinion for legitimating state action and regulating social relations‖ (Hauser 40). Liberal
democracy and the concept of unbiased fairness for all began to develop. As Taylor
notes, ―The principle of a public sphere disengaged from power raises the theoretical
possibility of its being impartial, so that alternative views may be tolerated and
agreements may be reached on their merits‖ (264). The public sphere, by the late
Enlightenment, became a tool for the democratization of society at-large.
Walter Lippmann observed that the public sphere in late modernity is, and
necessarily has to be, a thing apart from those who are making decisions. Not only is he
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asserting that the two are and have to be separate, but he notes that publics affect policy
―only if they influence an actor in the affair‖ (45). He is skeptical of the modern
democratic notion of the public:
The democratic ideal has never defined the function of the public. It has treated
the public as an immature, shadowy executive of all things … ―The people‖ were
regarded as a person; their wills as a will; their ideas as a mind their mass as an
organism with an organic unity of which the individual was a cell. Thus the voter
identified himself with the officials. … Democracy, therefore, has never
developed an education for the public. It has merely given it a smattering of the
kind of knowledge which the responsible man requires. It has, in fact, aimed not
at making good citizens but at making a mass of amateur executives (137-138).
Writing on the cusp on postmodernity, Lippmann spoke to Hannah Arendt‘s idea of the
failure of modernity‘s focus on monolithic institutions and a mass conception of the
public.
In the mid-20th century, Hannah Arendt theorized about the shortcomings of a
modernist conception of human life together in the form of the public sphere. For Arendt,
modernity is characterized by the loss of the world, by which she means the restriction or
elimination of the public sphere of action and speech in favor of the private world of
introspection and the private pursuit of economic interests. Modernity was the age of
mass society, of the rise of the social out of a previous distinction between the public and
the private, and of the victory of animal laborans, or the animal that labors over homo
faber, or the human who thinks and the classical conception of man as zoon politikon, or
the political animal (The Human Condition).
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Modernity, Arendt held, was the age of bureaucratic administration and
anonymous labor, rather than politics and action, of elite domination and the
manipulation of public opinion. It was the age where history as a ―natural process‖ has
replaced history as a fabric of actions and events, where homogeneity and conformity
have replaced plurality and freedom, and where isolation and loneliness have eroded
human solidarity and all spontaneous forms of living together. Modernity was the age
where the past no longer carries any certainty of evaluation, where individuals, having
lost their traditional standards and values, must search for new grounds of human
community. Arendt‘s argument that modernity creates society as a monolithic mass and
not as a collection of human beings and human relationships is shared by other
philosophers, perhaps most notably Lippmann.
Lippmann‘s assessment of the modern public is that it is fundamentally mistaken
in its assumptions about the human relationships that comprise a public:
We have been taught to think of society as a body, with a mind, a soul and a
purpose, not as a collection of men, women and children whose minds, souls and
purposes are variously related. Instead of being allowed to think realistically of a
complex of social relations, we have had foisted upon us by various great
prerogative movements the notion of a mythical entity, called Society, the Nation,
the Community (146).
Instead, Lippmann saw the public rhetorically, as an ongoing negotiation of ideas, beliefs,
and values that rise and recede given the individual people in the relationship and other
outside rhetorical factors like history, current events, and the economy.
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While Lippmann argued that the public, conceived rhetorically, is a thing apart
from the government or state—the entity whose people make decisions and change
outcomes—Dewey in his work The Public and Its Problems addressed the public as
having a slightly different rhetorical relationship to the state and government. Dewey
held that the modern state and government are different entities and that the state cannot
exist without the public. The public is organized into a state through its government and
has a responsibility to be watchful of the government.
Lippmann and Dewey agreed, however, that the public is not a reified modern
giant, but is rather a dynamic rhetorical public undergoing constant negotiation. Dewey
noted that American political life grew up ―out of general community life, that is,
association in local and small centers‖ (111). The public before modernity was an
amalgamation of local publics.
Hauser‘s work in rhetorical theory lends itself well to the discussion of
postmodern rhetorical publics. Calling emergent publics in postmodernity ―vernacular
voices,‖ Hauser‘s work argues for a rhetorical conception of public. He views a national
public as combinations of emerging and receding local publics—vernacular voices—that
change and gain and lose relevance based on a Bitzerian conception of ―the rhetorical
situation‖ (Bitzer 217). Dewey and Lippmann pointed to postmodernity in their work,
which is important for a postmodern rendering of public diplomacy.
Diplomacy
An historical overview of diplomacy aids in understanding how public diplomacy
works and how a postmodern conception of the public influences foreign policy. This
section will discuss the history of Western diplomacy from ancient Greece to modern

21

America. The thought of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hugo Grotius provides an
historical underpinning of the philosophy of American diplomacy through the mid-20th
century.
The history of diplomacy is long. Thucydides may be the first thinker to have
offered a power-situated definition of diplomacy to influence foreign publics to abide by
a given policy. In his Melian Dialogue, Thucydides explicated the conversations between
the Athenian leaders and Melos, a small, neutral state during the Peloponnesian War.
While the Melians wished to respect the interests of all states, the Athenians were
perhaps the first to advocate for what the modern West called political realism, or power
politics, saying:
Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their
nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make
this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and will
leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it‖ (Thucydides 334335).
Arguing a God-given right and the convention of law, the Athenians advocated a foreign
policy that promoted specific objectives. The diplomacy that flowed from that policy is
one not of engaged rhetoric with members of foreign publics, but one of advocating for a
specific objective in a unilateral, power-situated way.
Thucydides wrote at the time of the Peloponnesian War from 431 to 404 BCE.
While his writing does not concern itself formally with diplomacy, he does provide
insight into the political realism that dominated Greek political life. J.K. Davies explains,
―Athenian superiority had been broken, Persia entered the war, and Sparta became a sea-
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power. Thereafter the new configuration of international politics remained stable for a
generation‖ (117). The international stage was set through power politics, not diplomatic
initiatives that sought to stave off war.
While the political and diplomatic climate in ancient Greece was based in power
politics, the first ancient Greeks who may have thought differently about foreign relations
were the Sophists. While different types of Sophists existed in ancient Greece, this
project uses the terms Sophists in a general sense as itinerant, traveling teachers who
taught rhetoric. Perhaps the first group of people in the West who engaged a postmodern
conception of the world, the Sophists‘ worldview was informed greatly by exposure to
groups of people who rhetorically conceived of the world in very different ways
(Herrick). In Democracy and Classical Greece, Davies argues that the Sophists had two
roles: to teach and to subvert the world of myth for reason. Having been exposed to other
rhetorical worlds, the Sophists‘ worldview had necessarily changed to accommodate that
plurality. Thus were born the first postmodern diplomats—a group of people who spread
Athenian knowledge and influenced members of foreign publics who held varied
worldviews.
Machiavelli is the first major diplomatic thinker and figure in medieval Europe.
Machiavelli viewed diplomacy as only the advocacy of national interests. Machiavelli‘s
focus was the state—especially the republican state—and sustaining the requirements for
its stability. Born in 1469 in Florence, Machiavelli reached adulthood ―in the very years
in which diplomacy was being transformed by the invention and spread of the resident
embassy among the turbulent states of Italy‖ (Berridge 539). Friedrich Meinecke explains
that Machiavelli was the first to discover the real nature of raison d’état, or state reason,
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and he argues that it has had considerable implications for ambassadors and diplomats
since then. Moreover, ―[The] state system came into existence in the sixteenth century,
making use of the kind of secular and realistic political theory propounded by the Italian
humanists like Machiavelli and of the experience of international diplomacy … that had
been worked out in the Italian city-states in the fifteenth century‖ (Cantor, Meaning of the
Middle Ages 289). The historical moment opened the opportunity for Machiavelli to
influence world diplomacy theory for the next 500 years, but his particular circumstances
also served to inform his thought.
Machiavelli came from a family that, though modest in means, had been a key
player in the politics of Florence for more than 200 years. In 1498, at the age of only 29,
he was appointed second chancellor of the republic (Mattingly; Skinner). Those
experiences led Machiavelli in a vein of thinking commonly referred to by the phrase
―the ends justify the means.‖ Certainly, Machiavelli viewed public diplomacy as only the
advocacy of national interests.
Hugo Grotius is another thinker important to the rhetoric of diplomacy before the
Enlightenment. He was a philosopher, theologian, Christian apologist, playwright, and
poet (Dumbauld). A relative contemporary of Machiavelli, he was a jurist in the Dutch
Republic. With Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili, he laid the foundations for
international law, based on natural law.
Born in 1583, Grotius was one of the first political and diplomatic thinkers to
bridge the ancient and medieval worlds with the Enlightenment. Grotius was a proponent
of humanism and the Aristotelian conception of natural law. Historian Andrew Dickson
White notes:
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Into the very midst of all this welter of evil, at a point in time to all appearance
hopeless, at a point in space apparently defenseless, in a nation of which every
man, woman, and child was under sentence of death from its sovereign, was born
a man who wrought as no other has ever done for a redemption of civilization
from the main cause of all that misery; who thought out for Europe the precepts of
right reason in international law; who made them heard; who gave a noble change
to the course of human affairs; whose thoughts, reasonings, suggestions, and
appeals produced an environment in which came an evolution of humanity that
still continues (5).
Unlike Machiavelli, who was writing in Italy 100 years before, Grotius operated in the
historical moment at the end of the medieval period and the early dawn of the
Enlightenment in the Netherlands—much closer in both space and time to the ideas of
humanism and the birth of the Enlightenment in northern Europe.
Grotius answered the sceptics‘ claim that there can be no lowest common
denominator of human behavior. Grotius held that all men would agree that every person
has a fundamental right to protect and preserve themselves and also that unnecessary
harm to another person is unjustifiable. For Grotius, no social life as a civilized society
was possible if the citizens denied either of these two points. Moreover, no other
principles but these two were necessary for basic societal structures. Grotius‘
understanding of diplomacy was centered on the same tenet: nation-states were under no
obligation to come to the aid of another, but they were obliged not to harm one another
(Tuck). Grotius‘ work revises Machiavelli‘s ideas and textures an understanding of
diplomacy as advocacy of national interests by members of a government and members

25

of a society in a way that Machiavelli‘s does not. Grotius situated his ethic in the context
of international law and draws a fine distinction between a nation‘s fundamental rights
versus any obligation beyond that to help other nations.
Grotius‘ currency in defining diplomacy as the advocacy of national interests is
his emphasis on diplomatic goals and their relationship to Aristotelian natural law (Brett).
Unlike Machiavelli, Grotius looked to Aristotle for a means through which to vet human
nature and diplomacy goals beyond a grand scheme of Aristotelian virtues. He found that
structure in civil philosophy, in the conception of the city. Annabel Brett holds that ―This
conviction is distinct from, even if related to, the position which all post-Machiavellian
civil philosophers hold, that the city must accommodate [human] nature‖ (33). In his
nature-management conception of civil society, Grotius provided a late medieval
advancement in his understanding of diplomacy as the advocacy of national interests. In a
strong and stable government, the work of Grotius helped to codify constitutionalism
instead of absolutism as the way of achieving national sovereignty (Randall). As
medieval Europe underwent the changes ushered in by the Enlightenment, Grotius‘ ideas
retain their importance.
The idea of civil law and natural rights takes on even greater currency in the
Enlightenment and modern conceptions of diplomacy and had a profound influence on
thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. The Enlightenment ideas of Hobbes and Locke found
traction in the early years of the American colonies in the 16 th and 17th centuries and were
instrumental in the formalization of the United States as a nation in the 18th century.
American diplomacy, since the founding of the United States more than 230 years
ago, has relied on democracy and a robust public sphere to guide its work. ―Since the
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time when Thomas Jefferson insisted upon a ‗decent respect‘ to the opinions of
mankind,‘ public opinion has controlled foreign policy in all democracies‖ (Bailey 1).
American diplomacy—and American government at-large—has its roots in the European
humanism of the Enlightenment. Norman Melchert offers, ―Locke‘s influence extends far
beyond his epistemology. In fact, he may be best known in America for his political
thought, which had a decisive impact on Thomas Jefferson and the other founders of the
United States‖ (386). Indeed, the American ideal of the natural right to personal liberty
and happiness comes to American national thought from Locke.
Also from Locke by way of St. Thomas Aquinas comes the impulse in American
diplomacy to respect the natural rights and dignity of the human person while pursuing
American interests. ―Locke follows Thomas Aquinas in thinking that even before
government is instituted, human beings, through their reason, have access to natural law.
… In a natural state, humans have a sense for justice and injustice, right and wrong,
independently of any law declared by a sovereign‖ (Melchert 386). The American
diplomacy establishment is often challenged with the competing interests of respecting
the natural rights of foreigners while implementing and furthering the policy of the
government as developed from the public opinion of the American populace and strategic
goals. Traditionally, the business of American diplomacy lies in understanding the
opinions of the American public and translating that into foreign policy objectives that
provided for national aspirations: ―peace, security, neutrality, justice, freedom,
humanitarianism, territorial elbow room, commercial prosperity, and opportunity for
investment and trade abroad‖ (Bailey 2). Since the inception of the United States
Constitution, the guarantee of those rights has fallen under the purview of the State
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Department. In its 2011 refreshed mission statement, the State Department articulated its
mission: ―Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world, and
foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and
people everywhere‖ (United States Department of State, Fiscal Year 2011 6).
One of the original three Cabinet-level departments, the State Department was
founded in 1789 with an original six employees. Throughout the formative years of the
American nation and the 19th century, American diplomacy centered on formal
government-to-government relations led by diplomats. Public diplomacy initiatives like
cultural exchange programs, foreign press relationships, and an active approach to
directly influencing foreign publics were not a major factor in State Department
diplomacy until the 20th century when the nation had to contend with its preeminence on
the world stage as result of leadership in the World Wars (Bailey).
Power politics has been the dominant paradigm of international relations in the
United States since World War II (Kraig; Beer & Hariman, Realism and Rhetoric). Power
politics is synonymous with political realism, which holds that the reality of political
situations is best mitigated by national power. Beer and Hariman define realism in
international relations as ―state power‖ (What Would be Prudent? 299). They argue that
for most of the 20th century, realism was the dominant form of foreign affairs, ―where
giving priority to material and especially military capabilities and being suspicious of
verbal intentions and agreements, one could objectively determine the best possible
course of action for survival in a world of force and fraud‖ (299).
Moreover, through the early part of the 20th century, the United States diplomacy
establishment combined the Enlightenment conception of engaging the American
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peoples‘ political hopes, dreams, needs, and interests, and executing those interests
though political realism or power politics. ―The systematic inattention to the role of
words in foreign affairs is the result of a specific intellectual history that emphasized the
material bases of international politics as it ‗really‘ was‖ (Beer and Hariman, Rhetoric
and Realism 1). Until recently, American diplomacy engaged the world through an
Enlightenment rendering of the public sphere in a modernist, scientific model that
conceived of the public as a reified modern monolith. Policy and power politics was the
method of practicing diplomacy.
The latter half of the 20th century saw a shift in American foreign policy away
from classical government-to-government power politics and an increasing emphasis in
both the State Department and the Executive branch on attentiveness to sharing the
American culture abroad and directly influencing the hearts and minds of foreign publics.
By the 1970s, the Carter Administration had shifted the momentum of American foreign
diplomacy on the fundamental premise that ―it is in our national interest to encourage
sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United States and the
peoples of other nations‖ (Tuch 32). Likewise, in his search for the best organizational
arrangement for both policy and cultural communication in American foreign relations,
Gifford D. Malone notes an ―increasing call to dialogue‖ and a need to ―develop mutual
understanding, to learn as well as teach‖ as postmodernity and competing national and
international interests came to the fore in the latter half of the 20th century (26-27).
While persuasive discourse has always had its part in the practice of international
relations, rhetoric had taken a philosophical back seat to Enlightenment and modernist
conceptions of the world. ―One of the most important tenets of realist theory is the
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assertion that realism expresses without distortion the permanent essence of politics
between nations … most important, it escapes the influences of its own historical
moment. Thus, realism exemplifies the theoretical norms of scientific positivism‖ (Beer
and Hariman, What Would be Prudent? 5). With the occurrence of the horrors of the first
half of the 20th century, including two major world wars and a global economic
depression in the interim, the modern metanarrative, built solidly on science and
positivism, collapsed. As narratives began to contend for legitimacy, diplomats and the
foreign policy establishment began to recognize the importance of rhetoric and
persuasion for governments in the space created by the absence of assumptions of
certainty about the way the world was constructed. Nancy Snow argues that a rhetorical
engagement that focuses on two-way diplomacy geared toward understanding specific
cultures as opposed to one-way communication of foreign policy objectives is necessary
in the 21st century:
The shift from the diplomatic emphasis [or modern] to the public emphasis [or
postmodern] has resulted in the rise of two different philosophies about public
diplomacy‘s utility:
1. Those who view public diplomacy as a necessary evil, a mere ancillary tactic
that supports conventional … diplomacy efforts; and
2. Those who view public diplomacy as a context or milieu for how nations
interact with each other, from public affairs in the field to the citizen diplomat
and student exchanges at the grassroots (6).
Snow‘s call is for a move away from the modern conception of the bureaucrat and into a
rhetorically focused diplomatic praxis.
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Diplomacy in modernity functioned much as Snow and Arendt describe—
diplomacy‘s job was one of communicating the official policy of a bureaucratic entity in
an effort to influence, or in worse cases manipulate, public opinion. Traditional
diplomacy assumed a homogeneous public. Instead, Arendt revived Aristotle‘s concept of
praxis. A postmodern rhetoric of public diplomacy engages praxis.
Calvin Schrag in Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity offers a
definition of praxis similar to Arendt‘s vita activa: ―The Greek term ‗praxis,‘ because of
its rather widespread current adoption, is seldom translated when it is used in the
scholarly literature of philosophy and the human sciences. If indeed it is translated, it is
usually rendered as ‗practice.‘ It could also, however, be translated as ‗action,‘
‗performance,‘ or ‗accomplishment‘‖ (18-19).
A postmodern rendering of praxis is at the intersection of discourse and action
(Schrag). Modernity, as we have noted, proved the failure of one-way policy
communication over engagement in discourse with publics. It failed because it viewed
the public as a reified monolith, not as a dynamic engagement with people who are
constantly renegotiating their opinions as a public. Rodham Clinton called for more
engagement in the communities in which American diplomats work. Schrag discusses the
concept as dialogic encounter:
Indeed, within the density of the dialogic encounter the thoughts that are mine and
the thoughts that are yours codevelop in a consummate reciprocity. I lend you a
thought-experiment, a possible way of seeing things, and you respond. Your
response is one of incorporating what I have said, by either acceptance, rejection,
or modification … Such is the ongoing dialectics of dialogue (125).
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The QDDR itself called for—and furthered—the rhetorical turn in international relations.
In their book, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, Francis Beer
and Robert Hariman echo both Schrag and Rodham Clinton: ―This focus on discourse
ultimately involves consideration not merely of terms and habits of usage, but of the
institutions, social structure, and history of the people who have lived with them‖ (168).
In postmodern diplomacy, public diplomacy ascends to a place of strategic importance in
the diplomatic strategy of the United States, through a deep understanding of the culture,
educational programs, cultural exchange programs, community enrichment programs,
and media engagement of the local, vernacular publics.
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy assumes that public opinion is a function apart from the state
and that it can influence agents of the state. Public diplomacy, according to Snow, ―has
been about governments talking to global publics, and includes all those efforts to inform,
influence, and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign
policies‖ (6). This project understands Snow to mean members of a government talk to
members of global publics. Public diplomacy and traditional policy-maker-to-policymaker diplomacy differ in that there exists the assumption in the American foreign policy
establishment that foreign publics and public opinion are not only a thing apart from their
governments, but that foreign public opinion can wield significant influence over a
foreign government‘s policies toward the United States government. This section will
discuss the historical evolution of public diplomacy as a field within traditional
diplomacy. This iteration of public diplomacy emerged as a result of increasing calls for
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direct engagement from members of the government to members of foreign publics. The
concept of public diplomacy as ―soft power‖ by Joseph Nye is also discussed.
The term ―public diplomacy‖ came into common usage in the 1960s after it was
developed by Gullion at Tufts University (USIA Alumni Association). Public diplomacy
is communication from a government official directly to foreign publics, including media
relations, cultural education programs, and cultural exchange programs. Moving into a
postmodern historical moment and the advent of the Cold War, Gifford D. Malone notes
that public diplomacy during the 1960s centered around achieving the United States‘
foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations, by advising the
President, his representatives, and the various departments and agencies on the
implications of foreign opinion regarding American policies and programs. Malone also
notes that the 1970s brought with it ―increasing calls for putting an emphasis on
‗dialogue‘ with foreign publics‖ (26-27). Thus is born the first rhetorical turn in
American diplomacy in the 1960s and ‗70s.
By the 1990s, it had become clear that there was a place for public diplomacy in
the formal responsibilities of the State Department. Snow defines the difference between
traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy. For Snow, traditional diplomacy is
government-to-government relations and traditional public diplomacy is government-toglobal publics. This method of public diplomacy engages members of entire national
publics in efforts to inform, influence and engage them in support of American priorities.
―More recently, public diplomacy involves the way in which both government and
private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and
opinions that bear directly on another government‘s foreign policy decisions (Snow 6).
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This project understands Snow to mean members of a government talking to members of
global publics. Increased emphasis on direct government communication to varied
publics led to the absorption of the United States Information Association (USIA) by the
State Department in 1999 to bring public diplomacy more in line with policy making
(Rugh). In 2010, the State Department under Rodham Clinton‘s oversight issued the
inaugural QDDR, which called for even more attention to diplomats interacting directly
with foreign publics.
Until 1999, USIA was the body responsible for much of the nation‘s public
diplomacy, including mass communications like Voice of America radio broadcasts.
USIA and its emphasis on public diplomacy was absorbed into the State Department in
1999 and officially disbanded on October 1 of that year (Cull, ―Public Diplomacy Before
Gullion‖). Ten years later, when Rodham Clinton assumed leadership of the organization,
the world had seen al-Qaeda stage major terrorist attacks around the world, two
American-led wars that were unpopular on the world stage and the emergence of the
global dominance of the Internet. The importance—and possibility—of persuasion
through public diplomacy had never been greater.
Rodham Clinton took the reins of the State Department a decade after USIA was
folded into the work of the State Department in an effort to minimize redundancy and
better align the objectives of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy (Rugh). Shortly
after assuming leadership of the department, Rodham Clinton commissioned the QDDR,
which calls for a more engaged public diplomacy. Her recommendations go beyond
formal foreign public diplomacy programs aimed at influencing various publics and call
for more personal interaction—diplomats meeting local opinion leaders and learning the
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local culture as a way of understanding it and interacting with it, what Snow terms P2P
―public diplomacy.‖
In the 2010 QDDR, Rodham Clinton‘s State Department revised and extended the
call for personal engagement from public diplomacy professionals in the field. In the
July/August 2012 issue of Foreign Policy, Susan Glasser refers to Rodham Clinton‘s
brand of diplomacy as ―people to people‖ diplomacy, noting the primacy of individual
diplomats living and working in the field, attempting to understand the various publics in
a given state (77). A more personal model of public diplomacy whereby one shares his or
her culture with another can also be thought about as cultural attraction.
Cultural attraction in public diplomacy has been theorized about is as ―soft
power‖ (Nye 1). According to Snow, this ―is arguably the most referenced term in the
public diplomacy lexicon‖ (3). Nye‘s term ―soft power‖ is theoretically contrasted to hard
power—the ability to coerce—and grows not out of a country‘s military or economic
might, but arises from a nation‘s culture, political ideals, and policies. Nye argues that
while hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence
and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence, he emphasizes nurturing the soft
power of the United States to augment our ability to deal with critical global issues that
require multilateral cooperation:
More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it
was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today‘s world, it is best
to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even
more so in a global information age. Information is power, and modern
information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in
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history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature
of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft
dimensions into their strategies for wielding power. (1)
For Nye, when hard power and soft power are used in tandem, the result is ―smart
power.‖
Nye works on the premise that soft power, defined as influencing by attraction,
not coercion, is routinely used in interpersonal communication and organizational
communication. ―At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of seduction
and attraction. … And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership …
involves attracting others to do what you want‖ (5). In refining his definition of soft
power, Nye offers that, ―Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move
people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract,
and attraction often leads to acquiescence‖ (6). For Nye, democratic societies already use
soft power to some extent, but a nation‘s ability to attract in a globalized and
technological public sphere where language and national borders are more permeable
than ever, is necessary for success on today‘s world political stage. Public diplomacy is
central to Nye‘s work on power as an indispensable part of the rhetoric of diplomacy,
politics, and persuasion.
Since the term public diplomacy was first coined in 1965, it has been practiced,
revised, and theorized about, in many ways standing just on the fringe of the discipline of
rhetoric and communication. From the early history of diplomacy and state power
politics, diplomacy has emerged in the contemporary age as a nuanced rhetorical art that
not only advances national interests, but attempts to build mutually beneficial
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relationships with the various publics in—and governments of—foreign nations. Today‘s
diplomat is, more than ever before and consciously so, a rhetor.
Conclusion
The QDDR calls for several specific public diplomacy recommendations. The
document outlines a revised approach: ―The framework sets forth five strategic objectives
to inform, inspire, and persuade foreign publics: [1] Shape the narrative, [2] Expand and
strengthen people-to-people relationships, [3] Counter violent extremism, [4] Better
inform policymaking, and [5] Deploy resources in line with current priorities‖ (United
States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 6063). The first two strategic objectives are the focus of this research. Diplomats are called
to ―inform, inspire, and persuade‖ by ―shaping the narrative and expanding and
strengthening people-to-people relationships‖—both points of postmodern public
diplomacy. Chapter 2 will examine the postmodern assumptions of the world in which
Rodham Clinton operated. The following chapters will then more fully flesh out how
diplomats can philosophically engage the two explicitly public diplomacy-based strategic
objectives in the QDDR.
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CHAPTER 2
Public Diplomacy in the Modern and Postmodern Eras
The 20th century bore witness to a major philosophical shift from modernity, with
its emphasis on homogeneity and efficiency, to postmodernity, with its decline of
traditional structures that had historically given meaning to human life together. Through
two World Wars and a global economic depression, to a global push for democracy and
gender and race rights, modernity gave way to postmodernity as human community
renegotiated its value structure. In a postmodern era characterized by narrative
contention, how scholars and practitioners conceive of the public sphere takes on
currency, both for this project and for everyday life in a democratic society.
This chapter will examine the mid-to-late 20th century shift from modern policy
that viewed the public of a nation as a monolith and public diplomacy as mostly mass
communication, toward a rhetorical public diplomacy that views diplomats as generalists
engaging members of varied, local publics within a nation in a more specific and face-toface manner. This chapter will lay out a 20th century modern conception of the public
based on the work of John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, Richard Weaver, and Hannah
Arendt. Moreover, the chapter will discuss three modern examples of American public
diplomacy: Voice of America (VOA), the American Participants (AmParts) program, and
cultural and information centers. The discussion of modern publics will culminate in an
engagement of Arendt‘s work on, and critique of, the modern bureaucrat as a way of
showing the mid-20th century shift toward postmodernity. Looking then toward
postmodernity, the second half of the chapter will engage a 21st century postmodern
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iteration of publics as put forth in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR; United States Department of State and United States Agency on International
Development). Engaging a Hauserian conception of a montage of public spheres as the
idea of diplomatic generalists will be explored through the work of Weaver as a
postmodern way of considering the problem of the modern bureaucrat as articulated by
Arendt. The chapter will discuss a postmodern rendering of the public sphere through the
work of Weaver and theorize about how public diplomacy professionals can engage
multiple, localized publics in international public diplomacy as communication
generalists.
As Hauser notes, ―Our public deliberations occur in multiple forums not exclusive
to those of the official political realm, and they lead to opinions which, when widely
shared, set expectations for their consequences on official policies. We refer to this
montage of discursive arenas as public spheres‖ (20). Considering a modern versus
postmodern conception of public has significant implications for how diplomats—and in
particular, public diplomacy professionals—view their role. The QDDR recognizes that a
diplomat engaging his or her work as a modern bureaucrat is no longer viable in the job
of American diplomat. Rethinking the diplomat as a postmodern communication
generalist draws clear distinctions between the modern and postmodern conceptions of
the public sphere and public diplomacy.
Public Diplomacy in the Modern Public Sphere
The modern public sphere was conceived of as a national monolith whose
opinions could be gauged and changed by mass communications. Philosophers like
Dewey and Lippmann were among the first to theorize about the nature of the public
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sphere in the 20th century and its attendant implications and problems. Dewey was
an American philosopher whose ideas have been influential across a variety of sectors,
including education and social reform. Dewey was an important early developer of
American pragmatism as a system of philosophy. He asserted that complete democracy
was to be obtained not just by extending voting rights but also by ensuring that there
exists a fully formed public opinion, accomplished by effective communication among
citizens, experts, and politicians, with the latter being accountable for the policies they
adopt (Ryan).
In the 1920s Lippmann‘s Public Opinion commented on the challenge of
informed public opinion in modernity to guide policy. The reason, he claimed, is that the
average citizen is bewildered by the degree of information needed to be intelligent
regarding a given issue. Much like Plato in antiquity, his solution was that an elite sector
of informed society—the press—would speak for the people. Later, when Dewey
published The Public and its Problems, like Lippmann, he noted that modernity is a
problem for a robust public sphere. The rapid expanse of electric and mass
communication channeled a surplus of information that rendered people unable to
understand how the state‘s leaders‘ decisions affect their lives. (For Dewey, the state was
an outgrowth of the public.) Decisions, argued Dewey, were made by people in special
interest groups and mass production of communication was the rule of the day in late
modernity. The public as a whole was eclipsed by the modern state (The Public and Its
Problems).
A pragmatist philosopher of American democracy, Dewey was particularly
concerned with the ideas of public, state, and government as practical entities. He
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asserted the value of these rhetorical constructs are best evaluated by their consequences.
―There is no more an inherent sanctity in a church, trade-union, business corporation, or
family institution than there is in the state. Their value is also to be measured by their
consequences‖ (The Public and Its Problems 74). Conceiving of the public as a practical
rhetorical construct based on its consequences, Dewey spent the majority of his book
discussing the public, state, and government as practical problems to be addressed as the
result of late modernity in the early 20th century. He defined the public as:
Those indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil form a group
distinctive enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected is The
Public. This public is organized and made effective by means of representatives
who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc., care for its
special interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of
individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to itself political
organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the
public is a political state. (The Public and Its Problems 35)
In Dewey‘s conception, a public was a political entity that organizes itself into a state that
institutes a government to carry out its laws—the public is a political state, and also quite
literally, the forerunner of the state. In this modern rendering the problem for Dewey was
that the state is no longer localized, but in modernity becomes a continent-wide nationstate in the United States in the 20th century. Again, Dewey made clear that his problem
is a pragmatic one in modernity: ―[the public] is a practical problem of human beings
living in association with one another, of mankind generally. It is a complex problem‖
(The Public and Its Problems 32). For Dewey, the practical problem was the form the
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public takes in modernity as a continent-wide state and not a political group of people
who are organized on the basis of relative location to one another or similar concerns.
The public became a reified monolith. For Dewey, the public was necessarily tied to the
conception of state and government, and was not something apart from the state.
Dewey outlined several reasons why the state in modernity became a massive
monolithic public instead of a public that is closer to more traditional forms of
community, centered on specific, localized concerns (like Rodham Clinton‘s postmodern
rendering of publics). Dewey offered, ―American democratic polity was developed out of
genuine community life, that is, association in local and small centers where industry was
mainly agricultural and where production was carried on mainly with hand tools. It took
form when English political habits and legal institutions worked under pioneer
conditions‖ (The Public and Its Problems 111). Dewey cited the rise of technology, in
particular the telegraph, telephone, and the railways as part of the reason this shift to a
modern monolithic conception of public occurred. He also cited migratory patterns from
rural to urban areas as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. In Dewey‘s work the
modern public was necessarily conceptually tied to a state, so as the nation-state grows,
the public becomes a non-localized, non-vernacular entity rather than small, localized
entities set apart from the state.
Dewey cited an interesting example of the modern American state to assimilate its
19th century and early 20th century immigrants into a homogenous public sphere in a way
that would have ―disrupted any semblance of unity as surely as the migratory invasion of
alien hordes once upset the social equilibrium of the European continent‖ (The Public
and Its Problems 115). Dewey noted that at the same time hundreds of thousands of
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foreign immigrants came to America, the public sphere did not become more
heterogeneous, it became more homogenous as a process of modernity. Dewey said:
Mechanical forces have operated, and it is no cause for surprise if the effect is
more mechanical than vital. The reception of new elements of population in large
number from heterogeneous peoples, often hostile to one another at home, and
welding them into even an outward show of unity is an extraordinary feat. In
many respects, the consolidation has occurred so rapidly and ruthlessly that much
of value has been lost which different peoples might have contributed. The
creation of political unity has also promoted social and intellectual uniformity, a
standardization favorable to mediocrity. Opinion has been regimented as well as
outward behavior. (The Public and Its Problems 115)
The melting pot is a modern conception, and modern anonymity is a product of the
modern public. In Dewey‘s rendering, the form that modern diplomacy took looks much
different than Rodham Clinton‘s postmodern public diplomacy.
Like all modern institutions, diplomacy was a uniform process of policy
formulation and implementation, and while rhetoric and discourse have always had a part
in diplomacy, the modern zeitgeists of progress and uniformity carried over into how
diplomacy was conducted and into the modern conception of the diplomat as a modern
bureaucrat. When Gullion coined the phrase ―public diplomacy‖ in 1965, he noted a
rhetorical turn in the American diplomacy establishment. As Nicholas J. Cull notes, ―The
reason that the term public diplomacy took off in 1965 was that there was a real need for
such a concept in Washington, DC. A dozen years into its life, the United States
Information Agency needed an alternative to the anodyne term information or the
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malignant term propaganda‖ (―Public Diplomacy Before Gullion‖ 21). With a move
away from formal government-to-government diplomacy, Gullion highlighted the
emerging trend of engaging the public (as a whole, not members of a public) in discourse
and effecting opinion change through rhetorical means.
In Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas, Hans Tuch
notes that the development of public diplomacy was made possible, in large part, by the
technological advances of modernity. ―First, the communications revolution, which
began shortly after the Second World War and continues today, makes possible the
instantaneous transmission of information of all kinds across oceans and over mountains
to the remotest areas of the world‖ (4). Tuch notes that mass dissemination of
information to foreign publics (conceiving of, for example, all Russians as members of a
homogenous public) made possible by the advances of the 19th and 20th centuries was
indispensable to the development of public diplomacy as the first rhetorical turn in
American diplomacy.
Tuch goes on to note that radio, television, and satellites had profound effects on
the abilities of members of a government (in this case, the American government) to
communicate with members of the foreign public. He says, ―Thus, public opinion has
become an important factor in international affairs, exerting influence on the decisions
and actions of governments‖ (4). Tuch‘s conception, however, is characterized by a
modern, single, national public. ―The framework for the modern mass media, radio, and
television … was the nation state: a state whose institutions constituted both the core and
the boundary of the society in question‖ (Bentele and Nothhaft 97). And, as Hauser notes,
―Since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, for example, political leaders in the United
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States have relied almost exclusively on mass media for disseminating information and
presenting persuasive appeals‖ (26).
As the world became increasingly globalized in the mid-20th century, the United
States government began to engage in public diplomacy, though at the time, the term had
not yet been coined by Gullion. Mass communications efforts like VOA, speaker
programs like AmParts, and cultural and information centers were three early forays into
public diplomacy in late modern America. All three, however, while making a rhetorical
turn to engaging members of foreign publics in a formal way, relied heavily on the use of
mass media and a public-as-audience orientation to relay messages. W. Phillips Davison
puts early public diplomacy efforts in the mid-20th century this way:
Public diplomacy combines the skills of the traditional diplomat with those of the
specialist in mass communications and the social researcher. The diplomat
formulates the ideas that he would like to have communicated to a foreign public,
the social researcher studies the intended audience, and the communications
specialist chooses the most appropriate media and composes the messages. (399,
emphasis added)
Davison‘s public diplomacy is a modern concept for three reasons. First, there is an
assumption of a mass communications specialist. The idea of a specialist is antithetical to
the call in the QDDR, and while it may mark a rhetorical turn in diplomacy toward
persuading members of a foreign public, it achieves that by means of a removed,
bureaucratic specialist engaging a reified, homogenous public. Second, the emphasis is
on the social researcher—a detached, scientistic engagement is a hallmark of modernity.
Conceiving the public as a body to be studied as opposed to people to be understood is a
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major difference in the QDDR, and third, Davison‘s emphasis on audience and
composition of messages. Implicit in this approach is a cool, detached actor regarding a
foreign public as a homogenous group, as if in a theater, to which the actor is composing
and communicating carefully crafted, persuasive messages. Against this conception of
public diplomacy, the QDDR calls for person-to-person engagement and general
knowledge of localized, vernacular cultures.
In the rational, disinterested model of modern public diplomacy, the public
becomes reified. According to Hauser, a theory of publics situated in discourse, however,
must widen its purview to include discourse in petite public spheres as well as
institutional actors like diplomatic specialists. Modern forms of public diplomacy,
however, remained intact throughout the 20th century. When VOA was launched in 1942,
the radio station quickly became one of the most well-known tools of American public
diplomacy. Tuch notes that VOA operates from Washington, not in the field. Tuch also
observes that VOA ―is the only medium that can transmit a message directly from the
sender to the receiver without having to pass through any intermediary, human or
physical, that might be able to affect the tone or content of the message‖ (91). Tuch calls
this VOA‘s ―special value.‖ Clearly, in the early years of public diplomacy, the form of
radio as a medium necessarily excluded two-way communication and person-to-person
interaction. Whereas postmodern public diplomacy valorizes efforts at personal nuance
and discourse, Tuch holds that it is detrimental to the objectivity and rationality of the
message.
Certainly, VOA has its place as a tool in the arsenal of American public
diplomacy initiatives. VOA is sometimes the only medium of communication available to
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American public diplomacy when political turmoil abroad eliminates all other ways of
communicating. ―The American media rediscovered this fact in 1979, after the taking of
the American hostages in Tehran, and again in the spring of 1989, after the brutal
suppression of the pro-democratic demonstrations in China‖ (Tuch 93). In certain places
around the world, or at certain times of political upheaval, VOA and other mass
broadcasting options have proved invaluable sources of wielding American influence.
While mass forms of communication can be very valuable in persuading members of
foreign audiences toward democracy and pro-American views on a range of issues, radio
cannot narrowcast to petite public spheres or interact with them in the person-to-person
manner Rodham Clinton called for in a postmodern moment.
More than just a way to communicate foreign policy, Gary D. Rawnsley notes
that radio broadcasting came into its own in the early years of the Cold War as ―both an
instrument and determinant of foreign policy‖ (5). The growth of electronic forms of
communication like the radio, coupled with the mid-20th century emphasis on public
opinion as a viable consideration in policy formation compelled governments to revise
traditional channels of diplomacy. Radio helped to determine foreign policy because,
while still a modern implement of mass communication broadcasting, diplomats could
gauge broad-based national reaction to given policy, thereby helping them to analyze, at
least very generally, how a certain policy was received by a very general, national public.
Similar to VOA, but more targeted to specific audiences, the AmParts program,
which brought American speakers to host countries to lecture on a variety of topics,
marked a complementary component to the United States government‘s early public
diplomacy initiatives. Closer to a postmodern rendering of public diplomacy in that it
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narrowcasts its efforts to particular groups, the AmParts program consisted of Americans
who were ―invited by public affairs officers to appear before selected audiences to
discuss subjects of importance to public diplomacy‖ (Tuch 72) and were often able to
speak to a particular audience with more authority on a given subject than a diplomat at
the embassy.
Before USIA was folded in to the State Department in 1999, the AmParts
program boasted a slate of 600 speakers each year on a variety of topics from medicine,
law, and politics to entertainment, music, and art (Bissell). Tuch notes the strategic
importance of AmParts speakers in two ways:
First, when it comes to developing a broad understanding of the American society
and institutions, they make significant contributions by demonstrating the
diversity of responsible views in a democracy and, by their presence, give
evidence of the openness of the American society. Second, in a foreign policy
context, AmPart speakers are invited for the specific purpose of enabling [the
government] to address an issue that a post has determined to be of importance in
its country plan. (Tuch 74)
The American presence in West Germany at the end of World War II had a profound
effect on the democratization of the public sphere in that region in the 1960s. American
influence, in large part because of programs like AmParts and cultural centers and
libraries, played a large part in the development of a democratic sensibility in post-war
Germany (von Hodenberg).
Similar to cultural exchanges like the Fulbright program, which probably comes
closest to postmodern public diplomacy in connecting people individually and immersing
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citizens from both the United States and foreign countries in each other‘s cultures, the
AmParts program is a more targeted approach to public diplomacy and helps to shape
national attitudes toward pro-American sentiments and democracy. AmParts is, perhaps,
a step forward in the evolution of public diplomacy in late modernity that sought to
engage members of foreign publics in an effort to persuade and create affinity for
American values. The AmParts program still, however, engages as ―audience‖ in the
modern sense of the word, as a homogenous group instead of engaging person-to-person
in the field.
Third, cultural and information centers provided members of a foreign public with
an invaluable resource to learn about American culture and values. ―The idea of cultural
and information centers as the focus of U.S. public diplomacy activities emerged in large
measure from the occupation of Germany‖ (Tuch 65). In fact, within six years of the end
of World War II, there were 27 cultural centers (Amerika Hauser) throughout Germany
(Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany). These cultural centers, also
common in Austria and Japan after World War II, provided a major public diplomacy
advantage in that they openly and visibly represented American society and its culture,
and they provided a natural meeting place for person-to-person interaction between
American diplomats and members of a foreign public.
Tuch, however, notes some drawbacks to this method of public diplomacy,
questioning whether this type of cultural public diplomacy might better if modeled on the
premise of outreach, where diplomats go into the community and meet people rather than
wait for a random member of the ―public‖ to come into an American cultural center. He
notes, ―In times of political tension, local citizens may not want to be seen entering a U.S.
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information center; they might be more comfortable meeting with an American visitor in
a private home‖ (Tuch 67). He also notes the liability and potential for these centers to
become targets in times of political tension. Similarly, R.S. Zaharna calls cultural centers
―second tier relationship-building initiatives‖ in public diplomacy because the
participation required is ―expanded from individual-specific initiatives to programs that
encompass social groupings‖ (94).
While much of the 20th century‘s methods of public diplomacy continue today,
like media relations and educational exchanges like the Fulbright program, Tuch stops
short of calling for direct person-to-person engagement in programs like AmParts and
cultural centers, perhaps because public diplomacy—at least as theorized in the QDDR—
was ahead of its time when Tuch wrote in the 1980s. Giles Scott-Smith notes the ―human
factor‖ of exchange programs in public diplomacy. He says, ―The interpersonal nature of
the exchange experience, coupled with its inherently private character, have caused this
field to be largely written out of the documentation of diplomacy and its conduct in the
public realm‖ (51). The QDDR’s call for public diplomacy in a postmodern era is for
exactly these kinds of personal engagements, intended to co-create meaning between the
diplomat and specific individuals in a particular public. Public diplomacy in the 20 th
century made a rhetorical turn in the 1960s and was attempting to do rhetorical and
discursive work in a model that was still largely modern and bureaucratic, though no one
readily noticed the incongruence between the modern bureaucratic form and the
rhetorical content of public diplomacy until recently with Rodham Clinton‘s postmodern
public diplomacy.
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Arendt was perhaps one of the first scholars to note the incongruence between the
bureaucratic structures of the modern world and authentic communicative life. Arendt‘s
conception of a new form of political life necessitated a shift in public diplomacy
thinking. In The Human Condition, she set out to correct the ways in which modernity
had gone wrong. Writing about Arendt, Sheldon S. Wolin articulates:
―The political‖ was the ideal. The intention behind it was to combat a different
version of the masses than the one which had figured in her analysis of
totalitarianism. Although ―mass society‖ remained the danger, the analysis was
focused on the phenomenon of ―work‖ and on the transformation of society and
politics effected by the modern emphasis upon productivity and economic growth.
These and other notions were assembled under the idea of ―the social.‖ (6)
Diplomacy in modernity functioned much as Wolin and Arendt describe—as
communicating the official policy of a bureaucratic entity to an anonymous mass public.
Modern diplomacy assumed a homogenous public and an attempt at efficient governance
in the modern spirit of ―work.‖ The creation of a consensus in the modern public sphere
was also paramount. The first rhetorical turn in public diplomacy during the mid-20th
century marks perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena in American diplomacy—
the practice of discursive, postmodern models of public diplomacy attempting to carve
out a place in a largely modern, bureaucratic structure.
In postmodernity, ―Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value‖
(Lyotard 66). Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue, argues that emotivism—the basis of
decision-making as lying in personal preference—is dangerous to the public life of the
community. Postmodern public diplomacy looks to solve these problems by building, not
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national consensus in postmodernity, but unity of decision-making, rhetorically among
and within a given vernacular public sphere.
Public Diplomacy in the Postmodern Public Sphere
The postmodern public sphere may be best conceived of as an amalgam of
competing and complementary public spheres, situated in vernacular communities and
attentive to local, particular concerns. Against a modern conception of the public sphere,
which viewed the public as a modern, monolithic and homogenous national public, public
diplomacy professionals in postmodernity should be attentive to the fracturing of
modernity into smaller, localized and diverse public spheres. This section of the chapter
will argue that the QDDR works on the assumption of a postmodern rendering of public
spheres and that for public diplomacy to be successful in the 21 st century, diplomats
ought to conceive of the public sphere in postmodern terms.
Hauser highlights the centrality of postmodernity to a new conception of the
public sphere in Vernacular Voices:
An emphasis on consensus hearkens to premodern conditions of communication,
which were weak in diversity and placed a strong emphasis on shared traditions
for resolving differences. In the late-modern or postmodern context, continual
encounter with difference strips the productiveness of consensus as the test of
communication for the pluralistic conditions of actually existing democracy. (55)
Aristotle‘s Rhetoric argues that the purpose of rhetorical deliberation is for informed
judgment, not consensus or efficient governance. The strength of the rhetor‘s position
should not be the achievement of consensus in postmodernity, but instead should be that
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it can be understood across particular spheres to provide a basis for working together
among interdependent people (McKeon).
The postmodern public sphere is comprised of multiple, petite public spheres that
render judgment on the best way to move forward in the particularity of the specific
public sphere‘s time, place, and exigencies. Hauser notes that, ―Discursive practices
provide the evidentiary basis for studying and interpreting the constitution of social will.
… As a social practice, discourse involves symbolic transactions that affect people‘s
shared sense of the world‖ (13). As the latter half of the 20th century saw a shift in
American foreign policy away from classical government-to-government power politics
and an increasing emphasis in both the State Department and the Executive branch on
attentiveness to sharing the American culture abroad, discursive practices became
increasingly important.
Beginning in the 1970s, the Carter Administration shifted the momentum of
American foreign diplomacy on the fundamental premise that ―it is in our national
interest to encourage sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the
United States and the peoples of other nations‖ (Tuch 32). Likewise, in his search for the
best organizational arrangement for both policy and cultural communication in American
foreign relations, Malone notes an ―increasing call to dialogue‖ and a need to ―develop
mutual understanding, to learn as well as teach‖ as postmodernity and competing national
and international interests came to the fore in the latter half of the 20 th century (26-27). In
the late 1970s and ‗80s, scholars also called for a theory of postmodern public spheres
situated in rhetoric and argumentation, arguing that in a postmodern era of narrative
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contention, the only sure way forward in the absence of Habermasian modern consensus
is through rhetorical decision-making (McGee; McGee and Martin).
Rodham Clinton took the reins of the State Department in 2009, and in her fouryear tenure as Secretary of State, she helped the State Department make a second
rhetorical turn in public diplomacy toward a distinctly postmodern engagement of
localized, situated foreign publics. The QDDR is grounded in understanding diplomats as
generalists and focusing public diplomacy on specific person-to-person engagement.
Public diplomacy in postmodernity calls for direct engagement from diplomats to
influence the narratives within local foreign publics and expand and strengthen people-topeople relationships. In a postmodern world, the State Department‘s model under the
leadership of Rodham Clinton assumes multiple, local, and vernacular publics.
The QDDR calls for a rethinking of public diplomacy praxis. Underscoring the
complexity of publics and opinions, as well as the global interconnectedness of the 21st
century, the QDDR calls for increased emphasis on public diplomacy, including direct
diplomat interaction with members of foreign publics and community/cultural
programming—what I advance later in this project as public diplomacy 2.0. A rhetorical
environment is necessary for the functioning of these public spheres. Calling them
―rhetorical forums,‖ Farrell notes, ―a symbolic environment … within which issues,
interests, positions, constituencies, and messages are advanced, shaped, and provisionally
judged‖ (282) are central to the postmodern functioning of publics. The QDDR details the
current work of the department and provides specific directives and recommendations for
the continued preeminence of American foreign policy abroad.
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Similar to Hauser, Herbert Blumer understands developed societies as montages
of publics, each public activated when members feel issues intersect their experience of
the world and their larger society in ways that require attention. This exigency has led
Hauser to define a public as ―the interdependent members of society who hold different
opinions about a mutual problem and who seek to influence its resolution through
discourse‖ (32).
In conjunction with the issuing of the QDDR by the State Department, Rodham
Clinton explained in a November 2010 article she authored in Foreign Affairs why public
diplomacy needs to be central to the work of the State Department:
[I]ncreasing global interconnectedness now necessitates reaching beyond
governments to citizens directly and broadening the U.S. foreign policy portfolio
to include issues once confined to the domestic. … The QDDR endorses a new
public diplomacy strategy that makes public engagement every diplomat‘s duty,
through town-hall meetings and interviews with the media, organized outreach,
events in provincial towns and smaller communities, student exchange programs,
and virtual connections that bring together citizens and civic organizations. (1516)
Rodham Clinton‘s call is one of engagement, not by American diplomats to members of
foreign governments, but by American diplomats to individuals in localized, vernacular
publics, in an effort to understand the grassroots opinions that shape foreign attitudes and
opinions about American foreign policy. Developed Western societies are
characteristically pluralistic, with diverse and often competing interests that engender
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fragmentation and its accompanying dangers (Hauser). Effective public diplomacy
attends to this postmodern condition.
The QDDR calls for several specific public diplomacy recommendations. The
report states that, ―The framework sets forth five strategic objectives to inform, inspire,
and persuade foreign publics‖ (United States Department of State and United States
Agency on International Development 60). They are to shape the narrative, expand and
strengthen people-to-people relationships, counter violent extremism, better inform
policymaking, and deploy resources in line with current priorities (United States
Department of State and United States Agency on International Development). The
remainder of this project will concern itself with the first two enumerated points.
Diplomats are called to ―inform, inspire, and persuade‖ by ―expanding and strengthening
people-to-people relationships and shaping the narrative‖ (United States Department of
State and United States Agency on International Development 60-61). Rodham Clinton,
through the QDDR was asking American diplomats to undertake a complex and nuanced
postmodern rhetorical process.
Members of postmodern petite publics co-create meaning rhetorically. Hauser
holds that, ―Rhetoric‘s inventional character bears significantly on how we experience the
possibilities of political, social, and cultural choice, and rhetoric‘s experiential nature
contributes greatly to the dynamic possibilities of publics‖ (33). Moreover, as James
Boyd White argues, members of a public must be receptive to different ways members
might express themselves, actively interpret those meanings in order to understand how
what being communicated relates to them‖ (9). White‘s rendering of communication in
postmodern petite publics is an issue of praxis.
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In ancient Greek the word praxis referred to activity engaged in by free men.
Aristotle held that there are three basic activities of man: theoria, poiesis, and praxis.
There corresponded to these kinds of activity three types of knowledge: theoretical, to
which the end goal was truth; poietical, to which the end goal was production; and
practical, to which the end goal was action. Aristotle further divided practical knowledge
into ethics, economics, and politics (Poetics). Politics for Aristotle was the practical
knowledge of praxis action, and thus, the concept of praxis informs a postmodern
understanding of public diplomacy practice as a rhetorical and communicative function.
Arendt argued that modernity traded praxis for the contemplative life. Arendt
called ―praxis‖ the highest and most important level of the active life. Thus, she argued
that more philosophers need to engage in everyday political action or praxis, which she
saw as the true realization of human freedom, furthering Aristotle‘s concept of the ―free
man‖ engaging in praxis. Like Aristotle, Arendt believed that the capacity to analyze
ideas, wrestle with them, and engage in active praxis is what makes one uniquely human.
Her unique contribution came when she offered it as an alternative to modern ways of
being in the world. ―By viewing action as a mode of human togetherness, Arendt was
able to develop a conception of participatory democracy which stands in direct contrast to
the bureaucratized and elitist forms of politics so characteristic of the modern epoch‖
(d‘Entreves). For Arendt, human togetherness represented an alternative to modernity‘s
bureaucrat.
Moreover, for Arendt, praxis was useful in a postmodern world of plurality—a
model of the world Rodham Clinton engaged for postmodern public diplomacy. Arendt
defined plurality as ―the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world,‖
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(7) and says that it is the condition of human action ―because we are all the same, that is,
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives,
or will live ‖ (8). Moreover, an active public is emergent. Hauser argues, ―rather than
anticipating publics as already existing, we should seek them through actual discursive
engagements on the issues raised in civil society as emergences of society’s active
members‖ (33).
In postmodern plurality, for Arendt, each individual member is capable of acting
and relating to others in distinct ways, and consequently, of contributing to a network of
actions and relationships that is infinitely complex and unpredictable (d‘Entreves). This
network of actions makes up the realm of human affairs, that space where individuals
relate directly without the intermediary of things or matter — that is, through language.
For Arendt, action is in language, and for a postmodern rendering of philosophical public
diplomacy, its currency to shape narratives is in person-to-person discourse.
Arendt stressed repeatedly that action is primarily symbolic in character and that
the web of human relationships is sustained by communicative interaction (178-79, 18486, 199–200). As Hauser holds, ―Publics do not exist as entities, but as processes; their
collective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by practical judgment; their
awareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful‖ (64).
Arendt moved on to discuss the connection between speech and power, that which
springs up between people when they act ―in concert,‖ and which is actualized ―only
where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds
not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds
are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities‖
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(200). This is the work of public diplomacy in postmodernity: to co-create realities and
manage worlds by rhetorical practical reason. This is a marked difference from the
bureaucrat of modernity and mass communication as the main form of 20 th century public
diplomacy. For Aristotle, rhetorical knowledge, which is particular and situated, is not
part of his theoria, but instead exists in the activity of praxis. Praxis is practical reason,
the process whereby we come to determine courses of action and render judgment
(Rhetoric).
Schrag offers a definition of praxis similar to Arendt‘s, but moves it forward
another step from Aristotle‘s action and Arendt‘s speech and power in plurality, to
discourse and dialogue in a space of subjectivity between communicative partners in an
exchange. What allows for shared meaning in a world of plurality where participants may
not share the same ideas or even the same language, Schrag puts forth a space of
subjectivity in which praxis takes place and speech can create shared meaning. Schrag‘s
discussion of hermeneutical self-implicature also textures an understanding of the
rhetorical turn in diplomacy in postmodernity:
Indeed, within the density of the dialogic encounter the thoughts that are mine and
the thoughts that are yours codevelop in a consummate reciprocity. I lend you a
thought-experiment, a possible way of seeing things, and you respond. Your
response is one of incorporating what I have said, by either acceptance, rejection,
or modification … Such is the ongoing dialectics of dialogue.‖ (125)
Schrag‘s self-implicature as entrance to a public sphere is paramount to the co-creation of
shared meaning in a plural, postmodern world.
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In their book, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, Beer
and Hariman echo both Schrag and Rodham Clinton: ―This focus on discourse ultimately
involves consideration not merely of terms and habits of usage, but of the institutions,
social structure, and history of the people who have lived with them‖ (168). In a
postmodern understanding of public diplomacy, Schrag‘s work allows for a space of
subjectivity that is attentive to the historicity of a particular vernacular public sphere.
Borrowing the term ―rub‖ from Mikhail Bakhtin‘s The Dialogic Imagination, Hauser
notes this historicity:
Public opinions are embedded in the ongoing dialogue in which classes, races,
religions, genders, generations, regions, and a host of other significant
discriminators rub against each other, problematize one another‘s assumptions
about meaning, create discursive spaces in which new interpretations may
emerge, and lead, even if tentatively, to intersections that provide collective
expressions of shared sentiments. (110)
Implicit in Rodham Clinton‘s postmodern conception of public spheres was a call for an
understanding of historicity. Hauser says of petite publics: ―We must acquire its
vernacular language in order to share its rhetorically salient meanings‖ (67). Members of
a public must share in a web of meanings that define a world of commonality. This
includes common cultural actions, festivals, emotions (Taylor ―Interpretation and the
Sciences of Man‖).
In postmodern plurality, diplomats will need the cultural, language, and
communication skills to engage any number of situated vernacular publics. Because of
the plurality of these publics and their complex interests, being well-briefed on policy

60

goals and speaking the native language is not enough for public diplomacy in
postmodernity. Creating a mindset of, and educating, the next generation of public
diplomacy professionals as generalists, with a broad understanding of rhetoric,
philosophy, and the humanities is essential in effectively navigating the tricky diplomatic
waters of the 21st century. Diplomats as postmodern generalists, not modern bureaucrats,
are essential to the success of public diplomacy, and another way Rodham Clinton‘s work
marked a distinct philosophical move from a modern engagement of ―public.‖
As modernity‘s zeitgeist of progress and industry undermined traditional
community life in favor of anonymity in a reified monolithic public sphere, and an active
life was exchanged for introspection and labor, a rhetorical way of living together as a
body politic—or as multiple body politics in a nation—began to disintegrate. Weaver, a
southern agrarian academic, offered a solution for life against the problems of modernity,
and by extension, posits a way forward for public diplomacy praxis in postmodernity.
Weaver‘s answer to the ―problem which disintegration places in the lap of
practical men‖ (Ideas Have Consequences 92) lies in being a generalist, not a specialist.
Against a modern conception of technique in which a public diplomacy professional
masters a specific communication technology or policy area, Weaver‘s work has import
for postmodern public diplomacy praxis in its call for a general philosophical education
and a rhetoric of action. He offered, ―In this way disintegration has placed labor in a
position in which it must compete against other groups in a manner which cannot bring
ultimate advantage to any of those involved‖ (Ideas Have Consequences 75).
For Weaver, statesmanship and philosophy, which are tied to a generalist‘s
education, were sacrificed for egotism and labor in modernity‘s progress and

61

specialization. ―The object is not to say that labor is more or less to blame than other
groups of society; it is rather to show that when egotism becomes dominant and men are
applauded for looking to their own interest first, statesmanship and philosophy must
leave the picture‖ (Ideas Have Consequences 74-75). Weaver identified clearly and
unequivocally the thesis of his project: that modern man‘s philosophical ills are the result
of modern specialization. Public diplomacy in postmodernity calls for a generalist
conception of public diplomacy work in the field.
Generalists offer a philosophical engagement of diplomacy and public diplomacy
as opposed to a strictly technical orientation to diplomacy as the modern conception of
work suggests. To illustrate, a June 14, 2011, New York Times article discussing the
diplomatic contributions of Briton Patrick Leigh Fermor on the occasion of his death,
called for less specialized policy wonks and more generally educated diplomats like
Fermor in postmodernity:
…he combined the traits of a solider, linguist and humanist, and he appreciated
history and culture for their own sake even as he used that wisdom to defend
civilization. In today‘s world of over specialized foreign-policy knowledge, in
which military men, politicians and academics inhabit disconnected intellectual
universes, we need more generalists like Fermor. … Because America‘s own
security will rest in a world where tribes matter as much as Twitter, Fermor is an
icon of the kind of soldier, diplomat or intelligence expert we will need: someone
who can seamlessly move from any one of these jobs to another, who is equally at
home reading a terrain map as he is reciting the poetry of the people with whom
he is dealing. The more depth and rarity of knowledge we can implant in our
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officials, the less likely they are to serve up the wrong options in a crisis …
Fermor and his friends refused to reduce the world to questions of strategy and
national interest: they were more taken by culture and landscape, which in fact
made them more valuable than most intelligence agents. (Kaplan)
Kaplan provides an endorsement of Weaverian concepts and a Rodham Clintonian
conception of public diplomacy for postmodernity in calling for a breadth and generality
in education to help the diplomat achieve what Weaver called that ―intuitive feeling about
the immanent nature of reality‖ (Ideas Have Consequences 18).
A Weaverian generalist education provides many points for public diplomacy
praxis application. Several distinct practices emerge in approaching the world through a
postmodern generalist rhetorical lens. Diplomats who are generally trained have at their
disposal myriad experiences and a wealth of knowledge. They are better equipped with a
broad understanding of how others live in the world and are able to negotiate multiple,
vernacular, petite public spheres as Rodham Clinton charged them to do. This is
diplomacy by affinity and understanding, what Harvard international relations scholar
and theorist Nye calls ―soft power‖ (5). Soft power in public diplomacy is particularly
powerful because public diplomacy seeks to influence public spheres within a given
nation with the expectation that a foreign nation‘s own publics are better equipped to
persuade their government than the United States government. This is achieved by public
diplomacy professionals being on the ground, engaging directly with members of foreign
publics as generalists, learning and appreciating local cultures, languages, and histories in
order to build relationships with groups and among groups in a foreign country for the
expansion of peace, prosperity, and Western democratic ideals.
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Walter H. Beale‘s article on Weaver discusses the approach that Weaver takes to
rhetorical education: ―Rhetorical education is an attempt to shape a certain kind of
character capable of using language effectively to carry on the practical and moral
business of a polity‖ (626). Through the use of soft power—a practice that grows out of
approaching the rhetorical world as Weaver did—diplomats are best equipped to carry
out the recommendations in the QDDR. Weaver himself spoke to language in the shaping
of character and his belief that the world is intelligible and able to be apprehended
through language as the result of a broad liberal arts education. Weaver offered that ―It is
impossible to talk about rhetoric as effective expression without having a term giving
intelligibility to the whole discourse, the Good‖ (The Ethics of Rhetoric 23). Like
Weaver, postmodern public diplomacy asserts that the world is intelligible through
rhetoric.
A postmodern public sphere is characterized by myriad public spheres whose
voices emerge and recede based on given exigencies. Recognizing this postmodern trend,
the QDDR and Rodham Clinton‘s State Department called for more person-to-person
engagement. To be effective in any given number of specific situations, postmodern
public diplomacy requires more than mass communication and specialized foreign policy
professionals. The work of Weaver offers a generalist conception of the educated person
in the liberal arts in order to gauge a world of competing narratives and meanings.
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn distinctions between a modernist public sphere and public
diplomacy policy implementation and a postmodern rendering of multiple, situated,
vernacular public spheres and public diplomacy generalists engaging members of those
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spheres personally on the ground. This conception of postmodern public spheres and
public diplomacy generalists situates postmodern public diplomacy and the QDDR in a
philosophy of communication from which to engage postmodern foreign relations.
Specifically, this chapter overviewed a modern understanding of the public as a reified
modern monolith and pointed out some of the critiques made by 20 th-century
philosophers like Arendt, Dewey, and Lippmann, who theorized about communicative
life in a modern world characterized by bureaucracy and monolithic communications
institutions. The second half of the chapter argued that inherent in the QDDR is an
assumption of publics as postmodern entities—situated, vernacular, local, and emergent.
This section touched on the work of Schrag, Hauser, and Weaver to buttress an argument
for a philosopher-generalist diplomat in postmodern public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy in a postmodern 21st century requires diplomats to carry out the
work outlined in the QDDR. In the last 50 years since public diplomacy was coined as a
term, marking the first rhetorical turn in diplomacy, much has changed in the world—
from how public spheres are rhetorically created, maintained, and changed, to how lack
of metanarrative agreement has replaced progress, labor and a modern, singular public
sphere as the zeitgeist of political life together in the 21 st century. Chapter 3 will explore
Pearce and Cronen‘s Coordinated Management of Meaning theory to provide
philosophical texture for the first communicative diplomacy directive in the QDDR:
building person-to-person relationships.
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CHAPTER 3
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Directive 1:
―Expanding and Strengthening People-to-People Relationships‖:
Coordinated Management of Meaning
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR; United States
Department of State and United States Agency on International Development) ―sets forth
five strategic objectives to inform, inspire, and persuade foreign publics‖ (United States
Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60). The
first of two of those objectives explicitly concerned with communication is to ―expand
and strengthen people-to-people relationships‖ (60). Against a modern, mass
communications model of public diplomacy, postmodern public diplomacy extends into
the realm of interpersonal communication by calling for diplomats to engage individuals
in a relationship as they work toward the promotion of democracy and Western values
across the world. Public diplomacy in a postmodern moment creates social worlds by
engaging petite, localized, and vernacular public spheres in order to bring a particular
reality into conversation with the reality of American foreign policy goals, creating a new
social world from the two. Postmodern public diplomacy calls for interpersonal
engagement to accomplish the creation of new social worlds.
Public diplomacy in postmodernity, by its nature, is an interpersonal and
intercultural engagement. A cornerstone of the inaugural QDDR under Rodham Clinton‘s
leadership is that diplomats need to develop a deep understanding of individuals engaged
and living in any number of postmodern, localized vernacular publics. With local and
personal knowledge of thought leaders in a foreign public, diplomats can also understand
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what shapes, changes, and manages the socially constructed realities from which those
publics build the rhetorics of culture.
Chapter 3 recognizes the contribution of W. Barnett Pearce‘s and Vernon
Cronen‘s Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) theory to inform and provide
tools for diplomats charged with the call to create new social worlds and carry out the
directive of the QDDR. CMM provides a bridge for connecting scholarly work in the
fields of diplomacy and communication relative to building person-to-person
relationships. Concerned specifically with positing a theory of mediation between
persons and coordinating meaning between often vastly differing conceptions of the
world, CMM offers a way to think about diplomatic engagement at the personal level that
provides for contingencies of conflict, managing intercultural misunderstanding, and
accounting for differing participant meaning. Concerned with how people coordinate
action and rhetorically manage social worlds together, CMM provides the most
appropriate entrance for communication scholarship into the discussion about
postmodern public diplomacy.
First, this chapter will lay out an overview of CMM. Second, the chapter will
show how CMM creates social worlds by engaging the major metaphors of ―coordinating
social construction,‖ ―managing pluralism,‖ and ―participant meaning,‖ adapted from
Pearce‘s Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds. Finally, the chapter will
connect foundational ideas in CMM to the practice of community diplomacy as a core
initiative of what I term public diplomacy 2.0 in Chapter 5.
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Coordinated Management of Meaning: An Overview of the Theory
In the late 1970s when Pearce and Cronen first started theorizing otherwise than
the 20th century conventional wisdom of the behavioral sciences, they began to think
about communication from the vantage point of philosophy and language as a way of
thinking about how human beings interact to create reality as opposed to the use of
communication to discover some already-given reality in the world. According to Pearce
and Cronen‘s work, individuals engaged in social interaction construct their reality. Their
definition of CMM puts forth a model of communication as:
a form of action by which persons collectively create and manage social reality.
This definition implies a mutual causal relationship between the forms of
communication that occur and the content and structure of social reality,
necessitating a theory that locates communicators within larger social groups.
(Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 119)
Several unique features of CMM are illustrated here. First, CMM is a theory of
communicative action. Pearce and Cronen are concerned from a philosophy of
communication standpoint to understand the communicative act itself as constitutive of
human being together in the world.
Second, the type of communication that occurs and the content and structure of
the social reality created are mutually causal and rules-based, given the specific social
setting (Cronen, Pearce, and Harris). In essence, while communicative practice in
coordinating meaning with others produces content and structure for a negotiated reality,
that negotiated reality then acts back on communicators in ways that shape subsequent
communicative action by the construction of rules (Pearce and Cronen, ―The Coordinated
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Management of Meaning: A Theory of Communication‖). As well, Pearce and Cronen
advance communication scholarship in their thinking of communicators as ―enmeshed‖
as a characterization of the human condition. Human communicators are ―variably
enmeshed in multiple systems, each with its own logic of meaning and action. The theory
presented here focuses on communicators as enduring entities, acting in the nexus of
many systems‖ (Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 119-20). From
a postmodern, humanities understanding of situatedness in human communication,
Pearce and Cronen understand communicators as co-creating meaning in particular
systems where no universal logic of meaning exists, but is particular to its own system or
culture. For public diplomacy in postmodernity, the currency of Pearce and Cronen‘s
work is in understanding the particular person-to-person relationship in terms of the
vernacular logic of the non-American communicator.
Against a model of communication that understands a culture from observing it
outside the system, Pearce and Cronen adopt the idea of persons-in-conversation to orient
communicators inside the process and action of communication (Harre Personal Being).
Not only is the idea of ―persons-in-conversation‖ central to CMM, Em Griffin argues that
it is the ―primary social process of human life‖ (66). Conversation is how people come to
know one another interpersonally, and it is also the process whereby mediation and
problem-solving happen. The reflexive discursiveness of the social process of mediation
and problem-solving is a major tenet of CMM.
Reflexivity of communication is central to CMM. Communication is simply not
one-way with subsequent unaffected response, but instead, as persons-in-conversation
engage in discourse, their actions influence subsequent actions in an ongoing dialectical
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discourse. Pearce says, ―When we communicate, we are not just talking about the world,
we are literally participating in the creation of the social universe‖ (Interpersonal
Communication: Making Social Worlds 75). Creation of a social universe is important to
CMM as the theory‘s authors develop the ideas of coherence, coordination, and mystery.
Coherence, coordination, and cosmopolitan mystery are all ways that Pearce
situate the issue of storytelling in CMM (Communication and the Human Condition).
Coherence refers to how the story one is engaged in makes sense. ―According to CCM,
this speech act only makes sense within the multiple contexts of the specific episode, our
relationship, my self-identity, and my culture—four frames that shape and are shaped by
what I said‖ (Griffin 69). Coordination, for Pearce, refers to how persons-in-conversation
plan their future actions according to this hierarchy. According to Pearce it is ―the
process whereby persons collaborate in an attempt to bring into being their vision of what
is necessary, noble, and good and to preclude the enactment of what they fear, hate, or
despise‖ (Communication and the Human Condition 32-33). Communicators coordinate
future courses of action by and through this collaboration. Third, cosmopolitan mystery
in CMM stands against any attempt at reducing life to mere fact. According to Pearce,
mystery is ―the essence of a ‗cosmopolitan‘ attitude‖ (Communication and the Human
Condition 23) that views life as part of something greater than the particular culture or
meaning that a communicator brings to a conversation.
Mystery, put another way:
For coordination, it is only necessary that those who interact with each other draw
the lines at the same place—this allows them to ―dance‖ with each other. For
coherence it is only necessary that there be some lines drawn somewhere—this
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allows us to tame the terrors of history and impose meaning and order on the
world. Buy mystery is the reminder that such lines are ultimately arbitrary
distortion … Without such reminders, hard-eyed men and women forget that [a
word] is the basis for coordination and coherence, not a map of ―reality.‖ (Pearce,
Communication and the Human Condition 81)
Words as an arbitrary basis for creating a world together as communicators calls for a
cosmopolitan understanding of meaning-making as not already-given, but as injecting
humility into communication. A continual process of rhetorical, negotiated meaning
between individuals engaged from different petite, vernacular cultures serves to socially
construct a world together.
Moreover, CMM puts forth a hierarchy of meaning to theorize about how human
beings create social life together. The seven-layer hierarchy is raw sensory data, content,
speech acts, episodes, contracts, life script, and cultural patterns (Trenholm). The
hierarchy explains how people build worlds out of data they receive from the physical
world, formulate that experience into content through speech acts, which create episodes
and contractual relationships with others in the world. Those contracts then form a
person‘s life script and the larger cultural patterns.
In the first level of the hierarchy of meaning, individuals take raw sensory data
from the world and derive content from it. Content, according to Barnett, Pearce, and
Forrest Conklin is what is actually said or done. From there, the speech act is committed,
carrying with it specific intent communicated in an utterance. The speech act answers the
question, ―What is the communicator attempting to do?‖ Fourth, after raw sensory data,
content, and speech act, is the episode. The episode is the larger contextual situation in
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which the interaction occurs. The episode addresses the activity that communicators are
engaged in. Fifth in the hierarchy is the relationship between the interlocutors, which
gives context to the specific relationship of the participants in the speech act and episode.
Above the relationship in the hierarchy is what Barnett, Pearce, and Conklin refer to as
life script. The life script addresses the self-image of the individual participants and
essentially answers the question, ―What is the worldview of each of the communicators?‖
Ultimately in the CMM hierarchy is the cultural pattern. Beyond the episode the actors
find themselves in, their relationship to one another, and their individual life script comes
the sociocultural norms by which interlocutors abide. It asks, ―What group do I identify
with?‖ (Barnett, Pearce, and Conklin, ―On What to Look at When Analyzing
Communication: A Hierarchical Model of Actors‘ Meanings‖). Each level of the CMM
hierarchy adds texture and meaning to the levels above and below. Communication
between persons makes sense only in a contextualized world. The importance for
postmodern public diplomacy will be discussed later in the chapter.
Additional to the CMM hierarchy, two types of rules govern meaning-making
between people. Constitutive rules dictate how meaning at one level dictates meaning at a
subsequent level, whereas regulative rules specify that in the context of certain social
actions, if given a certain antecedent then there exists some degree of force for or against
subsequent actions (Trenholm). In other words, constitutive rules tell one how to
recognize speech acts, while regulative rules identify, in a given context, appropriate and
inappropriate responses or speech acts. In CMM, social worlds are rhetorically created,
maintained, and changed through social interaction in a hierarchy mitigated by sets of
socially accepted rules. The rhetorical creation of social worlds in CMM‘s hierarchy and
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rules yields three metaphors central to public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern era:
coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning. These
three metaphors engage a discussion of the various models and loops in CMM.
Coordinating Social Construction
Social constructionism stands in stark contrast to objective, scientific views of
reality. It views communication not as a means to uncover the objective truth about the
world, but instead it views communication as ―a symbolic process whereby reality is
produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed‖ (Carey 17). Reality as a symbolic and
ongoing process is at the heart of CMM. Pearce Associates argues:
CMM focuses on the patterns of communication in which we participate. It
attempts to describe them, explain how they are co-constructed, and intervene to
create ―better‖ patterns of communication. CMM focuses on communication
because communication is the primary social reality. Communication processes
constitute our knowledge of ourselves and of the world in which we live; patterns
of communication shape the persons that we are and the quality of our lives. In a
CMM perspective, the events and objects of our social worlds are ―made‖ in
social processes of naming, calling, and interacting. (10)
Pearce and Cronen‘s CMM theory concerns itself with the practice of communication,
that is, how human beings together comprise and live in a pluralistic world. Specifically
about the processes by which people communicate in a pluralistic world and only
secondarily about the products of that world (culture, self, et cetera), CMM offers a
practical theoretical ground for those charged with the process of strengthening
interpersonal relationships in postmodern public diplomacy.
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In engaging the metaphor from Pearce and Cronen, the orientation is different
than that of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann‘s social constructionism and other
scholars in the same vein. Social constructionists concern themselves from a sociological
framework to examine the processes and products of communicative action such as
culture. Berger and Luckmann hold that, ―our purpose in this treatise is a sociological
analysis of everyday life. … It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage
in philosophy‖ (19). Concerning themselves instead with the communicative production
of social reality and not its sociological products per se, Pearce and Cronen are concerned
explicitly with the ongoing discursive activity of constructing social worlds together as a
philosophy of communication. CMM‘s focus on communicative action as social
construction highlights at least two aspects of a social constructionist communicative
philosophy: the world is rhetorically constructed and social in nature.
Discussing the ―social‖ of social construction, William Wilmot and Joyce Hocker
highlight the concept of reframing as a proactive method to recast a particular problem
―with the goal of changing perceptions and positions from negative and fixed to more
positive and flexible‖ (259). Concerned with interpersonal conflict, their work posits a
way forward when active listening is difficult because of cultural differences that lead to
misunderstanding. Reframing the issue allows the communicator access to a postmodern
hermeneutic entrance into the discourse. By reconceiving the issue and entering the
residence of discourse through a familiar door as opposed to an unfamiliar door, the
communicator may be more able to engage and rhetorically shape the social and
linguistic reality constantly being negotiated in the intercultural discursive exchange.
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In theorizing about CMM through the metaphor of social construction, the role of
language as central to the concept that meaning—and its extension, culture—is social.
Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter discuss the role of language in culture not as a
carrier of meanings or ideas, but as constitutive of them. They say that language‘s role is
formative because the action that builds a culture is found in language. ―This view draws
on the seminal ideas of George Herbert Mead, whose thinking early in the [20 th] century
provided the foundation for what was to become the symbolic interactionism perspective
in social theory‖ (Samovar and Porter 186-87). They go on to note that Mead‘s theories
about human social constructionism flew in the face of radical behaviorism, which was
enjoying its zenith in the United States at the time. Mead‘s view, according to Samovar
and Porter, was that the external world does not impinge on human behavior, but that
human behavior grows out of the situations people create through language. Mead‘s
symbolic interactionism and Pearce and Cronen‘s CMM have in common the
understanding that language, as a social living out of human being between people,
constitutes rhetorical reality. After all, Harre argued that language ―is our medium for
being as persons‖ (Language-games 23). Human beings exercise their full humanity in
and through language.
In his seminal work, Mind, Self, and Society, Mead says, ―Language does not
simply symbolize a situation or object that is already there in advance; it makes possible
the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the
mechanism whereby the situation or object is created‖ (78). The communicative process
whereby two individuals engage in the ongoing discourse and dialectic of getting to know
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one another is more than just the exchange of information, but is instead constitutive of a
new rhetoric, a new reality for both individuals and both cultures.
In their work on CMM, Kimberly A. Pearce and Pearce underscore the concept of
wonder in the social and linguistic aspect of CMM. They call for a genuine interest in the
ongoing social processes of all participants in the discourse through active listening,
holding that ―in its absence most people are unwilling or unable to participate in rich
conversation‖ (113). In the case of intercultural listening in order to participate in
conversation, the problem may be more the inability to actively listen in a particular
public sphere with which the listener is unfamiliar, as opposed to unwillingness.
Recognizing the construction of the rhetorical world as grounded in the social
entity of the communities that legitimize particular stories, John Shotter foregrounds the
inherent sociality of language as the building block of a social constructionist approach to
strengthening person-to-person relationships. He offers, ―In everyday life, words do not
in themselves have a meaning, but a use, and furthermore, a use only in a context; they
are best thought of, not as having already determined meanings, but as means, as tools, or
as instruments for use in the ‗making‘ of meanings‖ (54). Shotter understands the
malleability of language across contexts for how communicators create social meaning.
His discussion of context underscores the social component of meaning-making in that
the ongoing rhetorical negotiation of meaning varies across engagement with particular,
situated, vernacular public spheres. Moreover, Shotter highlights the action aspect of
CMM, that language achieves some end as persons-in-conversation socially engage it as
a pragmatic tool for person-to-person understanding.
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Underscoring the issue of understanding and the rhetorical creation of reality,
Berger offers insight in his book, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory
of Religion. There, Berger calls attention to the connection between CMM‘s focus on the
communicative activity and processes of rhetorical creation of reality through person-toperson interaction and the products of that action—society, religion, and myriad other
institutions. Underpinning the practical as well as the semantic connection between social
and society, Berger says:
Society is a dialectic phenomenon in that it is a human product, and nothing but a
human product, that yet continually acts back upon its producer. Society is a
product of man. It has no other being except that which is bestowed upon it by
human activity and consciousness. There can be no social reality apart from man.
Yet it may also be stated that man is a product of society … Society was there
before the individual was born and it will be there after he has died. What is more,
it is within society, and as a result of social processes, that the individual becomes
a person. (3)
A sociologist, Berger recognizes the communicative and social aspect of meaningmaking on a societal scale. As public diplomacy engages actors as persons-inconversation in a postmodern moment, Berger calls for a contextualizing of those
interpersonal coordinated management of meanings in the larger web of social
construction. The particular society and/or public sphere creates the individual-as-person
even as that person participates in the ongoing renegotiation of the society as he or she
enters into meaning-making with another.
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Also central to the coordination of social construction is that meaning-making is
always rhetorical and always situated within a particular ethical system. Rhetoric is
persuasive: beyond simply a didactic and descriptive metaphor of communicative action,
social construction is also persuasive. As people engage in building rhetorical reality
together, actors engage socially to determine and persuade as to the best courses of
action. Declining metanarratives do not indicate the death of ethics or of using rhetoric to
determine best courses of action together. ―Postmodernity does not deny the notion of the
good; this era is more like a juncture, a reminder that we cannot agree on a single
defining view of the good‖ (Arnett, Bell and Fritz 102). In fact, this project would argue
that in an era characterized by metanarrative decline, rhetoric and persuasion take on
enhanced currency in negotiating culture. Public spheres constructed as petite, local, and
situated vernaculars in postmodernity in conjunction with a more homogenous national
public sphere, require a posture of social construction of reality in order to be attentive to
the issue of making ethical choices together through rhetoric. The notion of ethics and
rhetorical decision-making by members of vernacular foreign publics moves
communicative life out of the realm of one-way communication, placing postmodern
communication and culture squarely in the realm of social construction and CMM as an
ongoing rhetorical process.
Lois Self also underscores the rhetorical aspect of socially constructed worlds and
adds to it the notion of phronesis:
Rhetoric is an art, phronesis an intellectual virtue; both are special ―reasoned
capacities‖ which properly function in the world of probability; both are
normative processes in that they involve rational principles of choice-making;
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both have general applicability but always require careful analysis of particulars
in determining the best response to each specific situation; both ideally take into
account the wholeness of human nature (rhetoric in its three appeals, phronesis in
its balance of desire and reason); and finally, both have social utility and
responsibility in that both treat matters of the public good. (135)
Rhetoric and phronesis in response to the particular exigencies of a postmodern
communication situation take on special currency as they relate to foreign relations in a
moment of postmodern lack of agreement about the meaning of the world. Employing
wisdom, prudence, and practical reason takes on even more salience in vernacular public
spheres where agreement on issues in a postmodern pluralistic world cannot be taken for
granted.
Managing Pluralism
In a pluralistic world, Pearce argues, ―good communication occurs when you and
others are able to coordinate your actions sufficiently well that your conversations
comprise social worlds in which you and they can live well—that is, with dignity, honor,
joy and love‖ (Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds 366). Managing
pluralism can be engaged through a discussion of meaning coordination (the ways in
which actions come together to produce patterns) and meaning coherence (the stories that
one tells that make life meaningful). CMM offers a praxis touch point for engaging
pluralism in public diplomacy, which will be discussed shortly.
For CMM, communication constitutes what it means to be human. Cronen
suggests, ―If communication is the primary social process, it is not something external to
us that we are able to do as a consequence of what human beings are. Rather, it is
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intrinsic to our constitution as distinctively human creatures‖ (19). Both Dewey
(Democracy and Education) and Mead (Mind, Self, and Society) recognized the tendency
of the Western mind to assume the Cartesian dualism in terms of communicative thought
and communicative action. CMM, however, does not assume the ascendency of thought
over action. ―The primary form of action is the ‗conjoint activity‘ of two or more persons.
This claim … has been central to the development of CMM from the start‖ (Cronen 35).
In communicative action the coordination of stories and the coherence of stories are
rhetorically managed in the ongoing discourse between diverse people engaging in a
pluralistic world of oftentimes competing commitments. Vivien Burr notes the
importance of discourse to story coordination in postmodern plurality. ―Discourses,
through what is said, written or otherwise represented, serve to construct the phenomena
of our world for us, and different discourses construct these things in different ways‖
(49).
In their book, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness, Berger,
Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner explain that for most of history human beings
lived in small communities where differences could be managed easily. That is to say in
CMM terms that stories could be easily coordinated on the basis of shared meaning.
―[T]he typical situation of individuals in a modern [contemporary] society is very
different. Different sectors of their everyday life relate them to vastly different and often
severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience‖ (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 64).
Story coordination in CMM theorizes that as actors in a situation communicate, they
coordinate the ongoing discourse in real-time, as it unfolds between them as they manage
their competing commitments in a pluralistic situation.
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Meaning coordination in CMM has particular relevance for postmodern
communication. As Griffin notes, ―coordination is difficult when two people have a
separate sense of what is necessary, noble, and good‖ (73). Certainly, those engaging
vernacular voices abroad will find not only a language barrier, but a moral and ethical
barrier as to what is conceived of as the best way forward. Calling them ―different logics
of meaning and action,‖ Pearce and Cronen offer a pragmatic way forward
(Communication, Action and Meaning 33). CMM holds that parties or communicators
can coordinate future action rhetorically without sharing a common interpretation of
reality. Stephen Littlejohn, Jonathan Shailor, and Pearce analyzed mediation and
discovered that a deep sense of reality surfaces in conversation against a backdrop of
plurality. CMM, however, holds that despite an individual‘s ―logical force‖—that is, the
moral obligation with which they feel to act in a particular way—coordination can be
achieved if the rhetorical meaning both parties ascribe to yields a given plan for future
action that does not hinder the effectiveness of the rhetorical agreement (Cronen and
Pearce, ―Logical Force in Interpersonal Communication: A New Concept of the
‗Necessity‘ in Social Behaviors‖).
Meaning coherence is another concept central to a discussion of CMM in
managing plurality. Plurality creates unique problems of misunderstanding in
postmodernity for the coherence of meanings. According to CMM, a speech act makes
sense within layers of context: the particular episode, the relationship between
communicators, the actors‘ self-identities, and the actors‘ particular cultures. These four
layers of context are what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls ―frames of life,‖ those particular
lenses which provide the background and historicity to communication (5-6).
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While CMM puts forth a stable hierarchy and system of coherence and
coordination, the theory recognizes that misunderstandings occur. With its concept of
strange loops, charmed loops, and subversive loops, CMM theorizes about how
communicators engage contradictory meaning, perceptions, and actions. Multiple
contexts may hold equivalent importance at the same time or may swap back and forth
between levels. This leads to a strange loop. Essentially, a strange loop is a repetitive
interaction between interlocutors that alternates between contradictory meanings that may
cause confusion or frustration between parties. Another iteration is the charmed loop. In
this interaction, each communicator‘s perceptions and actions help to reinforce the other
participant‘s perceptions and actions. Third, is a subversive loop. Texts and contexts
within a subversive loop invalidate one another and can prevent coherence and
coordination. Subversive loops are so called because they subvert the intent of the
communication and may result in refusal to recognize the possibility that the outsider to
the context of the episode or culture can understand the situation of the insider, thereby
subverting any impact the communicative act may have. CMM‘s concept of loops allows
for the ongoing management of conflict, misunderstanding, and misperceptions as they
relate to the meanings of participants in the communicative exchange.
Participant Meaning
The metaphor of ―participant meaning‖ engages a discussion of the various
communication models in CMM that public diplomacy professionals may look to in order
to understand their role as a participant in a pluralistic, socially constructed reality.
Specifically, the metaphor of ―participant‖ looks at how communicators are situated and
implicated in the following CMM models: the hierarchy model, the serpentine model, the
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daisy model, and the LUUUTT model (Pearce, ―The Coordinated Management of
Meaning‖) in order to provide specific practical application points for understanding the
process of strengthening people-to-people relationships for postmodern public
diplomacy.
The hierarchy, serpentine, and daisy models are all examined through an example
from Pearce‘s chapter, ―The Coordinated Management of Meaning‖ in William
Gudykunst‘s Theorizing About Intercultural Communication. Pearce analyzed the
courtroom discourse between Ramzi Yousef, the man convicted of bombing the World
Trade Center in 1993, and Kevin Duffy, the federal judge who heard his trial. According
to Pearce, Yousef's pre-sentencing statement criticizes the United States for its hypocrisy,
and he levies the charge that the United States is the world‘s foremost terrorist.
Moreover, he reiterates his commitment in the fight against America. At the sentencing,
Duffy calls Yousef evil, claiming that Yousef perverts the principles of Islam and is
interested only in hatred, destruction, and death. According to Pearce, both men talk at
each other, not to each other (―The Coordinated Management of Meaning‖ 50-54).
Pearce‘s example is particularly valuable for a discussion of the metaphor of ―participant
meaning‖ as it provides an intercultural rendering of CMM by the theorist himself.
Moreover, as public diplomacy professionals engage radically different worldviews and
rhetorical realities, the ability to appropriate each of these models as a participant in the
discourse will prove valuable for building person-to-person relationships in
postmodernity, and in countering violent extremism, one of the State Department‘s other
mandates in the QDDR.
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The hierarchy model of CMM as communicative action allows one to look at the
multitude of perspectives of their co-communicator while providing an opportunity to
reflect more thoroughly on their own perspectives. The hierarchy model of CMM can
also be appropriated to analyze a completed conversation for the purposes of teaching,
training, or analysis of one‘s own discourse as a person-in-conversation. Following is
Pearce‘s example as conceived in the CMM hierarchy, or in the Wittgensteinian frames
detailed earlier in the chapter.
For Ramzi Yousef, the frame of culture is a powerful ―logical force‖ (Pearce and
Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 153-54) of a story situated in an ethic of
radical Islam and oppressive foreign relations by the United States. His duty to culture,
understood as a particularly situated vernacular culture within the larger culture of Islam,
is to rout the United States from the Middle East. For the frame of episode, Yousef views
himself as wrongfully being tried as a terrorist by the very country who he claims to be
world‘s largest terrorist, hypocritically accusing others of terrorism. Regarding the frame
of self, Yousef‘s identity is rooted in a view of self as fulfilling his duty as a freedom
fighter against the great oppressors of the West: The United States, Europe, and Israel.
Lastly, in the frame of relationship, his is one of opposing the United States. His
relationship to the victims of the attack is an untold story.
Judge Kevin Duffy‘s frames take on a different nuance. For the cultural frame,
Duffy‘s ―logical force‖ (Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 15354) is grounded in Western morality and belief in the rule of law and a Western
humanistic ethic. His episode is that of a fair trial of a criminal murderer and terrorist,
who was given due process in accordance with American and Western belief in trail by
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law, even for the most heinous of criminals and terrorists. Duffy‘s frame of self is rooted
in his role as judge and as the facilitator of fairness, due process, and trial by jury.
Duffy‘s relationship frame is fundamentally opposed to Yousef‘s ethics of killing for
religion and violation of fundamental and internationally held principles of terrorism.
Duffy also views Yousef as betraying the religious principles of the larger public sphere
of Islam for the small, vernacular, radical public sphere of extremist and conservative
fundamental Islam and terrorism (Pearce, ―The Coordinated Management of Meaning‖
43-54). This exercise of CMM‘s four frames in story coherence lends itself well in
understanding one‘s role in a co-created enmeshed web of meaning.
The hierarchy model is structured in such a way as to show how the message is
embedded in the relationship, the relationship as situated in the individual's concept of
self, which backgrounds the specific episode occurring in a larger culture. The hierarchy
model is CMM‘s rendering of historicity. Pearce takes the hierarchy model another step
in his reinforcement of the importance of interaction and by adding a temporal element.
The serpentine model of communication in CMM is attentive to the element of time
(―The Coordinated Management of Meaning‖ 43). Pearce notes that one cannot engage in
discourse alone, and as dialectic, discourse happens before or after another‘s
communication action. Therefore, understanding communication activity both ashappened and may-happen is central to a dialectic-discourse understanding of rhetoric
and communication.
The serpentine model visually demonstrates communication as a sequentialtemporal exchange between participants as opposed to a transmission of information
outside the temporality of human experience and communication. Understanding that
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communication is more than just one-way transmission of information, CMM‘s concept
of the serpentine model adds the dimension of time to extend the hierarchy model. Pearce
stresses that communication cannot be done alone (―The Coordinated Management of
Meaning‖). Furthermore, he notes that communication occurs before or after another‘s
communication, implicating communication in the contextual milieu of other
communicative acts. The serpentine model considers the time and sequence of a
particular context in the communicative situation.
The daisy model further engages the context of a participant in communication.
The daisy model, so called because of its shape, examines secondary and oftentimes less
noticed communication actions that take place at the same time, sometimes in concert
with, the main discourse of a conversation. In Pearce‘s example of Yousef and Duffy, the
discourse of trial is the main discourse. However, each is participating in multiple
concurrent communication events. Yousef is communicating with his family, potential
would-be jihadists, and Muslims at-large, according to Pearce‘s analysis. On the other
hand, Duffy is communicating with his family, the legal community or his peers, and the
American voting public (Pearce ―The Coordinated Management of Meaning‖). The daisy
model of CMM calls communicators-as-participants to be engaged in the sub-discourses
that are happening outside, but related to, their own conversations for a more robust
understanding of reality.
The LUUUTT model fronts the centrality of story for the diplomat-as-participant.
LUUUTT stands for stories Lived, Untold stories, Unheard stories, Unknown stories,
stories Told, and story Telling (Kearney ―Glossary‖). This model may be useful during
the actual communication process as a communicator begins to learn about individuals,
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and by extension, the vernacular cultures shared by a group of individuals. The focus on
story and the process of storytelling is also helpful in understanding the larger cultural
knowledge of a group of people. Engaging CMM through the metaphor of participant
meaning foregrounds the issue of story in building person-to-person relationships,
creating a natural tie to narrative and story, which will be engaged in Chapter 4.
Stories lived and stories told are distinct categories in the LUUUTT model of
communication because how one constructs their identity from their stories differs from
the stories they actually live and the communication activities in which they actually
engage. For Pearce, stories lived and stories told may actually help individuals come to
terms with their realities. ―Understanding that these differences exist and paying attention
to them can be important to understanding the nuances within a communication event‖
(Pearce Associates 58). In the diplomatic exchange, a discrepancy in the story told and
the reality of the action happening may appear as lack of sincerity in the partnership, but
may be a more salient way of managing self-identity in a given culture where
circumstances prevent told stories from becoming lived stories.
Unheard stories are told stories, but for one reason or another, the other
participant in the conversation does not hear the story. Reasons for not hearing the story
may include an unwillingness to hear the story, lack of attentiveness to the story, physical
or social prevention from hearing the story such as not being able to get to the location
the story is being told, or the message is being communicated in an unfamiliar or
unknown fashion, including language barriers (Kearney ―Glossary‖ 8-9).
Communicators may not hear a story for any number of reasons, including travel, safety,
or language. In a given situation, myriad stories may be lost that could inform the person-
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to-person engagement, making active participation more difficult in a foreign exchange
than may be the case in a more familiar situation.
Untold stories are ones that are known but not shared for any number of reasons.
Unknown stories are unknown because the persons-in-conversation may not know the
stories exist or understand the story. Last in the LUUUTT model is story Telling. Jeremy
Kearney describes the process of storytelling as ―when and where a person tells a story,
their mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice, and subject matter all contribute to the
overall story being told‖ (Kearney ―Glossary‖ 9). In CMM, the telling of a story is
layered with cultural significance, particular to the vernacular the story belongs to.
Communicators engaged in postmodern vernacular public spheres should understand told
stories as heavy with the layers of a culture as postmodern communication calls for
increased attentiveness to and engagement with petite and localized public spheres.
Coordinated Management of Meaning‘s Importance for Community Diplomacy
in Postmodern Public Diplomacy
CMM creates social worlds in postmodern public diplomacy through an
interpersonal interaction between people living in a vernacular, situated culture and
American diplomats. Community diplomacy is a core initiative of Chapter 5‘s
development of public diplomacy 2.0 and is attentive to the particular vernacular public
sphere of a given community. According to the QDDR:
Community diplomacy is a new approach to identifying and developing networks
of contacts through specific on-the-ground projects, programs, or events and then
helping those networks evolve into consistent centers of action on areas of
common interest—from non-proliferation to climate change to expanding
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opportunities for women and girls. The purpose of community diplomacy is
twofold: first, building networks of contacts that can operate on their own to
advance objectives consistent with our interests; and second, showcasing through
particular events our commitment to common interests and universal values.
Moreover, community diplomacy draws on one of the great assets and
comparative advantages of our Foreign Service personnel, namely the deep
knowledge of the culture, language, and political landscape in a foreign country.
(United States Department of State and United States Agency on International
Development 63)
Community diplomacy as an outgrowth of public diplomacy shifts the focus of public
diplomacy from traditional forms of modernist public diplomacy like mass media and is
conceived here as a core competency of public diplomacy in postmodernity. Community
diplomacy initiatives also understand communities as situated vernaculars within a larger
nation. For example, in both Guangzhou, China, and Monterrey, Mexico, the American
diplomatic posts there organized community walks and races to support local
organizations and showcase ―America‘s commitment to helping those in need while
forging relationships with local government representatives and NGOs‖ (United States
Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64). The
events provided an opportunity for diplomats to expand and strengthen interpersonal
relationships through the community diplomacy events and programs.
Moreover, according to the QDDR, diplomats around the world are ―connecting
directly with communities across the globe to showcase America‘s values and build
relationships‖ (64). An understanding of CMM can lend philosophical texture to these
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direct engagements with members of vernacular public spheres: the QDDR cites efforts to
liaise with future thought leaders in New Zealand through the American ambassador to
New Zealand ―organizing meetings with student leaders at New Zealand universities to
share ideas and discuss current issues‖ (64). Tactically, community diplomacy should
look to build person-to-person relationships with opinion leaders in order to both
understand a culture and to shape narratives from the top of public opinion formation
down to others in the community.
Engaging community interaction as consciously rhetorical co-creators of
meaning, diplomats who understand CMM‘s core metaphors of coordinating social
construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning are embedded in enmeshed
action whereby diplomacy, and indeed communication at-large, is not thought of as
simply sharing of ideas, but as building person-to-person relationships and creating and
shaping ideas to influence the narrative, which Chapter 4 will address.
For postmodern public diplomacy, understanding a culture and knowing its
people, as well as mediating conflict and promoting American interests lies in the
centrality of CMM‘s conception of ―persons-in-conversation.‖ A central aspect of
postmodern public diplomacy is on-the-ground interaction with citizens in local, situated
publics and conversing in Embassy-sponsored town hall meetings to get to know local
citizens and to troubleshoot problems and explain American interests in the area. An
important texture for public diplomacy in creating person-to-person relationships is a call
to understand that as diplomats engage in a world, they alter the reality of that world by
their ongoing participation in the social discourse. By understanding communicative acts
through CMM—specifically, its hierarchy, its constitutive and regulative rules, its
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various models, and its loops that account for misunderstanding and subversion of
coherence and coordination—diplomats engaging in postmodern public diplomacy in any
variety of situations in which they are called to ―expand and strengthen people-to-people
relationships‖ in the QDDR can benefit from the interpersonal communication insight
offered in CMM (United States Department of State and United States Agency on
International Development 60).
To be sure, encountering members of a foreign public is an exercise in alterity. In
a postmodern moment as diplomats engage with various publics advancing different
ethical structures within a single nation, the situatedness of the vernacular public sphere
that requires attention at a given time within the larger national public sphere takes on
importance. Understanding CMM through the metaphor of coordinating social
construction allows the diplomatic professional to see his or her work as social,
rhetorical, and situated within a vernacular ethical system requiring phronesis, or
practical wisdom. Important in a world where a given metanarrative is in decline or is
contested, the call in the QDDR is one of engaging and managing pluralism, where
meaning‘s construction takes on importance as a rhetorical practice situated in a local
public sphere. Diplomats carrying out the QDDR‘s maxim to engage their work through
building interpersonal relationships should take care to approach the stories they tell and
the stories they want to co-create with members of a foreign public in a manner of
thinking that is explicitly aware of the particularly hierarchy of content, speech act,
episode, relationship, life script, and culture. Engaging the work of community
diplomacy as a generalist takes on currency here. Public diplomacy in a postmodern
moment should open a space for diplomats to be attentive to a CMM model of coherence
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by learning the literature, poetry, music, and customs of a vernacular foreign culture for
the sake of interpersonal relationship building—in addition to policy briefings, country
plans, and instrumental language training. For the diplomat to learn the canon of a
culture, they must not be a disinterested modernist communicator, but instead an active
participant in a culture. That CMM is an active, ongoing management of meaning
coordinated by interlocutors in a discourse requires the diplomat to view his or her work
in the field as a participant in the ongoing construction of culture and narrative for both
the understanding of that culture and for the promotion of peace, stability, and Western
political ideas.
Conclusion
The State Department‘s maxim in the QDDR that to be effective public diplomacy
practitioners in a postmodern moment diplomats need to build people-to-people
relationships is well-taken. Outside of that mandate, however, the QDDR does not give a
theoretical or philosophical framework for how that should be done. In a postmodern
world characterized by lack of metanarrative and shared values, and one in which
American diplomats understand themselves in a cosmopolitan manner as situated in a
multiplicity of public spheres within a nation‘s boundaries, the call for interpersonal
engagement to understand the particular vernacular public sphere is of critical
importance.
Pearce and Cronen‘s CMM broke with convention 30 years ago when it posited a
communicative, humanities-based understanding of reality as socially constructed
through communicative action, particularly as their work related to mediation. Their
understanding of communicators as active participants enmeshed in a pluralistic world of
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varying rhetorically constructed, changed, and maintained realities marked a turn in
thinking from a scientistic conception of reality as ―out there‖ to be apprehended by
language to a reality created by and through language.
Moreover, CMM carves a space in front of the social constructionists who,
concerned with the products of communication, do not think philosophically with regard
to communication-as-action as a socially constructive process first and one that creates
cultural products second. CMM‘s ideas of persons-in-conversation, coherence,
coordination, and cosmopolitan mystery speak directly to postmodern public diplomacy‘s
central concept of building relationships as a hermeneutic entrance by which to
understand public spheres in their postmodern rendering as petite, situated, and
vernacular. To engage effectively in shaping the narrative of a public sphere, public
diplomacy professionals need a philosophically textured understanding of a theory of
communication that builds a praxis approach for carrying out the interpersonal mandate
in the QDDR as a prerequisite for shaping vernacular narratives.
Once a philosophical groundwork has been laid for building interpersonal
communication and meaning management between individuals, diplomats will need to
shape both individual and community narratives toward American policy goals. Chapter
4 will survey narrative theory and apply each scholar‘s work to public diplomacy in
postmodernity to build a philosophy of communication for narrative formation in
American foreign diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 4
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Directive 2: ―Shaping the Narrative‖:
Narrative in Public Diplomacy
Writing in the early-to-mid twentieth century, Robert T. Oliver may be one of the
first thinkers to bring communication scholarship to bear on international relations and
diplomacy. He fronted the notion of culture as central to effective communication with
his understanding that diplomacy and intercultural communication were not things apart
(Oliver). His work contributes one of the first voices in the field of communication and
rhetoric that called for an intersection between scholarship on communication and
diplomacy. Robert Shutter argues that:
Moreover, he turned his culturally informed mindset on the world‘s most serious
social problems—tackling tenaciously the rhetorics of war and peace, poverty and
abundance—but always steadfast in the belief that without a deep understanding
of national cultures, communicators—albeit, nations—will continue seriously to
misunderstand one another. (31)
Oliver‘s work provides a historical and modernist background metaphor for this chapter.
His work recast for a postmodern moment might consider how diplomats speak
effectively to others, that is, how diplomats understand, in order to shape, the personal
and collective narratives of members of petite publics within a nation.
Citing the importance of the narrative ground from which one speaks, Janie M.
Harden Fritz notes that Oliver‘s work ―implies a three-dimensional understanding of
persons as individual, social, and narrative beings‖ (72). Oliver pointed to a turn toward
recognizing the importance of narrative in diplomacy on the cusp of postmodernity.
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Looking at philosophy of communication in postmodernity that fronts narrative as central
to understanding human communicative activity underpins the Quadrennial Diplomacy
and Development Review’s (QDDR; United States Department of State and United States
Agency on International Development) second communicative mandate: that diplomats
should actively participate in shaping foreign narratives.
In a postmodern era characterized by lack of metanarrative agreement, narratives
take on new importance to shape and give meaning to vernacular groups‘ particular and
situated stories. As public diplomacy professionals engage postmodern local publics in
postmodern public diplomacy initiatives like community diplomacy programs and town
hall meetings, a philosophical and rhetorical understanding of narrative will allow
diplomats to shape the narratives of the publics with which they interact. Those cocreated narratives will not only further American policy goals, but will also empower the
members of vernacular foreign publics to shape their political self-will in a narrative that
remains true to experience and history within democracy:
If we wish to understand the deepest and most universal of human experiences, if
we wish our work to be faithful to the lived experiences of people, if we wish for
a union between poetics and science, or if we wish to use our privileges and skills
to empower the people we study, then we should value the narrative. (Richardson
117)
Clearly, narrative is fundamental to human life together. Chapter 4 considers how
narrative theory can help the diplomatic practitioner shape the narratives of members of
foreign publics and the narratives of foreign publics at-large to effectively carry out the
task charged by the QDDR to ―shape the narrative‖ (60).
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Moreover, this chapter will, in turn, examine the work of Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Walter Fisher, Ronald Arnett, and Pat Arneson and apply each to postmodern
public diplomacy praxis. Within the corpus of communication and rhetorical scholarship,
much work has been done on the issue of narrative. This project selects these five
scholars because of the unique contribution each makes to the specific intersection of
communication scholarship and diplomacy. Ricoeur‘s work addresses identity, selfhood,
and time, the conceptions of each influencing the effectiveness of the intercultural
exchange to achieve persuasive foreign policy goals. MacIntyre‘s work is engaged for its
unique attention to ethics and engages a discussion important to diplomacy: what can the
diplomat conceive of as a minimal set of ethical goods between two vastly different
communicators in a postmodern world. Fisher‘s name is perhaps the most synonymous
with narrative scholarship and offers a way of understanding stories, not in the rationalworld modernist paradigm, but rhetorically and philosophically for a postmodern
diplomatic moment. Arnett‘s work engages narrative from the metaphor of community.
Because this project is concerned with building genuine rhetorical community between
American diplomats and individuals in emergent, vernacular public spheres, Arnett‘s
work offers insight for the diplomat. Finally, Arneson‘s work discusses narrative from
poiesis. Her attention to the poetic and inherently creative nature of human
communication and its contribution to how narratives are built, maintained, and changed,
offers insight for a generation of diplomats called to interface with local customs, stories,
and culture as an entrance into already existing narratives.
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The Philosophy of Narrative
Ricoeur‘s work provides philosophical ground for understanding how stories form
the basis of humans‘ understanding of themselves, others, and their place in a given
world. A particular value that Ricoeur adds to the conversation about shaping narratives
in a postmodern moment is that his work approaches stories and human understanding
from an intercultural philosophy of communication. His narrative theory will be engaged
from three main metaphors: time, identity, and selfhood.
Using the terms temporality, narrative identity, and entanglement of personal
incidents in stories, Ricoeur offers that:
to translate a foreign culture into the categories peculiar to one‘s own presupposes
… is a difference of memory, precisely at the level of the customs, rules, norms,
beliefs and convictions which constitute the identity of a culture. But to speak of
memory is not only to evoke a psycho-physiological faculty which has something
to do with the preservation and recollection of traces of the past; it is to put
forward the ‗narrative‘ function through which this primary capacity of
preservation and recollection is exercised at the public level of language. Even at
the individual level, it is through stories revolving around others and around
ourselves that we articulate and shape our own temporality. Two noteworthy
phenomena concern us here. … The first is the ‗narrative identity‘ of the
characters of the story … [and] the entanglement of personal incidents in stories.
(―Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe‖ 5-6)
Ricoeur‘s work understands culture not as reified, but as an ongoing re-creation with the
telling of stories. Memory here takes on an active function in the telling of the stories of a
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culture. Ricoeur also sees the communicator, whether the diplomat or a member of a
foreign culture, as understanding the notion of time through the construct of the narrative
that makes up both the communicator‘s narrative identity and, by extension, his or her
sense of selfhood in relation to myriad other stories he or she is entangled in.
In his later work, Time and Narrative, Ricoeur argues that time and narrative
cannot be understood apart from one another. He argues that, ―time becomes human to
the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full
meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence‖ (52). For Ricoeur, the claim
of truth central to any narrative is always situated in human experience, which, by its
nature, is temporal. Put another way, Ricoeur says, ―The world unfolded by every
narrative work is always a temporal world. Or, as will often be repeated in the course of
this study: time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of
a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of
temporal experience‖ (Time and Narrative 3). For Ricoeur, temporality and narrativity
reinforce one another. Time is more than a taken-for-granted element of a story—that a
story obviously takes place in time. Ricoeur‘s concern for narrative is how the narrative
structure humanizes time and brings time into human experience and language, while
understanding how time affects human narratives and humans‘ experience of those
stories.
Aristotle‘s concept of plot is one way in which Ricoeur gets at the temporality of
narrative. He says, ―By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought together
within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action‖ (Time and Narrative ix).
Ricoeur offers three iterations of mimesis, which is ―a figure of speech, whereby the
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words or actions of another are imitated‖ and ―the deliberate imitation of the behavior of
one group of people by another as a factor in social change‖ (―Mimesis‖) that produces a
narrative. In other words, narrative is the ―what‖ or product of mimetic activity. Ricoeur
says of emplotment and its relation to time and narrative, ―My chief concern in this
analysis is to discover how the act of raconter, of telling a story, can transmute natural
time into a specifically human time, irreducible to mathematical, chronological ‗clock
time‘‖ (Kearney, Dialogues With Contemporary Continental Thinkers 17). Ricoeur‘s
fascination with time is not only in how time affects narrative, but in how time is
humanized by narrative, that is to say how time moves from an explicitly Enlightenment,
mathematical, and scientific delineation of time to human time where plot and action give
human time shape and meaning. Ricoeur is concerned with how narrativity allows for
new ways of expressing human time.
Ricoeur goes on to say that ―narrativity is the mode of discourse through which
the mode of being which we call temporality, or temporal being, is brought to language‖
(A Ricoeur Reader 99). A human‘s temporal being and their experience of time, for
Ricoeur, is bound up not in clock time, but in time as experienced in human action and
the narrativity of life as life is lived and communicated through stories. Ricoeur‘s concept
of narrative identity is the identity a person has based on the stories that give their life
meaning. David Wood says, ―Ricoeur suggests we think of the examined life as a
narrated life, characterized by a struggle between concordance and discordance, the aim
of which is to discover, not to impose on oneself, a narrative identity‖ (11). Ricoeur‘s
sense of narrative identity is that identity which one discovers as subject, which makes up
their life and is not an identity laid upon oneself by choice.
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Radical individualism has no place in Ricoeur. Standing outside of narrative time,
which provides situatedness for one‘s identity, is not an option for Ricoeur. He says,
―Our life, when embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the field of a constructive
activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not
simply impose from outside the narrative identity which constitutes us‖ (―Life in Quest
of Narrative‖ 32). Ricoeur conceives of narrative identity as human subjectivity within a
narrative that gives one a sense of belonging to history and community.
For Ricoeur, narrative identity situated in narrative time bridges the gap between
scientific, clock time and phenomenological time. In other words, narrative time and the
subjectivity of narrative identity reconcile the two. Henry Isaac Venema offers that
narrative identity in Ricoeur is a ―resolution to the problems of the dialectic of narrative
and temporal experience‖ (97). The individual‘s identity within a narrative structure
points to a reconciliation of time and narrative in Ricoeur as does emplotment, which
―transforms the many incidents into one story‖ (Ricoeur ―Life in Quest of Narrative‖ 21).
Fadoua Loudiy argues:
Narrative identity has the following implications: First, the self understands itself
via interpretation; second, interpretation is mediated primarily through narrative
and other signs, myths, and symbols; and third, narration combines history and
fiction for the construction of a life story. One‘s identity is negotiated through
various mediums and genres and understood within a hermeneutic circle. But this
hermeneutic circle is an open one; it evolves with life experiences and encounters
with others. (441)
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Ricoeurian narrative hermeneutic is one of subjectivity: individuals are implicated in a
life of narratives that gives life fluid meaning, that is, meanings can and do change as
narratives are introduced throughout a life and as other narratives disappear. If
individuals are enmeshed in myriad stories that give their lives meaning, the issue of
agency and conscious choice-making about stories arises. Ricoeur answers this call in his
discussion of selfhood.
Ricoeur‘s concept of selfhood is the third major point of his narrative theory that
carries import for the diplomat. He distinguishes between two kinds of selfhood, ―identity
as sameness … and identity as selfhood‖ (―Narrative Identity‖ 189). This project
understands Ricoeur‘s selfhood as agency. Venema offers, ―To each objectification—
linguistic, practical, narrative, and ethical—the question ‗who?‘ is addressed, and in each
case Ricoeur asserts that ‗the self‘ is the only appropriate response‖ (125). Furthermore,
Ricoeur himself engages the question of agency when he says, ―Who is speaking? Who is
acting? Who is recounting about himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of
imputation?‖ (Oneself as Another 16). Whereas narrative identity provides the ―what‖ for
a person, that is, a man or woman, an American or Briton, selfhood in Ricoeur provides
personal agency for a narrative.
For Ricoeur, narrative identity engages both concepts of the self: identity as
sameness and identity in narrative, but fronts identity in narrative. Mara Rainwater offers
that ―attention to discursive language has … led Ricoeur to develop a model of selfhood
that privileges a narrative (ipse) identity … always mediated by others‖ (100). A person‘s
identity, for Ricoeur, is unique and constant, as well as changing in relation to others. The
self‘s identity as same gives one temporal stability (―I am always me.‖) while identity-as-
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agency gives the self the ability to change in relation to others and other narratives (―I
hold a different set of political commitments than I used to.‖).
Ricoeur‘s contribution to the conversation on narrative is in his approach to
placing the individual in relation to oneself, the other, and the larger world. Against an
understanding of narrative that views the commitments of individuals and cultures as
reified, his work understands narrative as an ongoing hermeneutic negotiation. Moreover,
his work contributes that individuals live in myriad relationships—with oneself, with
other people, and with the larger world and time. Ricoeur‘s work grows out of an
understanding that stories with oneself, other people, and the larger tradition undergo
regular rhetorical negotiation. His insight calls for a minimal set of ethical goods for a
postmodern philosophical moment through which individuals can operate in order to
engage a world that in constantly changing, even as the individual is changed by his or
her implication in the narrative.
Postmodern Narrative Ethics
MacIntyre is one of the foremost scholars of ethics in postmodernity. His After
Virtue concerns itself with answering the problem of lack of agreement on basic grounds
from which to make ethical decisions in postmodernity. His work brings communication
scholarship into conversation with the academic field of international relations and
diplomacy by offering a way of rhetorically conceiving of a minimalist set of ethics to
guide the navigation of contrasting narratives in postmodernity and the shaping of foreign
narratives toward American policy goals. This project‘s discussion of MacIntyre‘s theory
will center on his conception of postmodern ethics through the metaphors of practices,
traditions, and the narrative self from his work, After Virtue.
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It is in After Virtue that MacIntyre turns to communication and narrative to lay out
a theory of how people should live life together. Jason Hannan says of MacIntyre‘s turn
to communication and narrative:
MacIntyre rejects the abstract formalism characteristic of Enlightenment-style
moral theory, the kind of formalism that seeks to transcend the particularities of
history, language, and culture so as to derive final, authoritative, and universal
judgments. It is precisely this attempt at transcendence that explains the gap
between theory and practice, as well as the lack of rhetorical force in the
judgments derived through such abstraction. MacIntyre contends that the only
viable basis for public discourse is the social and practical circumstances of
everyday life. (394)
MacIntyre makes a move away from formal logic and Enlightenment renderings that look
to explain human nature outside of a specific narrative. MacIntyre understands the human
agent as embedded in an already-given social construction of the world in which the
agent has to search for what they should do and not simply make decisions outside of the
constructs of their already-given social experience.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre argues that:
man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a storytelling animal. … I can only answer the question ‗What am I to do?‘ if I can
answer the prior question ‗Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?‘ We
enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into
which we have been drafted.‖ (201)
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For MacIntyre, the answer to the question of what one is supposed to do is contingent on
practices and, more largely, tradition. MacIntyre‘s metaphors of practices, traditions, and
the narrative self form a narrative theory in response to ethics and the problem of virtue
(After Virtue).
MacIntyre‘s conception of narrative speaks directly to trying to shape a given
narrative in a postmodern moment, and MacIntyre offers that ―to think of a human life as
a narrative unity is to think in a way alien to the dominant individualistic and
bureaucratic modes of modern culture‖ (After Virtue 227). For MacIntyre, a narrative
begins with a set of practices whose goods are internal to it. MacIntyre defines practice as
―any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence‖ (―The Claims of After Virtue‖ 71). For example,
farming for MacIntyre would be a practice because the goods yielded are internal to that
form of activity. He argues that this was the basis for narrative life together before the
Enlightenment separated practice and work. Thus, to be a morally good farmer would be
to farm well in the construct of what it means to yield a good crop. Being a good farmer
is not simply what one deems a good farmer to be, but is situated in the practice of good
farming, based on communally accepted standards.
Moreover, MacIntyre addresses the change that modernity made to work and its
subsequent effect on narrative in the West. He holds that:
the kind of work done by the vast majority of the inhabitants of the modern world
cannot be understood in terms of the nature of a practice with goods internal to
itself, and for very good reason. One of the key moments in the creation of
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modernity occurs when production moves outside the household. So long as
productive work occurs within the structure of households, it is easy and right to
understand that work as part of the sustaining of the community of the household
and of those wider forms of community which the household in turn sustains.
(After Virtue 227)
For MacIntyre, the bureaucratizing of modern work and the historical process whereby
narrative and practice were expelled are the same process. MacIntyre‘s call is for a return
to classical conceptions of humankind—the person as derived from his or her role in a
practice whereby activity yields a product internal to that practice. Modern work divorced
practices from community, and as MacIntyre argues, shattered any common conception
of narrative.
MacIntyre offers that ―The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest‖
(After Virtue 203). Human life together, for MacIntyre, is a return to understanding the
self as socially constructed, that is to say, against the liberal notion that ―emphasizes our
status as choosing and deciding beings‖ (Horton and Mendus 9). Deciding what to do, for
MacIntyre is set against the backdrop of discovering who we are in relation to alreadygiven roles and in relation to others. Through practices, individuals can situate
themselves in the wider context of tradition.
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift offer an account of tradition in MacIntyre that
argues, ―A tradition is constituted by a set of practices and is a mode of understanding
their importance and worth; it is the medium by which such practices are shaped and
transmitted across generations‖ (90). They go on to note that traditions can have their
basis in religion or morality, economics, aesthetics, or geopolitical structures. Tradition,
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for MacIntyre, is the larger scheme of practices in which people engage that provide a
narrative for their life.
Self as nested in practices and traditions, MacIntyre‘s narrative models offers that
the narrative of a person‘s life is backgrounded by the already-given social context in
which the individual finds him or herself. That already-given social context is made up of
myriad practices that define virtue. Those practices, then, sustain and are situated within a
tradition that provides the support by which the individual person may embark on his or
her narrative quest. Horton and Mendus offer that, ―It is traditions which are the
repositories of standards of rationality and which are crucial to moral deliberation and
action‖ (12). Traditions give the individual agent a framework within which to act, but
MacIntyre‘s concept of tradition is not a conservative, reified tradition.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre avoids reifying tradition. He offers that ―a living
tradition is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition‖ (207). This makes sense
in considering that tradition is an ongoing recasting of narratives. If one conceives of
tradition as a set of narratives, then as new narratives and ideas come into conversation
with the already-existing tradition, and as certain narratives fall into disrepair within a
tradition, the tradition becomes an ongoing rhetorical negotiation with itself and the
community that is rhetorically creating the tradition.
MacIntyre‘s third narrative metaphor is self. For MacIntyre, self must be
understood against the backdrop of community. Paul Kelly suggests that, ―MacIntyre
introduces the idea that communities constitute the self by providing the resources from
which the self‘s narratives must be constructed‖ (134). This is not to say that MacIntyre
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takes the thesis that the individual is completely constructed by the community.
MacIntyre says that:
I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the
given of my life, my moral starting point … [but] the fact that the self has to find
its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of
the family, the neighbourhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self
has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of
community. (After Virtue 220-21)
MacIntyre recognizes the self as situated, but still autonomous. The self is implicated in
and obligated to the community for its understanding of itself, but the self is not limited
by the community in that a person can make a willful choice to act out of accordance
with the community. MacIntyre‘s theory of self narrative allows for the individual to
exist without individualism.
In any case, MacIntyre provides a three-part model for how narratives work in
relation to virtue. To understand the particular morality of a culture and the set of virtues
that members of that culture hold dear, one should look to the products of the practices
members of the public engage in. For example, if a cultural practice is an attentiveness to
particular female dress or hairstyle, diplomats should attend to that practice as a carrier of
narrative meaning for the culture. In what tradition is that practice embedded? How might
an American misunderstand that practice, and subsequently the tradition and the
community narrative? For MacIntyre, to understand practices is to understand the larger
context of tradition, and by extension, to understand whereby individuals forge their self
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narratives out of a communal narrative. His work posits that individuals should engage all
three—practices, tradition, and self narrative—as necessarily causal of one another in an
ongoing rhetorical circle.
The Narrative Paradigm
Fisher introduced narrative theory to the field of rhetoric and communication,
formalizing Kenneth Burke‘s concept of dramatism. Fisher entered the conversation at a
time when the field of communication and rhetorical studies was beginning to think
otherwise than verifiable, scientific data to understand human phenomena. His work
offers fresh insight for postmodern public diplomacy with its orientation toward the idea
that stories are more than formally rational. The texture he offers allows diplomats to
engage a postmodern world from a rhetorical perspective as opposed to engaging a
modern world from a data-driven policy perspective. This discussion will center on an
overview of Fisher‘s narrative paradigm as well as his concepts of narrative coherence
and narrative fidelity as they relate to engaging a postmodern moment in the world.
In their article about social, humanistic approaches to understanding
communication, Arthur P. Bochner and Carolyn Ellis offer that ―sooner or later most of
us recognize that the social phenomena of communication are different in important ways
from the phenomena of nature. Atoms cannot comprehend the terms by which they are
described theoretically; humans can‖ (165). Fisher‘s seminal work on narrative, Human
Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action, argues
that narrative theory offers a rhetorical way to conceive of the nature of human beings
and how communicate, as opposed to a conception based in a formally rational model.
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What Fisher identifies as the rational-world paradigm had been the accepted
model of communication in the field until Fisher introduced narrative paradigm (Human
Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action).
Hearkening back to the classics over Enlightenment renderings of scientific logic, Fisher
contrasts the tenets of the rational-world paradigm and the narrative paradigm, arguing
that storytelling and narrative are the cornerstones of human existence and logic. A
decade before Human Communication as Narration, Fisher pointed to an alternative to
logic in human communication when he offered that, ―Humans as rhetorical beings are as
much valuing as they are reasoning animals‖ (―Toward a Logic of Good Reasons‖ 376).
Fisher‘s logic of good reasons unchained reasoning from argumentative, formally logical
communication and moved reason into the arena of symbolic action. In other words,
rationality can be found in the human capacity to tell a story as much as rationality can be
found in Enlightenment and modernist logic.
Fisher provides a major insight for a postmodern diplomatic moment. His concept
of ―the logic of good reasons‖ is a rhetorical way to assess and participate (in order to
shape) a narrative (Human Communication as Narration 47). Fisher argues that the
classical conception of logos ―meant story, reason, rationale, conception, discourse,
thought‖ (Human Communication as Narration 5). He argues that with the rise of Greek
classical philosophy, the idea of logos was transformed into a technical logic and away
from storytelling. That distinction, Fisher argues, still remains in Western thinking today,
and he calls for a return to a pre-Socratic ideation of logos as the narrative co-creation of
human worlds (Human Communication as Narration). In a public diplomacy context,
Fisher‘s advocacy for a narrative paradigm where logic is situated and particular to the
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stories of a petite public sphere is opposed to a rational-world paradigm that would
encourage diplomats to understand—and attempt to shape—narratives on an assumption
of technical, formal logic, where the logic is not in and of the story, but is external to the
story and evaluates the story as valid or invalid.
Fisher lists five ―essential postulates‖ of the narrative paradigm:
1. Humans are storytellers; 2. Humans make decisions and communicate based
on ―good reasons;‖ 3. How good reasons are produced and practiced is ruled by
history, biography and culture; 4. Rationality is determined by people as essential
narrative beings who have inherent awareness of narrative probability (what
constitutes a good story), and the testing of narrative fidelity (whether or not
stories ring true to with the experiences and stories they know to be true; and 5.
The world as people understand it is a collection of stories that must be chosen
among in order to live human life together in a process of continual re-creation
(Human Communication as Narration 5).
A narrative, for Fisher, whether personal or communal, is characterized by a set of
agreed-upon stories that both make sense and ring true in the particular culture and
history of a given people. This is what, holistically, Fisher calls ―narrative rationality‖
(―Narration as Human Communication Paradigm‖ 2; ―Narrative Rationality and the
Logic of Scientific Discourse‖ 23), and narrative rationality is his project‘s response to
the scientific conception of logic that had ruled communication studies through
modernity.
Making a sharp distinction between scientific, formal logics and rhetorical, storybased logics, Fisher is careful not exclude issues of fact, consequence, or consistency in
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the narrative paradigm. He offers, ―In other words, narrative rationality does not deny
that discourse often contains structures of reason that can be identified as specific forms
of argument and assessed as such‖ (Human Communication as Narration 48). Fisher
takes issue with technical logic and its sharp ascendency in modernity to dominate human
life together by mathematical formulas, as though human life together were a machine of
causal parts. He says, ―By the twentieth century, technical logic had reified reason to
mathematical symbolic forms, and rhetorical logic had continued its tradition of
conceiving of reason as a form of argumentative proof‖ (Human Communication as
Narration 49). Reclaiming logos in a classical rhetorical sense, Fisher moves the concept
into a postmodern notion of contingency—what is logical is a matter human agreement
on what makes sense and what rings true.
Narrative coherence is the way in which a story fits together. Coherence evaluates
how the people and events of a story seem to be parts of an organic whole. Fisher, not
discounting the logic of the rational-world paradigm argues that the story must be
consistent. Em Griffin offers that, ―Fisher regards the internal consistency of a narrative
as similar to lines of argument in a rational-world paradigm. In that sense, his narrative
paradigm doesn‘t discount or replace logic. Instead, Fisher lists the test of reason as one,
but only one of the factors that affect narrative coherence‖ (300). Fisher‘s central
question is whether or not one can count on the characters in a story to act in a reliable
way. Fisher notes that narrative coherence (or narrative probability) and narrative fidelity
are subsumed in the narrative paradigm (Human Communication as Narration). For
Fisher, the narrative paradigm does not replace formal logic, but is the umbrella under
which logic and other tests of coherence and fidelity reside. Stories for Fisher are too
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complex and rich to be reduced to only formal logic. ―Stories are enactments of the whole
mind in concert with itself‖ (Fisher, Human Communication as Narration 68). Coherence
for Fisher, then, is not simply fact and logic, but also value.
Coherence tests whether a given narrative seems logically in line with the values
of the culture at-large and the culture‘s history. Fisher holds that for a story to be
coherent or probable, the story has to be reasonable as well as reflect the logic of values
of that culture:
Obviously some stories are better stories than others, more coherent, more ―true‖
to the way people and the world are—in perceived fact and value. In other words,
some stories better satisfy the criteria of the logic of good reasons, which is
attentive to reason and values … the paradigm is a ground for resolving the
dualisms of modernism: fact-value, intellect-imagination, reason-emotion, and so
on. (Human Communication as Narration 68)
Narrative coherence is postmodernity‘s answer to modernity‘s scientific, formal logic.
Shaping the narrative, then, becomes not only a matter of reasoning with members of a
foreign public, but of telling stories that take into account their values, histories, and
collective imaginations to shape the narrative from a place of coherence and fidelity.
Narrative fidelity is the second component of Fisher‘s narrative paradigm. ―The
principle of coherence brings into focus the integrity of a story as a whole, but the
principle of fidelity pertains to the individuated components of stories—whether they
represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for
belief or action‖ (Human Communication as Narration 105). Narrative fidelity, for
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Fisher, is the way a story rings true in answering the ethical question, ―How ought a
given value affect the way human life together moves forward?‖ Fisher says:
The definition I offer says that a good reason is a warrant for a belief, attitude, or
action and the value of a value lies in its relevance, consistency, and consequence,
and the extent to which it is grounded on the highest possible values. Put another
way, a value is valuable not because it is tied to a reason or is expressed by a
reasonable person per se, but because it makes a pragmatic difference in one’s life
and in one’s community. (Human Communication as Narration 111)
Fisher moves the idea of value away from a tie to reason or the person expressing the
value and instead places value and narrative fidelity at the heart of rhetoric—in praxis
decisions about the best course forward for a community.
Fisher‘s narrative paradigm marked an important turn in the field of
communication and rhetoric. Moving away from a rational-world paradigm, his narrative
theory is a standard for understanding human communication as rhetorical narrative, not
as formal logic. Moreover, his contributions of narrative coherence and fidelity open the
study of narrative to local, vernacular understandings of logic and rationale, positioning
the individual participant in the narrative differently, requiring their implication in the
stories in order to understand in a more nuanced way than a removed, modern treatment
of logic and rationale would offer.
Narrative in Community
Arnett also deals with narrative in his work. Arnett‘s scholarship situates narrative
as essential to human life together in a postmodern moment and as the cornerstone for
postmodern community life generally. Arnett‘s work offers fresh perspective for
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scholarship on postmodern public diplomacy and foreign relations by introducing a voice
for philosophy of communication through the metaphor of community as diplomats
engage situated, local community narratives in their public diplomacy work. Arnett‘s
ideas are engaged here through two concepts: narrative as tied to community and
narrative rationality as rooted in tradition.
Recognizing the importance of postmodernity to narrative and its place in
community life, Arnett offers that, ―To recognize the importance of story does not require
embracing a hegemonic metanarrative; an emphasis on story acknowledges the presence
of both good and bad stories, in which embedded agents meet the given and offer change
in the public arena‖ (Dialogic Confession 37). In a postmodern world characterized by
narrative contention, Arnett‘s work understands narratives as particular and situated
within petite, local public spheres, not a modern monolithic public sphere.
Moreover, Arnett and Arneson hold that, ―Metanarrative assumes a uniform virtue
system, which the project of postmodernity has revealed as impossible‖ (52). For Arnett,
while no metanarrative can exist in postmodernity, particular narratives are tied to public
community, which provides a philosophical center for stories and practices after the
collapse of universal virtue systems. Arnett argues that, ―A narrative, a story of a people
or an organization, can provide a common center that can pull people of difference
together‖ (Dialogic Education 20-1). Furthermore, the concept of public is necessarily
linked to narrative in Arnett to the point that he argues that the quality of narrative is
causal of the quality of public life:
In short, the richness of our public life in an age of diversity may depend on the
quality of our narrative life. It is this insight that guides Bellah et al. in The Good
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Society. They discuss rhetoric as the key to rediscovering the notion of the ―good
society,‖ a narrative in the midst of a complex world. Rhetoric becomes the
vehicle for making good arguments and holding organizations together by ideas.
(―Communication and Community‖ 44)
Arnett does not advocate for a notion of narrative that reifies and codifies life. Instead,
his notion is a rhetorical one, recognizing that some narratives are good and some are
bad, and he argues that the praxis of rhetoric helps a community decide which narratives
to allow to guide human life together as they engage in the ongoing rhetorical process of
building, maintaining, and changing their narrative.
Moreover, for Arnett, the idea of community is counter to the Enlightenment idea
of individualism similar to that of Bellah et al., when they say in Habits of the Heart:
We described a language of individualistic achievement and self-fulfillment that
often seems to make it difficult for people to sustain their commitments to others,
either in intimate relationships or in the public sphere. We held up older
traditions, biblical and civic republican, that had a better grasp on the truth that
the individual is realized in and through community; but we show that
contemporary Americans have difficulty understanding those traditions today or
seeing how they apply to their lives. We called for a deeper understanding of the
moral ecology that sustains the lives of us all. (5)
Arnett argues that a radically individualistic culture that does not attend to—or cannot
attend to—issues of community and tradition will collapse human communicative life.
The idea of community in postmodern narratives takes on further currency for
Arnett in that postmodernity understands public spheres as petite, localized, and
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vernacular. By their nature, petite public spheres cannot include everyone, and such is the
view of community for Arnett. Against cosmopolitanism where a given narrative would
suit everyone, Arnett says, ―Community is better comprehended as a double-bladed knife,
cutting simultaneously in the directions of inclusion and exclusion‖ (―Communication
and Community‖ 36). For Arnett, communities that meet the needs of all people are an
unrealistic fiction.
Narrative is necessarily tied to the notion of community in Arnett‘s work. In
communities individuals find an alternative to an individualistic narrative. The health of
public communities is a direct effect of the health of the narratives. The narratives that
guide communities are not hegemonic or reified, but in postmodernity are more like
petite narratives that give life to localized, vernacular public spheres.
Arnett‘s work, like the work of other narrative scholars, also introduces the idea
of tradition. Arnett makes explicit that narrative rationality is located in and of the
tradition. Like Hans-Georg Gadamer, the issue of foregrounding one‘s present horizon is
reciprocal in that it necessarily elucidates the past from which it is foregrounded.
Tradition and history are not fixed ideas for Gadamer from which the present is set apart
from, but instead are experienced as a tension between the text of the tradition and the
present (304-305). Against an Enlightenment concept of rationality as a formulaic, outthere-to-be-grasped, uniform way of knowing the world, Arnett holds that rationality is
particular to a given tradition within a community based on a present rationality situated
in all the historicity of tradition. He says, ―Without a story-laden tradition there is no
rationality. Rationality is a modern construct assuming universal agreement on basic
presuppositions that situate and provide background for interpretation (―Hannah Arendt‖
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79). For Arnett, the self is only understood through a return to tradition in postmodernity
and the turning away from Enlightenment individualism. Whether traditions are religious,
ethnic, or social, individuals find themselves enmeshed in myriad narratives after
modernity.
Arnett holds that with the ascendancy of progress to the zenith of modern ideals,
―The movement from tradition to modernity‘s confidence in progress made the ground
under one‘s feet—tradition—irrelevant. Tradition became irrelevant and the self became
the focus of attention‖ (―Hannah Arendt‖ 73). In modernity, the idea of tradition stood in
the way of progress and mobility, and in postmodernity, tradition reemerges as plural
traditions, or ―petite narratives‖ (Lyotard 60). Traditions, as Arnett appropriates them for
postmodernity, are petite, localized narratives that situate one in community. Arnett‘s
voice contributes to thinking on narrative by offering that in a postmodern moment
characterized by lack of metanarrative hegemony, local community is essential to the
health of narratives. Moreover, like Gadamer, he suggests that traditions should be
understood as living, rhetorically managed, maintained, and changed cultural and
narrative goods that allow for a petite anchor in a postmodern world.
Poiesis and Creativity in Narrative
The QDDR calls for narrative shaping from a deep and involved understanding
and engagement of culture through human relationships. Arneson‘s work provides an
opening through which to understand narrative as poetics. Her ideas about poiesis and
creativity open an entrance for postmodern public diplomacy that positions narrative in
the creativity of language. This posture calls diplomats to engage individuals in
postmodern public spheres by understanding the richness of the particular canon of the
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culture—its stories, art, music, and other linguistic constructs that guide the story of a
particular public life. The discussion of her work here centers on the metaphor of poiesis.
Arneson offers that ―Poiesis is a way of creatively ‗making,‘ participating in the
world. The ambiguity, questions, and gaps in a poetic narrative supply hermeneutical
potential for understanding‖ (208). Discussing the implications of Martin Buber‘s
Hasidic tales as poetic narratives to illustrate Jean Gebser‘s integral consciousness,
Arneson places poiesis at the gap in understanding between two people, thereby offering
a way, through poetic narrative, to understand a culture or tradition. Arneson further
suggests that poetic narratives draw people toward ―existential experience of human
relationships. They focus on individual characters and how the characters are transformed
through the event(s)‖ (207). The inherently creative nature of human language for
Arneson suggests that poiesis can be one of the best ways to understand a group‘s
narratives. Moreover, the poetic nature of the telling of human stories opens the door to
understanding cultural narratives in music, the visual arts, and literature.
Hermeneutic potential and individual transformation through events are two touch
points Arneson offers for understanding narratives and how they shape the lives of the
individuals involved. If one considers hermeneutics as the interpretation of a text,
Arneson‘s work offers that the formal imperfections in human narratives open a space for
potential understanding. Working from the premise that human stories—as well as
systems of human stories—are inherently riddled with Arneson calls ambiguity and gaps,
an outsider looking to understand and participate in a narrative may find entrance points
into narratives not only through the poetic structure of the narrative, but because of it.
Arneson‘s work calls attention to the concept that because narratives are based in poiesis
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and creativity, they live outside formal structures and instead undulate and move with
imperfection, gaps, and misunderstandings. Those points of ambiguity and imperfections
of human creativity make it possible for entrance into participation with and influence of
narratives.
Moreover, Arneson‘s work agues of Gebser that poetic narratives compel people
to understand life existentially. More than understanding a narrative formally, based on
an austere, removed modern analysis of a narrative, Arneson suggests that the nature of
narratives as a form of poiesis requires people to be implicated in personal, human
relationships in order to understand a narrative. Arneson‘s contribution to narrative
theory is that the very nature of human relationships that make up narratives should be
understood as having their basis in poiesis with all the human gaps, misunderstandings,
and imperfections that a strictly rational or formal understanding of narratives would
prohibit.
Narrative‘s Importance for Community Diplomacy in Postmodern Public Diplomacy
This chapter considered the QDDR‘s call to shape the narrative from a philosophy
of communication perspective. Understanding that call as important for 21st century
postmodern public diplomacy, the diplomat must understand that shaping the narrative is
an essentially rhetorical call. Beyond understanding narrative as rhetorical, the diplomat
must be able to engage in communicative praxis with a philosophically textured
understanding of the concept of narrative. Considering the work of Ricoeur, MacIntyre,
Fisher, Arnett, and Arneson, this chapter drew specific metaphors for engagement from
each of these scholars‘ work.
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Ricoeur‘s work on narrative attends to three metaphors pertinent for public
diplomacy in postmodernity: time, narrative identity, and selfhood. Ricoeur argues that
through narrative, time is reconfigured from the Enlightenment, scientific concept of
clock time back to human time. As human beings tell and retell stories, time becomes
wrapped up in narrative. Understanding history and human experience in this mode of
time, diplomats are discouraged from the temptation to view the history of a culture as
reified and not implicated in the daily life of the community. Narrative identity, for
Ricoeur, is the idea that a person‘s identity is discovered through narrative. In other
words, for Ricoeur an examined life is a narrated life.
Selfhood, then, for Ricoeur, is only possible in and through community. As
individuals are called into self from birth, their selfhood is enmeshed in myriad narratives
that give their lives meaning. While avoiding a deterministic approach to self-as-given,
Ricoeur offers that the choices an individual makes that dictate selfhood are given from
the traditions and narratives they are implicated in beyond their choice. As diplomats
understand the centrality of reclaiming narrative in postmodernity as an alternative to
Enlightenment rationality, and as they engage the centrality of narrative to time in
Ricoeur‘s argument, diplomats should also understand individuals through their place in a
narrative and selfhood as a product or outgrowth of narrative.
Ricoeur offers much to the diplomat charged with shaping the narrative. His work
on time, narrative identity, and selfhood provides a depth and richness to diplomatic
engagement that has not yet been recognized by the diplomatic establishment. Ricoeur‘s
conception of time calls the public diplomacy practitioner to engage in history
differently: not as a rehashing of dates in a disembodied linear fashion, but as narratives
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whereby the members of a given public experience time and history as lived stories. As
stories affect the human conception of time, diplomats would be wise to engage in
understanding (in order to shape) a narrative as Ricoeur would: by understanding that
one‘s experience of time and being is bound up in a set of stories, not that stories are set
in a reified time and space.
When a diplomat understands a narrative not as a reified story set against a
backdrop of scientific time, narrative identity comes to the fore. To shape the narrative,
public diplomacy professionals should understand that shaping the narrative through the
lens of identity is tied to that narrative. Members of a culture are not disassociated from
the stories that give their lives meaning, but are implicated deeply in those stories
understood through the constant ongoing re-creation of culture in lived, experienced,
human time. Kearney notes that, ―Narrative identity operates at the level of both
individual and communal identity‖ (―Narrative Imagination‖ 182). Ricoeur‘s work calls
the postmodern public diplomacy professional to attend to both individual and
community identity as inextricably linked.
Narrative identity also offers ethical implications for the public diplomacy
practitioner. Narrative identity implores diplomats to understand both themselves and the
members of a foreign culture, whose narrative they are trying to shape, as subjects whose
self-knowledge lies not in a narcissistic ego or dogma, but instead lies situated in the
narratives of the culture. To shape a narrative, diplomats need to understand how identity
is tied to narrative and not assume an individualistic self that understands itself outside
the narrative. To shape the narrative is to shape people‘s identities and their experience of
the world.
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Moreover, Ricoeur offers a praxis, action-oriented touch point for those charged
with shaping narratives in his concept of self-as-agent. To shape a given narrative,
diplomats should understand the two-fold nature of selfhood. Ricoeur is concerned not
with the self-same, but instead with the self as constructed consciously by members of a
public by participation in, and creation of, narratives. To understand how best to shape a
narrative, diplomats should be attentive to how shaping the narrative will affect
members‘ sense of self. David D. Brown offers, ―One experiences ‗belonging‘ to the
extent that one is able to interweave interpretations of the self with the interpretations of
others through narrative discourse. Such a notion of belonging sheds light on the
phenomena of political consciousness and social movements‖ (109). For Ricoeur,
narrative discourse is how people come to adopt political commitments and form their
political and social selves. Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy should
understand the fundamental tie between a narrative and one‘s conception of self. To do so
will help diplomats be attentive to the ethics of self implicated in shaping a given
narrative and will allow them to consider ways to shape a narrative that are generous and
attentive to the idea of narrative self as they seek to shape both the narratives of members
of foreign publics as well as the narratives of foreign publics at-large.
MacIntyre‘s work on narrative is central to public diplomacy in a postmodern
world. First, his work, like the State Department‘s QDDR, is a response to modernity and
its attendant bureaucracy and relegation of the self and narrative to the fringes.
MacIntyre‘s call is also one for attentiveness to narrative in postmodernity. He lays out a
nested conception of narrative of the self as situated in practices and practices as given
currency in tradition. Tradition provides the means for the individual to discover their
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narrative self. The self is implicated in and given birth in tradition, but the ongoing
renegotiation of the tradition is in the practices the individual engages in in search of their
narrative self. The self is, above all, a rhetorical process attendant to the situatedness of
the story.
Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy can texture their understanding of
how to shape the narrative by understanding the nature of story MacIntyre puts forth. In
many cultures where American diplomats work, Enlightenment individualism does not
enjoy the philosophical throne it does in the West, particularly in America.
Understanding that in many places across the globe, people live with a much stronger
sense that who they are is tied to their role. This is what MacIntyre conceives of as
practices—action tied to excellence bound up in the notion of the fulfillment of purpose
or function, reminiscent of the classical Greek conception of arête (Liddell and Scott). In
many cultures where the diplomat may be attempting to shape the narrative,
understanding narrative as the self situated in practices may offer a hermeneutic entrance
into understanding a given narrative.
Moreover, understanding tradition not as a set of reified cultural practices like
Thanksgiving dinner or the giving of Christmas gifts, but understanding traditions as
living rhetorical safeguards of a community allows a second entrance into how the self
may be conceived of. When looking to understand and shape narratives, diplomats should
be attentive to tradition as the locus of understanding one‘s personal narrative in the
grander scheme of community narrative. After having strengthened person-to-person
relations in a petite and vernacular public sphere, diplomats should be trained to see those
individuals with whom they have forged relationship as having identities situated in the
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larger framework of living cultural traditions that are undergoing ongoing rhetorical
maintenance, change, and negotiation.
Fisher‘s work opens up the conversation for postmodern public diplomacy by
situating narrative theory against the rational-world paradigm of the Enlightenment and
modernity. Calling attention to rationality as situated within the two-fold paradigm of
how a story hangs together and whether or not a story rings true to the community,
Fisher‘s work moves rhetorical decision-making and understanding the lived reality of
people together in the world from a formal, rational model to a narrative model.
Specifically, Fisher‘s work is important for understanding a postmodern call in the
QDDR to shape the narrative because he thinks otherwise than modernist, data-driven
scientific methods for measuring communication and instead thinks in terms of stories to
understand human life. Postmodern public diplomacy fronts narrative as central to policy
decisions in an age where socio-political data is no longer enough to craft effective
foreign policy for a world where the public sphere is not characterized by a monolithic
conception of the public as an entire nation-state.
Moreover, in order to shape the narrative, public diplomacy professionals should
evaluate the narrative based on a rhetorical understanding of logos, not a technical one.
Having strengthened people-to-people relationships, diplomats can engage particular,
vernacular stories through those relationships to shape the narrative from a narrative
paradigm, as participant, as opposed to a detached observer in the rational-world
paradigm. Postmodern public diplomacy views narrative the same way—to shape
narrative effectively, diplomats can no longer rely on formulaic and bureaucratic means
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as a way to think about persuasion, but must instead understand both the coherence and
fidelity of a given narrative.
To properly execute the QDDR‘s mandate to shape the narrative, diplomats need
to be attentive to narrative coherence in the stories of a culture in order to understand
them well enough to shape the narrative by telling stories that have narrative fidelity.
Public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern moment would be well-served by diplomats
who, having built strong people-to-people relationships, spend time inside a public,
listening to the narratives that make up that public‘s culture. While fact and logical
consistency make up a good deal of the narrative coherence, Fisher‘s work calls
diplomatic professionals to not only be attentive to those elements that also exist in the
rational-world paradigm, but also to the rhetorical logic particular to the narratives of a
given culture. Fisher essentially democratizes communication by arguing that common
sense in story-making lies with everyone because storytelling is the central tenet of
human being. Public diplomacy professionals, then, should not look strictly to opinion
leaders, but also to the common and vernacular stories of a culture that give value to
everyday life.
The QDDR‘s directive to shape the narrative is a postmodern call. Postmodern
public diplomacy is consistent with Fisher‘s narrative paradigm in its attentiveness to
particular and situated rhetorics and cultures as products of human communication, and
postmodern public diplomacy does not seek to understand them only on the basis of
scientific ways of knowing the world. Public diplomacy professionals can look to
Fisher‘s work for guidance in understanding human life‘s cultures, institutions, and
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practices as essentially the products of human beings who understand and build their
world through storytelling.
Being attentive to both how the stories of a culture make sense and ring true will
allow the diplomat to implicate him or herself in the stories in order to understand and
influence those narratives that make up a culture. Similarly, in shaping the narrative,
being attentive to the particular values, emotions, and cultural imagination at work in
narratives, public diplomacy practitioners enter a humanistic, rhetorical understanding of
culture that assesses narratives and shapes the narratives of petite, vernacular public
spheres not from a place of policy crafted on a formulaic, sociological understanding of a
culture, but on a rhetorical understanding of the stories that shape a public. Attending to
the QDDR directive to shape the narrative is a rhetorically rich turn that sets postmodern
public diplomacy apart from earlier 20th century iterations of public diplomacy.
Arnett understands narrative as tied to community and rationality as situated in
tradition. Arnett provides a philosophical treatment of communication for the diplomat to
understand narrative as tied to community and against an individualistic rendering of the
term. Moreover, Arnett offers a rationality that, like Ricoeur, MacIntyre, and Fisher, is
situated within the narrative. Understanding the logic is a narrative matter.
Public community is not conceived of in modernist terms as a monolithic public of a
nation-state, but instead as situated in particular traditions that give a vernacular
community shape. These are the kinds of postmodern communities diplomats will engage
as they look to understand and shape narratives.
Over and against Bellah‘s conception of American ―rational, technical, utilitarian,
ideology‖ (xiv) frames that yield a wealth of information, tradition instead centers the
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diplomat otherwise. Understanding of tradition in cultural contexts alien to a diplomat‘s
own is bound to be more effective when the frames of reference through which the
diplomat is seeking to understand the tradition are commensurate with the tradition. This
is what Arnett means when he argues that rationality is within the tradition. To
understand a tradition, one must think with the tradition. To shape a narrative in a public
community, that is to say, to change the direction of a narrative in a public sphere,
diplomats need to engage from inside the tradition they wish to change (inasmuch as
possible). This requires deep understanding of language and culture, but not only that:
person-to-person relationships as the QDDR has called for, allow an entrance into selfimplication within a tradition.
Arneson encourages diplomats charged with shaping the narrative to approach the
poetic narratives of a culture as offering spaces of engagement to understand and shape
narratives. As diplomats strengthen person-to-person relationships, taking heed of the
poetic narratives of a culture—those ambiguous stories that open space for interpretation
and encounter—is paramount. To shape the narrative, a diplomat must understand the
narrative, to the greatest extent possible, from with inside the tradition, and by paying
close attention to what Arneson calls poetic narrative, ask questions and propose ideas
that might shape the larger community narrative toward policy goals. The goal of public
diplomacy in shaping the narrative in postmodernity is to engage the voices of all
stakeholders in shaping the larger community narrative toward American foreign policy
goals.
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Conclusion
Narrative theory across all the philosophers of communication discussed in
Chapter 4 offers consistent ideas and themes for the diplomat working in the field to
shape the narrative of a given public. First, diplomats‘ work in this area should be
informed by an understanding that in postmodernity, metanarratives no longer enjoy the
same centrality they once did. Therefore, diplomats should be attentive to the localized,
petite narratives they engage. Moreover, understanding people is a matter of
understanding the community in which they live and build their lives. History, story, and
self in postmodern narratives are tied to the notion of community. No longer (at least in
most cases) is history, story, and self tied to large monolithic institutions like the Church
or the nation-state. Instead, people operate and find their identities in the narratives of
communities and vernacular, local public spheres. Public diplomacy policy should be
formulated around this understanding of narrative.
Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy should also shift their thinking
about rationality to rationality-in-tradition, that is to say that rationality becomes
rationalities particular to narratives. While a minimal reasonableness as human beings
exists, gone is the era of conceiving of rationality as a given universal. Understanding
rationalities as particular to their narrative or tradition, diplomats can avoid the
Enlightenment impulse to evaluate the merit of a narrative on an assumed universal
rationality that lies outside of the given narrative.
In Chapter 5, I introduce the term public diplomacy 2.0 to describe the particular
iteration of postmodern public diplomacy being practiced by American diplomats around
the world today as a result of the second rhetorical turn in American diplomacy
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championed by the State Department under Rodham Clinton‘s tenure. The chapter will
engage a case study of a State Department community diplomacy initiative that is
highlighted as a particular success of postmodern public diplomacy in the QDDR. The
program brought together members of different vernacular public spheres on either side
of the Catholic-Protestant sectarian divide in Northern Ireland for mutual benefit of both
groups as well as American policy goals. The case study will incorporate the theoretical
work of Chapters 3 and 4 to show how State Department programs can be buttressed by
diplomats with fluency not only in foreign languages and policy briefings, but in how
philosophy of communication relates to strengthening people-to-people relationships and
shaping the narrative.
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CHAPTER 5
Public Diplomacy 2.0 at Work: Community Diplomacy in Northern Ireland
The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR; United
States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development)
cites several examples of community diplomacy success stories, which this project counts
as a central element of postmodern public diplomacy. Community diplomacy as part of
postmodern public diplomacy outreach to strengthen personal relationships across
cultures and shape narratives showcases the unique approach of the efforts of the
Rodham Clinton State Department. The approach is a public diplomacy iteration that
combines 20th century public diplomacy, or ―simply the conduct of foreign policy by
engaging with a foreign public‖ (Cull 3) and track two diplomacy, which is ―unofficial,
informal action between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop
strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways
that might help to resolve the conflict‖ (Montville 162). Whereas the focus in track two
diplomacy lies more with the decision-makers and leaders of public spheres (Cull),
postmodern public diplomacy‘s community diplomacy programs offer an area of
synthesis between public diplomacy and track two diplomacy. Like postmodern public
diplomacy tactics, community diplomacy starts at the grassroots—by building person-toperson relationships with common individuals in the public sphere to influence the
narrative from the ground up—instead of the leaders of policy. Like track two diplomacy,
community diplomacy programs organize human and material resources to better human
life and resolve a particular conflict in a postmodern moment.
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This project‘s contribution to the conversation taking place at the intersection of
communication scholarship and diplomacy research is the identification and definition of
what I call ―public diplomacy 2.0.‖ The idea of public diplomacy 2.0 emerged as a
specific core competency of the State Department in the second rhetorical turn in
American diplomacy under the tenure of Rodham Clinton, but has yet to be formally
identified. Public diplomacy 2.0 is a particular postmodern iteration of public diplomacy
that is attentive the cacophony of voices and variety of emergent public spheres. Because
public diplomacy 2.0 recognizes that there are many competing narratives in a given
nation in postmodernity, its practice is centered on the QDDR‘s specific call for public
diplomacy officers to engage the world as practitioners of rhetoric. Moreover, its tactics
are new: through public diplomacy initiatives like town hall meetings and community
diplomacy programs, public diplomacy 2.0 engages locally, recognizing that
understanding vernacular publics and local narratives is increasingly important for
American diplomats to effectively promote American policy objectives, secure peace,
and spread democratic ideals in a postmodern moment.
This chapter will look at community diplomacy as a tactic of public diplomacy
2.0 in Northern Ireland that sought to carry out the QDDR‘s directives to strengthen
person-to-person relationships between individuals on either side of the sectarian divide,
and by extension, to shape the narrative in a way that promoted women‘s empowerment
and economic development in areas of the country historically underserved as a result of
the Troubles. First, the chapter will explore public diplomacy 2.0 and its community
diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland in terms of promoting women‘s empowerment
and fostering economic growth. Next, the chapter will sketch an overview of the history
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of Northern Ireland, both before and during the Troubles that lasted from the late 1960s
to the late 1990s, as well as discuss American involvement in the Good Friday Peace
Treaty of 1998. Last, the chapter will apply the theoretical work on Coordinated
Management of Meaning and narrative to build a praxis example of how rhetorical theory
and philosophy of communication can provide theoretical ground from which to practice
in the new field of public diplomacy 2.0.
Public Diplomacy 2.0: Community Diplomacy in Northern Ireland
The QDDR offers that, ―Our diplomatic and consular posts are on the front lines
of community diplomacy—connecting directly with communities across the globe to
showcase America‘s values and build relationships with people and governments with
whom we share common interests‖ (United States Department of State and United States
Agency on International Development 64). Particularly, the community diplomacy
initiatives undertaken by the American foreign policy establishment in Northern Ireland
have focused on economic development, educational attainment, and equal opportunities
for marginalized groups like women.
Community diplomacy programs are central to public diplomacy 2.0, especially in
their ability to give practical, real-world traction to strengthening people-to-people
relationships and shaping the narrative. Specifically, community diplomacy programs are
efforts by the American diplomatic establishment to engage locally by creating and
managing programs that help the particular community in which they are based. As an
extension of such programs, ideals like prosperity and equality are promoted in the
service of American foreign policy goals. Moreover, community diplomacy programs
carve out a space for praxis application of rhetorical theory and philosophy of
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communication. The case study here will apply CMM and narrative theory to the specific
community diplomacy programs undertaken in Northern Ireland after the Troubles.
Focusing on two central themes in the State Department‘s initiatives, this section will
discuss how American community diplomacy programs have benefited economic growth
in a part of Ireland disadvantaged by the Troubles. Second, this section of the chapter will
discuss how the involvement of the State Department has helped to bolster the fight for
equal opportunity for women in Northern Ireland.
Economic woes have been central to Northern Ireland since the beginning of the
Troubles. As the strife wore on through the late 1970s and 1980s, much of an entire
generation of Irish young people lacked the requisite education necessary to create a
viable economy with sustained growth, and several programs were put into effect near the
end of the Troubles to combat the problem:
The Clinton administration also pledged to expand transatlantic partnerships
between mid-level companies and to support community regeneration at the micro
level through assistance to small businesses. … Later, the Clinton administration
played an important role in the passage and implementation of the Walsh Visa
Program, which gives young, unemployed Irish people three-year US work visas.
The primary objective is for participants to acquire skills in growth industries that
would bring economic regeneration to their communities when they returned
home. (Wilson 23)
These efforts to engage young people in the revitalization of their own communities was
part of a larger economic package, including grants and direct financial aid to the
government of Northern Ireland.
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After the administration of President Bill Clinton, the 2000s saw the continuation
of efforts to revitalize the economy of Northern Ireland come under the purview of
diplomacy initiatives. In his article, ―An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern
Ireland Conflict,‖ Colin C. Jennings argues that diplomacy has to be as much political as
economic, citing that economic disenfranchisement among various groups of people in a
given political climate contributes greatly to violence and unrest, even when a cease-fire
is in place. Economic woes and their attendant violence necessitated the continued work
of development through American diplomacy in Northern Ireland.
The QDDR cites its development successes in Northern Ireland:
our Consulate in Belfast is building a network of local citizens who have
participated in programs sponsored by the United States. Connections forged by
the Consulate have already had an impact across the province…two groups of
alumni have established a Northern Ireland public service mentoring partnership
[to help develop skills in the youth population for the revitalization of the
economy]. (United States Department of State and United States Agency on
International Development 64)
Mentorship programs and job skills training programs through American cooperation are
the community diplomacy tactics the QDDR cites to underscore the State Department‘s
commitment to economic viability in Northern Ireland.
As Rodham Clinton marked the end of her tenure as Secretary of State, she
continued to underscore the importance of public diplomacy initiatives to the continued
growth and viability of the Northern Irish economy:
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Mrs Clinton … plans to discuss the trilateral US-Ireland Research and
Development Partnership and economic opportunities for Northern Ireland. Later
Mrs Clinton will take part in an event hosted by The Ireland Funds—a global
fundraising network supporting programmes of peace and reconciliation, arts and
culture, education, and community development in Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland. (BBC News Northern Ireland)
Rodham Clinton‘s commitment to the economic growth and viability of Northern Ireland
is a dual-track diplomacy. In addition to formal diplomacy mentioned by the BBC News
Northern Ireland, above, Rodham Clinton‘s approach to the question of economic growth
and sustainability in Northern Ireland is also advanced by public diplomacy 2.0 initiatives
in local, mentoring programs. Building and strengthening people-to-people relationships
between diplomats and locals, as well as between Protestant and Catholic locals, helps
shape the narrative that guides economic development in that area of the country.
Rodham Clinton‘s posture of engaging a postmodern turn in public diplomacy in
the development of economic community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland has
aligned with traditional diplomacy there:
These jobs are not just numbers. They represent opportunities for people,
particularly young people, to be able to feel a strong connection with and make a
stake in the future that we‘re all so supportive of seeing. … The Envoy‘s office
also launched the U.S.-Northern Ireland mentorship program, placing young
people from Northern Ireland in American companies for one-year internships. …
And finally, I want to thank everyone at the U.S. Consulate General in Belfast. I
see our Consul General there. Your team has done a great job in supporting the
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Envoy‘s office and driving economic development as one of our key
commitments. … And through conferences like these and the conversations and
collaborations that they lead to, people understand the economic potential of
Northern Ireland. (Clinton ―Remarks at the U.S.-Northern Ireland Economic
Conference)
American diplomats‘ focus on community diplomacy programs as a central feature of
public diplomacy 2.0 add another, more nuanced, vernacular layer to traditional
economic diplomacy. Community diplomacy programs that result in job training and
mentorship programs offer a local, postmodern tactic to strengthen people-to-people
relationships and shape the narrative to bolster traditional diplomacy.
Community diplomacy initiatives in Northern Ireland also focused on women‘s
empowerment as a distinct but related issue to economic development in Northern
Ireland. The QDDR cites that, ―in one case, women who had participated in different U.S.
programs have organized a community of female activists‖ (United States Department of
State and United States Agency on International Development 64). Women‘s
empowerment, both economically and politically, has been a salient priority for Northern
Ireland officials as the area moves on from the Troubles, as well as for Rodham Clinton,
as First Lady, as Senator, and as Secretary of State.
In their book, Women, the State, and War, Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P.
Williams note that during the Troubles, ―Increasing unemployment and poverty rose for
women in Northern Ireland; it was that degradation of life coupled with the generally
harsher conditions exacerbated by the troubles that contributed to the growth of women‘s
political activism‖ (158). During the Troubles, women‘s issues became so salient—in
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terms of economic empowerment, educational attainment, and political activism—that
their importance trumped sectarian issues and women‘s groups began to connect across
the religious divide. A 2006 article in The Economist noted that women in the working
class in Northern Ireland tend to have the lowest paid unskilled jobs, regardless of
whether they are Catholic or Protestant (―Northern Ireland: Still Troubled‖). This means
that working-class women often have more in common with each other, even if of a
different ethno-religious background, than they do with women of their same background
in a higher social stratum, thereby giving them a basis on which to build a new narrative.
Women‘s political issues have largely been grassroots and community-based in
Northern Ireland. ―Women have been described as ‗the mainstay of community groups,‘
whose activities have helped to hold the society together through years of great
adversity‖ (McCoy 3). The main channel for women‘s political activism during the early
years of the Troubles in the late 1960s and through the 1970s was through engagement in
community groups, not in official political capacities. Kaufman and Williams note:
One of the characteristics that sets Northern Ireland apart is that regardless of how
active women might be in their respective communities, which is often their base
for political involvement, on the whole, most did not and do not see their work as
―political‖ per se. … Further, in general, they did not identify their work as a
―feminist‖ response to their situation. Rather, they saw themselves in more
traditional roles, as wives/mothers/sisters, and used those roles as the rationale for
their activism, based on the need to do something or ―protect‖ their community.
(157)
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Women, viewing their roles not as political, but based on their social roles in the
community, ―recognizes the reality that women have generally been excluded from the
formal political process and the fact that they have been able to be effective political
actors nonetheless‖ (157). Indeed, the political climate as it stood in the 1960s and 1970s
prevented women from taking an active role in politics.
Kaufman and Williams note, ―As we have seen, Northern Ireland tends to be a
fairly traditional society where women‘s roles are found predominantly in the realm of
the private sphere (i.e., as wives and mothers)‖ (178). Northern Ireland was not immune
from the effects of 20th century philosophical modernity on the conflation of the public
and private spheres or the emergence of postmodernity and increased opportunities for
women‘s petite narratives to come to the fore. ―The breakdown between public and
private was foisted on the women when the private space was ‗invaded‘ and co-opted for
political purposes‖ (Rooney 171). Common factors among women on both sides of the
sectarian divide—poverty, violence, and disenfranchisement—allowed women to find a
way into the political process through community activism. As formal political
enfranchisement became more accepted in the later years of the Troubles through groups
like Women Into Politics and Northern Ireland Women‘s Coalition, women were
empowered to make a change formally with the ―eruption of women‘s issues into the
[political] arena‖ (Cockburn 78). The State Department recognized this postmodern,
vernacular exigency in Northern Ireland, and the community diplomacy programs there
have sought to invite more women into the formal political process in Northern Ireland.
At its core, women‘s enfranchisement that has flowed out of community
diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland is a shaping of the narrative away from only
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traditional women‘s roles and political spaces. The website of the American Consulate in
Belfast lists a link for ―Women‘s Rights‖ under its ―Key Reports‖ heading. The page
includes a document titled ―Women of Influence.‖ This November 2006
collection chronicles how 21 notable American women broke new ground, some by
championing equal rights for all and others by their accomplishments in fields such as
government, literature, and even in war‖ (U.S. Consulate Belfast). Public diplomacy
initiatives like this publication and programs that teach women job skills, as well as skills
that allow them to organize politically, have all been part of the American effort in
Northern Ireland to guarantee disenfranchised women the right to the political process.
Many of these programs are developed and implemented apart from one another,
with diverging tactics of how to achieve their goals. As will be discussed, communication
theory offers a philosophically informed praxis approach by which to cohere these
initiatives in a way that allows them to work in tandem with one another to both foster
economic growth and promote women‘s rights. Moreover, communication theory allows
the public diplomacy practitioner to more fully engage their call in the QDDR by working
to strengthen people-to-people relationships and shape the narrative in real, programmatic
initiatives like the ones being undertaken by the United States mission in Belfast.
Historically Situating Northern Ireland
In the early 17th century the English throne initiated the policy of planting its own
capitalist farms in Ulster (one of the four Irish provinces and roughly one quarter of the
land mass of the island), effectively instituting British rule over that part of Ireland. As a
result, landed gentry from Britain, mostly Scots, moved into the Ulster counties, claimed
ownership on the land, and built estates as gentleman farmers in Ireland. This movement
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became known as the Plantation of Ulster (Foster). The influx the British influence
brought with it Protestant Christianity in the form of Presbyterians from Scotland and
members of the Church of England from Britain. After the Williamite wars in the late
17th century, the Catholic aristocracy of the Gaelic clans left Ireland for mainland Europe,
effectively ceding economic and political power over the whole of the island to the
Protestant minority landlords (Foster). This historical point is important in understanding
the genesis of the deep sectarian divide that exists in parts of Northern Ireland today.
In the early part of the 20th century, Britain enjoyed rule over the whole of
Ireland. Several rebel uprisings were quelled by the Black and Tans—the British military,
so dubbed for the color of their uniforms—before the fighting that led Britain to grant
independence to 26 of Ireland‘s 32 counties, with the exception of six of the nine Ulster
counties that make up the British province of Northern Ireland today (claiming historical
precedence and a majority population). The history of Northern Ireland leading up to the
Troubles was a tumultuous one, even after the signing of the treaty that gave Ireland its
independence in 1921:
The decade between 1912 and 1922 was a momentous one for Ireland. Civil
conflict between north and south, where private armies were openly drilling, was
averted by the outbreak of the First World War; the Easter 1916 rising in Dublin
and the subsequent guerrilla campaign shifted the spotlight southward; the signing
in 1921 of a treaty between the British government and Sinn Fein, the political
wing of the Irish Republic Army, established a state from which Northern Ireland
opted out. These events and the first years of both new states were accompanied
by civil disorder. Belfast experienced a guerrilla campaign and sectarian conflicts.
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The new state was created in the midst of the troubles and divisions which were to
characterize its history. (Darby 19)
Civil disorder and division were common characteristics of Irish—and especially
Northern Irish—history in the years leading up to the period of unrest in Northern Ireland
known as the Troubles.
McKittrick and McVea in Making Sense of the Troubles offer that even before
open violence broke out in the late 1960s with the shift of elected power in Northern
Ireland, the area was less than peaceful. ―In what are today assumed to be quiet and
uneventful periods, even a cursory glance at the records of the time reveals a most
unsettled society‖ (1). In the 1960s, existing animosities that had been latent for decades
boiled over in the unresolved issues of nationality, religion, power, and territorial rivalry
in Northern Ireland.
The period commonly referred to as the Troubles, began in 1969 when The
Apprentice Boys of Derry, a political organization, wanted to stage a march in Derry (the
British refer to Derry as Londonderry). After some debate, the march was allowed, and
the tinderbox of political animosity erupted with skirmishes between Catholic republicans
and Protestant loyalists. The skirmishes escalated into a nearly full-scale uprising, known
today as the Battle of the Bogside, named for the Catholic enclave in the Bogside
neighborhood of Derry (McKittrick and McVea). Much like the start of World War I, a
politically tense situation erupted into full battle with one incident in a parade. After that
eruption, London decided that British military troops would be deployed to Belfast and
Derry as a safeguard. The Irish republicans viewed the British presence as foreign
military occupation and the Troubles were born.
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Moving forward from the violence of August 1969, McKittrick and McVea note
that, ―Belfast had a long history of sectarian clashes; now it was permanently and
physically scarred by ugly barricades across many of its mean streets … as years passed
and violence continued…larger and more substantial permanent brick and metal
structures were erected‖ (56). Those barriers lasted even after the Good Friday Peace
Treaty in 1998 and can still be seen in some of the more economically and sociopolitically disadvantaged areas in Belfast city where Protestant loyalists and Catholic
republicans still live with an uneasy tension.
In the 30 years of violence that ensued, several major milestones should be noted
before a discussion of American involvement (in large part due to President and First
Lady Clinton) in the peace process. Bloody Sunday of 1972 and the H-Blocks Hunger
Strikers in Long Kesh Prison in 1981 are two watershed moments of the Troubles that
reinforced the Irish call for an end to British involvement in Northern Ireland.
On January 30, 1972, British military personnel, in an effort to break up an Irish
republican demonstration in Derry that was turning violent, opened fire on the
demonstrators, killing 13—mostly unarmed teenagers—and fatally wounding another
who would die months later. A few days after the Bloody Sunday incident in Derry,
demonstrators marched on the British Embassy in Dublin, burning it down (Arthur and
Jeffrey). Diplomacy between the British and Irish was at a low point as the Bloody
Sunday events hardened the opinion of the Catholic public sphere across Ireland.
The crystallization of opinion as a result of Bloody Sunday could be seen readily
in the vernacular public sphere of young, disenfranchised Irish boys and men, whose
attitudes toward what they saw as British occupation turned so sour that the Irish
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Republican Army (IRA) saw a drastic rise in recruitment. Father Daly, who was made
famous on Bloody Sunday by a photograph depicting him waving a white handkerchief
while Catholics carried the body of a boy who had been shot by the British, is quoted as
saying:
A lot of the younger people in Derry who may have been more pacifist became
quite militant as a result of it. People who were there on that day and who saw
what happened were absolutely enraged by it and just wanted to seek some kind
of revenge for it. In later years many young people I visited in prison told me
quite explicitly that they would never have become involved in the IRA but for
what they witnessed, and heard of happening, on Bloody Sunday. (McKittrick and
McVea 77)
McKittrick and McVea go on to comment that, ―The incident had enormous
ramifications, taking a place in Irish history as a formative moment which not only
claimed fourteen lives but also hardened attitudes, increased paramilitary recruitment,
helped generate more violence, and convulsed Anglo-Irish relations‖ (77). During the
decade of the 1970s, the IRA became a household name around the world as the
organization gained more prominence as a result of Bloody Sunday and similar outbreaks
of violence, which the IRA and its sympathizers viewed as hostile acts of an occupying
foreign military.
As IRA recruitment increased, so did the arrest and jailing of members of the
paramilitary group. At times, IRA members were subject to internment without trial.
When they were offered political status, they were housed in the H-Blocks at Long Kesh
Prison, but because they were separated from the general criminal prison population,
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accommodation space and quality was lacking, and ―in many respects resembled a World
War Two prisoner-of-war camp‖ (McKittrick and McVea 137). The internment and poor
accommodations further enraged the IRA and their likeminded counterparts, and
prisoners began a series of hunger strikes.
The hunger strikes were intended to win demands from the British government
that included ―the right to wear their own clothes; no prison-dictated work; free
association; weekly letters visits and parcels, and the restoration of all remission lost as a
result of the [earlier] protests‖ (McKittrick and McVea 141). The second series of hunger
strikes began on March 1, 1981, with Bobby Sands, an IRA member who would go on to
become a martyr of the republican movement in Ireland. After more than two months on
hunger strike, Sands died on May 5, 1981, but not before being elected to Parliament as
MP (Member of Parliament) for the Fermanagh-South Tyrone Westminster constituency
after the sudden death of the MP in that seat. ―It was a propaganda victory of huge
proportions for the IRA. … Since Sands‘ victory was one of the key events in the
development of Sinn Fein as an electoral force, some observers regard it as the genesis of
what would eventually become the peace process‖ (McKittrick and McVea 143). The
ensuing two decades would see continued violence and repeated attempts to institute
some semblance of peace in Northern Ireland. American diplomacy would play a crucial
role in establishing the Good Friday Peace Treaty of 1998.
Then-President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton played a key
part in American-Northern Ireland relations during the latter years of the Troubles, and
the Clintons planned to visit Northern Ireland in December 2012 as part of Rodham
Clinton‘s farewell tour as Secretary of State:
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If the trip runs to plan, it will be a nostalgic occasion for Mrs Clinton and her
husband. The couple visited the province three times while he held the Presidency
between 1993 and 2001. Both took a close interest in the peace process and she
was well-known to open doors for Northern Ireland politicians, especially women,
in Washington. … In 1995 the two of them stood behind a bullet-proof screen to
turn on the Christmas lights in Belfast just a year after the IRA ceasefire. (Clarke)
The Clintons were very involved in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, so it should not be
surprising that the State Department‘s community diplomacy programs showcase an
initiative in Northern Ireland under Rodham Clinton‘s leadership; moreover one that
looks to improve the economic situation and the lives of women in the area.
Clinton was the first American president during the latter years of the Troubles to
highlight the situation by increased Executive and diplomatic involvement. Francis M.
Carroll says that, ―by the mid-1990s, the new American president, Bill Clinton, saw an
opportunity to intervene on the edge of events, as a neutral party, with the hope of
pushing the peace process forward‖ (211). As Clinton‘s involvement in Northern Ireland
grew, his presidency became more central to the peace process. Between 1993 and 1995,
Gerry Adams, the leader of Northern Ireland‘s Sinn Fein party (the political party of the
IRA) was granted a visa and traveled to the United States at least three times to meet with
Senator Edward Kennedy, and his sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, then-U.S. Ambassador to
Ireland (Carroll). Adams‘ visits were controversial because the British government
officially recognized Adams as a terrorist, and in an effort to not strain relations with the
Crown, the State Department advised Clinton against endearing himself so quickly to
Adams. In March 1995, Adams attended both the Speaker of the House‘s and the
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President‘s St. Patrick‘s Day parties in Washington, where he met Clinton and shook his
hand (Carroll). As Sinn Fein became more legitimized on the world stage, resorting to
guerilla tactics on the part of the IRA would become harder to justify.
Clinton‘s 1995 Christmas trip to Belfast marks a watershed moment in the
American involvement in the peace process. Carroll offers:
The president‘s visit to Northern Ireland was more than a courtesy call. It
represented a commitment to an actual Irish policy that no other administration
had been willing to attempt. Clinton had worked with all the major parties, had
met all the major leaders, and had publicly committed himself to the peace
process. (Carroll 232)
After the cease-fire in 1996, Clinton would play a major part in the intervening years to
help build the Good Friday Peace Treaty of 1998.
On April 10, 1998, a peace treaty was signed that is commonly referred to as the
Good Friday Peace Treaty, or formally, the Belfast Agreement. The agreement formally
ushered in an end to the Troubles, if not practically, then formally between the British
government and Sinn Fein. The 35-page document outlines political processes and
obligations, as well as human, social, and economic rights. Among them is ―the right to
equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability,
gender or ethnicity‖ (Belfast Agreement 20). Community diplomacy programs like the
ones highlighted in the QDDR can front any number of issues salient to a particular,
situated, vernacular community. The community diplomacy programs the State
Department undertook in Northern Ireland highlight many of the same human and social
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rights as are guaranteed in the Good Friday Peace Agreement. The QDDR highlights the
community diplomacy program in Northern Ireland this way:
As Northern Ireland continues to move beyond its troubles, our Consulate in
Belfast is building a network of local citizens who have participated in programs
sponsored by the United States. Connections forged by the Consulate have
already had an impact across the province: in one case, women who had
participated in different U.S. programs have organized a community of female
activists; in another two groups of alumni have established a Northern Ireland
public service mentoring partnership. (United States Department of State and
United States Agency on International Development 64)
After more than 30 years of violence during the Troubles, and generations of tension and
intermittent violence before the 1960s, basic rights of access to education and political
and economic empowerment are needed in many communities throughout Northern
Ireland. The State Department‘s community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland
address the most salient residual social issues from the Troubles.
The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy 2.0 for Northern Ireland
Public diplomacy 2.0 is a powerful tool for American diplomats. Rendering clear
that public diplomacy 2.0 is a specific, new iteration in postmodern public diplomacy—
and by bringing communication scholarship to bear on its practice—is critical for
success. Specifically, in heeding the State Department‘s directives to build interpersonal
relationships and influence the narrative toward American policy objectives, this section
will address those maxims in light of economic empowerment and women‘s equality in
Northern Ireland. Through the engagement of the three coordinated management of
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meaning metaphors—coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and
participant meaning—the remainder of this project will undertake an examination of, and
make recommendations for improvement of, economic viability and women‘s
empowerment. Similarly, through the metaphors or history, story, and self, this section
will examine economic and women‘s empowerment, making recommendations for public
diplomacy practitioners working on shaping the narrative toward peace, prosperity, and
democracy in Northern Ireland. Moreover, a philosophy of communication that is
attentive to interpersonal and narrative communication can bolster the work of public
diplomacy 2.0 as American diplomats engage with a postmodern world.
CMM lays out three major metaphors from which diplomats can approach their
work: coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning.
The theory is concerned with the social, communicative processes whereby human
relationships and organizations are formed, making Pearce and Cronen‘s work a good
entrance from which to engage the QDDR‘s directive to strengthen people-to-people
relationships. Concerned more about the communicative and active processes that make
up human communication and less about the products of that communication—like
culture, religion, et cetera—CMM offers praxis recommendations on how public
diplomacy practitioners can strengthen people-to-people relationships from a rhetorical
posture for the goal of building the economy in Northern Ireland.
The community diplomacy program in Northern Ireland brought together groups
of people across the sectarian divide for the purpose of job skills training in order to
strengthen the local economy in the border counties between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland. Approaching that work through the lens of social construction as a
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key component of coordinating and managing meaning, this project recommends that
community diplomacy programs take socially constructed difference seriously. Against
fronting the sectarian issues as something to be pushed aside for the sake of working
together to strengthen relationships through a concerted effort to strengthen the economy,
diplomats should look to strengthen people-to-people relationships by looking at the
issues of social construction, providing a space for a real and honest discussion of
socially constructed difference between Catholic republicans and Protestant loyalists.
Those identities of nationalism and religion are the products of a socially constructed
rhetoric, and as such, should be given proper place in community diplomacy programs
that look to use communicative theory and processes to strengthen people-to-people
relationships.
Mentorship programs should develop ways in which to engage participants in
communicative practices and action to build a new socially constructed paradigm—one
that builds from existing meaning and tradition while underscoring the importance of a
coordinated management of meaning that is attentive to difference in order to solve the
problems tradition and sectarianism has caused. Coordinated management of meaning
applied to community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland should socially construct
a new hybrid reality of economic hope and reconciliation for mentorship groups and for
women. As the programs work to bring together economically disadvantaged people from
both sides of the issue, they should use CMM to mediate and engage difference, which is
a major driver of identity in Northern Ireland, by offering a new meaning, coordinated
and managed toward the idea of economic revitalization and sustainability. For women,
particularly, CMM offers a new communication action paradigm, by which women can
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see themselves not as Protestant or Catholic, but as women, who are working to socially
construct a reality of political enfranchisement through both community groups and in
formal political affiliation within the government.
Community diplomacy programs should promote specific communicative tactics
by which to strengthen people-to-people relationships through working toward the goal
of economic growth and women‘s enfranchisement. Knowing that the products of
nationality and religion have been the major socially constructed paradigms that
contributed to the Troubles, diplomats should be attentive to them, but should be
ultimately concerned with developing a philosophy of communication that manages and
coordinates a socially constructed meaning that privileges the hope of economic
advancement and political enfranchisement and that has the power to offer a new
paradigm of what it means to be Northern Irish—on either side of the sectarian and/or
gender divide.
Pluralism in Northern Ireland is a matter of individuals understanding themselves
as Protestant, ethnically distinct Anglo-Saxons, British loyalists; or as Catholic,
ethnically Celtic/Irish, and culturally and nationally distinct from British law, culture, and
in many cases, language. In a pluralistic world, Pearce offers, ―good communication
occurs when you and others are able to coordinate your actions sufficiently well that your
conversations comprise social worlds in which you and they can live well—that is, with
dignity, honor, joy and love‖ (Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds
366). Important in a world where a given metanarrative is in decline or is contested (as in
the case of Northern Ireland), the call in the QDDR is one of engaging pluralism, where
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meaning‘s construction takes on importance as a rhetorical, social practice situated in the
ethical system of a local public sphere to promote dignity, respect, and peace.
Community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland should be coordinated on
the basis of shared common ground through the stories of economic hope or women‘s
rights. ―Different sectors of [people‘s] everyday life relate them to vastly different and
often severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience‖ (Berger, Berger, and
Kellner 64). Engaging pluralism in a CMM approach to community diplomacy in
Northern Ireland should focus on strengthening people-to-people relationships through
coordinating the stories of individual‘s minimally shared goods, like their role as women
or their economic situation. Story coordination in CMM theorizes that as actors in a
situation communicate, they coordinate the ongoing discourse in real-time, as discourse
unfolds between them and as they manage their competing commitments in a pluralistic
situation.
Story coordination in being attentive to pluralism in Northern Irish community
diplomacy programs has particular relevance for public diplomacy 2.0. As Griffin notes,
―coordination is difficult when two people have a separate sense of what is necessary,
noble, and good‖ (73). For practitioners of public diplomacy 2.0 in Northern Irish
community diplomacy programs, individuals will certainly have a separate sense of the
good. CMM would recommend that to strengthen those people-to-people relationships,
diplomats build their community programs around the minimal commonly accepted
notion of the good—that is, economic viability in Northern Ireland or that women,
whether Protestant or Catholic, share a common good in the goal of political activity.
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The third metaphor CMM offered to strengthen people-to-people relationships is
participant meaning. A common feature of all the Northern Irish community diplomacy
programs is that they engage individuals who have historically not been participants in
the life of Northern Ireland, whether politically or economically. Community mentorship
programs were developed to help those on the economic margins, particularly young
men. Women‘s programs were intended to provide a path for community organization
and local activism for women, who had historically not enjoyed as many opportunities for
political activism as their counterparts in other Western countries.
CMM‘s metaphor of participant meaning prompts diplomats to build and develop
their programs not just to help members, but to be structured to empower women and
those on the economic margins to develop meaning as active participants in the cocreation and management of their new realities of economic opportunity and equal
suffrage. The concept of participant meaning was approached through several different
CMM models. Particularly, this project‘s work on coordinating and managing meaning
fronted the idea of diplomat-as-participant—that the public diplomacy 2.0 practitioner
has a responsibility to attend to the myriad stories at work in constructing the current
reality. In Northern Ireland, this means that to strengthen people-to-people relationships
effectively through community diplomacy programs, diplomats have to become part of
the community to understand the stories of that community. The metaphor of participant
meaning in CMM theoretically buttresses Rodham Clinton‘s 2010 charge in Foreign
Affairs:
The QDDR endorses a new public diplomacy strategy that makes public
engagement every diplomat‘s duty, through town-hall meetings and interviews
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with the media, organized outreach, events in provincial towns and smaller
communities, student exchange programs, and virtual connections that bring
together citizens and civic organizations. (―Leading Through Civilian Power‖ 1516)
To strengthen people-to-people relationships, diplomats cannot be removed, disinterested
policy bureaucrats, but must be in the community, understanding the socially constructed
realities of people‘s lives in order to offer solutions to problems. They need to be
participants, encouraging members of local, vernacular communities to participate in and
shape the narrative as well.
Moreover, the participant metaphor in CMM offers a space in community
diplomacy programs for individuals to take an active communicative role in coordinating
and managing the meaning of their lives. Community diplomacy in Northern Ireland
should be developed in a way that empowers people to solve their problems and
implicates them in the ongoing work of communicatively constructing a new paradigm
through which to engage in a renewed a viable economic and political life. Community
diplomacy mentorship programs and women‘s activism programs in Northern Ireland
should approach their work by offering tools for communicative action to the people they
are intended to help, that is to say, skills that allow the strengthening of people-to-people
relationships by equipping them to engage together. In her work The Human Condition,
Arendt calls this the vita activa, which is a life of action in the community, through
communication, to philosophically address and solve problems.
Narrative theory was also engaged to examine how public diplomacy practitioners
might philosophically engage in the directive to shape the narrative. Through a discussion
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of the narrative theory work of major thinkers in the discipline, three metaphors emerge
that can inform the community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland: history, story,
and self. Diplomats‘ work in shaping the narrative should be informed by an
understanding that in postmodernity, metanarratives no longer enjoy the same centrality
they once did. Therefore, diplomats should be attentive to the localized, petite narratives
they engage. Moreover, understanding people is a matter of understanding the
community in which they live and build their lives. History, story, and self in postmodern
narratives are tied to the notion of community. No longer (at least in most cases) is
history, story, and self tied to large monolithic institutions like the Church or the nationstate. Instead, people operate and find their identities in the narratives of communities
and vernacular, local public spheres in a postmodern moment. Public diplomacy policy
should be formulated around this understanding of narrative.
History has a central place in public diplomacy practices that look to shape the
narrative. Practitioners of public diplomacy 2.0 developing and implementing community
diplomacy initiatives should shift their thinking about rationality to rationality-intradition, that is to say that rationality becomes rationalities particular to histories. While
a minimal reasonableness as human beings exists, gone is the era of conceiving of
rationality as a given universal. Understanding rationalities as particular to the history in
which the narrative is grounded, diplomats can avoid the Enlightenment impulse to
evaluate the merit of a narrative on an assumed universal rationality that lies outside of it.
In the case of both mentorships and economic development programs, calling on
members of localized, sectarian publics to set aside difference for the sake of a common
cause like economic growth will not work. Diplomats need to understand that the
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rationality of the particular situation in Northern Ireland during the Troubles was born out
of a long and painful history. Moreover, as philosophers of communication would offer,
the narrative that emerged out of that particular history, and is embedded in it, is a
narrative that makes sense and finds emotional buy-in that particular history.
In the case of women‘s narratives, understanding identity as identity-in-narrative
offers agency based in story. A person‘s identity, or their self, is both unique and constant
as well as changing in relation to others. The self‘s identity as same gives the self
temporal stability (―I am always me‖) while identity-as-agency gives the self the ability
to change in relation to others and other narratives (―I hold a different set of political
commitments than I used to‖). To encourage women‘s equality this project recommends
a Ricoeurian approach to shaping the narrative that offers agency to women by grounding
their identity in discursive practices that bring women together, not in spite of their
gender, but because of their gender. A Ricoeurian approach may help to build a narrative
around empowerment because of women‘s unique roles in Northern Irish life, regardless
of their place on either side of the sectarian divide.
MacIntyre and Arnett are also attentive to the particularities of history, story, and
self as situating the narrative. Both understand the human agent as embedded in an
already-given social construction of the world in which the agent has to search for what
they should do particular to their narrative and history. Community diplomacy programs
should retain and reinforce the particularity of each stakeholder‘s narrative standpoint in
relation to history and their community. Against changing paradigms of what groups
should value (e.g., ―economic growth‖ over ―religious and ethnic identity‖), a philosophy
of communication should encourage ownership of and pride in particular public spheres

155

and shape the narrative in a way that opens the narrative to encompass new ideas. For
example, the self might be recast in a narrative that values economic growth as a good
that flows out of Irish Catholic or British Protestant pride in the health and viability of
one‘s community. If economic growth and prosperity for Northern Ireland is the good to
be promoted and protected, diplomats can shape a cooperative narrative between the two
groups based on that minimal, particular, vernacular rationality.
Shaping the narrative in community diplomacy programs is best served by being
attentive to the rationality of particular histories, stories, and selves. Effective community
diplomacy does not emerge as a result of devaluing old narratives in an effort to create
and shape new ones, but instead builds new ethical goods identified from minimal
commitments each side holds. These minimal ethical goods are based in pride and
ownership of difference that make Northern Ireland a unique place. Good narrative
shaping in Northern Ireland comes from commitment to understanding the histories,
stories, and selves forged from very particular circumstances, including socio-economic
situation, physical location within Northern Ireland, and gender. Public diplomacy 2.0
practitioners who implicate themselves in the myriad public spheres can yield good
community diplomacy initiatives that actively and effectively shape the narrative based
on those differences and by identifying minimal ethical commitments common across
narratives.
Conclusion
This project considered how diplomats can employ communication scholarship in
carrying out the work of diplomacy 2.0—a new iteration of postmodern public diplomacy
that is attentive to rhetoric and communication. This project has argued that the State
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Department‘s conception of public diplomacy under Rodham Clinton leadership marked
a second, and explicitly postmodern, rhetorical turn in American diplomacy out of which
my term ―public diplomacy 2.0‖ grows. Moreover, an overview of American diplomacy
history, a consideration of major differences between modernity and postmodernity, as
well as theoretical work in the field of rhetoric and communication laid the groundwork
for this intersection of scholarship between rhetoric and diplomacy.
In chapter 1, four terms were historically central to situating the argument that the
Rodham Clinton State Department marked a second, postmodern rhetorical turn in
American diplomacy with their 2010 QDDR. The terms ―state,‖ ―public,‖ ―diplomacy,‖
and ―public diplomacy,‖ provided a background for understanding the call to attend to
interpersonal and narrative communication theory. By juxtaposing Rodham Clinton‘s
work against conceptions of the public, the state, and diplomacy in the early-to-mid 20th
century, she was established as a postmodern diplomat in Chapter 2. Moreover, the State
Department‘s mandate in the QDDR to strengthen people-to-people relationships and
shape the narrative marks an explicit communicative and rhetorical component in
contemporary American diplomacy. Chapter 3 brought interpersonal communication
theory to bear on the QDDR‘s maxim to strengthen interpersonal relationships. By
applying Pearce and Cronen‘s CMM theory and identifying major metaphors, this chapter
offered a praxis application for the public diplomacy 2.0 practitioner. Similarly, Chapter
4 introduced narrative theory work across the communication and rhetoric discipline to
inform how public diplomacy professionals can philosophically engage with their work.
Community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland were highlighted in the
QDDR. They sought to bring together people across the sectarian divide for the
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strengthening of the local and regional economy, and for promoting women‘s rights.
Specifically, Chapter 5 introduced the field of public diplomacy 2.0 as a new iteration of
postmodern public diplomacy whose ground is in the scholarship of rhetoric and
communication. The chapter then applied the philosophical work undertaken in Chapters
3 and 4 and offered recommendations that public diplomacy practitioners—as
philosophic generalists—can use to engage their work in strengthening people-to-people
relationships and shaping the narrative.
Rhetorical theory and philosophy of communication are important to international
relations and diplomacy, and central to public diplomacy 2.0. This project works on the
assumption that diplomacy and international relations are essentially rhetorical and
communicative ways of building a world, and as such, the study of diplomacy can benefit
from rhetorical scholarship. The work undertaken in this project to develop public
diplomacy 2.0 promotes peace, human rights, and a more democratic world. Those
qualities—peace, human rights, and democracy—can find a source of hope for their
postmodern fulfillment through public diplomacy 2.0‘s anchor in the field of
communication and rhetoric.
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